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The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warns that tax 
avoidance and tax evasion threaten government revenues throughout the world.  In light of 
the OECD‘s call for greater transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, the 
South African Revenue Service (SARS) required a more aggressive reporting system.  
Consequently, the new reportable arrangements provisions were introduced in sections 
80M to 80T of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended, (the Act) and replaced the 
former section 76A on 1 April 2008. 
 
This study focuses on one such reportable arrangement provision, namely section 
80M(1)(d).  If the following requirements of section 80M(1)(d) are met, an arrangement is 
reportable: 
 
1. An ―arrangement‖ (as defined) is entered into, 
2. A ―tax benefit‖ (as defined) is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived, 
3. By any ―participant‖ (as defined) by virtue of that arrangement and 
4. The arrangement does not result in a reasonable expectation of a ―pre-tax profit‖ (as 
defined) for any participant. 
 
Although a ―pre-tax profit‖ is defined, the concept of a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-
tax profit‖ is, regrettably, not defined in the Act, it has not been considered by our courts 
(in the context of reportable arrangements) and SARS has not issued any guidance or an 
Interpretation Note as to the application of section 80M(1)(d).  The objective of this study 
is therefore to conduct a critical analysis of the language of section 80M(1)(d) in order to 
determine its nature and scope.     
 
Due to this lack of local case law and implementation guidelines, the legislation and court 
cases of other countries must therefore be considered.  In light of the Constitutional 
principles of interpretation, South African courts are allowed to consider comparative, 
foreign law.  Canada‘s Income Tax Act contains a ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ 
(REOP) test which has been developed over 70 years of research and court cases and 













80M(1)(d).  Consequently, the Canadian REOP test is examined so as to identify objective 
guidelines for the application of section 80M(1)(d).   
 
The analysis of the wording in section 80M(1)(d), together with the objective guidelines 
identified in the Canadian REOP test, are incorporated in the development of a workable 
model that could be utilized by South African taxpayers in the identification and 
application of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.  The accuracy, completeness 
and usability of the proposed model are tested in a survey conducted among the tax 
partners at a sample of leading audit and legal firms. 
 
The results from the survey indicate that the overwhelming majority of respondents 
considered the proposed model to be more accurate, user-friendly and helpful than the 
model provided by SARS.  Also, the vast majority of respondents found the Canadian 
objective guidelines helpful in determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-
tax profit‖ requirement in section 80M(1)(d) is met. 
 
A section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement must be disclosed in terms of section 80O.  
Any participant to such an arrangement who fails to comply with the disclosure obligation 
shall be liable to a penalty of R1 million in terms of section 80S.  It is therefore of the 
utmost importance that taxpayers fully understand the precise meaning of the requirements 
of section 80M(1)(d).  It is hoped that the results from this study will assist in affording 
taxpayers greater clarity on the identification and application of the reportable 
arrangements provisions.  The workable model proposed in this study could be of value to 
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“A reporting system was necessary to uncover innovative corporate tax products that 
effectively cost the tax system hundreds of millions of Rand annually.” 
 


















1.1.1  Tax Evasion 
 
An important distinction must be drawn between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  Tax 
avoidance is characterised by open and full disclosure, where a taxpayer has arranged his 
affairs in a perfectly legal manner whereby he has either reduced his income or he has no 
income on which tax is payable.  Tax evasion, on the other hand, is characterised by fraud 
and deceit. It refers to all those activities deliberately undertaken by a taxpayer to free 
himself from the tax that the law charges upon his income.  Examples include the 
falsification of returns and the conclusion of sham transactions (De Koker 2010:par19.1). 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) warns that tax 
avoidance and tax evasion threaten government revenues throughout the world (OECD 
2011:3).  In many developed countries the sums run into billions of  Euros and developing 
countries lose vital revenue through tax evasion. This translates into fewer resources for 
infrastructure and affects the standard of living for many in both developed and developing 
economies.   
 
The OECD has initiated a global forum on the transparency and exchange of information 
for tax purposes.
1
 The forum correctly observes that although globalisation generates 
opportunities to increase global wealth, it also results in increased risks. The increases in 
cross-border flows that come with a global financial system require more effective tax 
cooperation. The OECD (2011:3) notes that: 
 
―Better transparency and information exchange for tax purposes are key to ensuring that taxpayers 
have no place to hide their income and assets and that they pay the right amount of tax in the right 
place.‖ 
                                                     
1
  The aim of the Global Forum is to ensure that all jurisdictions fully implement the international standards 














The South African Revenue Service (SARS) concurs with the OECD and acknowledges 
that the inevitable delays between the conclusion of the transactions, the submission of the 
related annual returns, and the return‘s assessment and audit mean that years may pass 
before the transactions are detected, analysed and challenged (SARS 2008).  According to 
SARS (2008), one measure to improve response times, and which is increasingly being 
adopted worldwide, involves the advance reporting of transactions meeting criteria that 
indicate that they may give rise to concern. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum on the Revenue Laws Amendment Bill of 2003 explains 
that a reporting system was necessary to uncover innovative corporate tax products that 
effectively cost the tax system hundreds of millions of Rand annually (SARS 2003).  This 
reporting system (in the form of the first reportable arrangements provisions) was designed 
to counter tax evasion and to serve as an aggressive anti-avoidance tool.  The special 
reporting rules were introduced to the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962, as amended, (the 
Act) by section 76A and came into effect on 1 March 2005. 
 
Section 76A was repealed on 1 April 2008 and replaced with a new Part IIB, inserted into 
the Act by section 6(1) of the Revenue Laws Second Amendment Act No. 21 of 2006.  
Part IIB contains sections 80M to 80T and will apply to any arrangement entered into with 
effect from 1 April 2008.  Sections 80M to 80T are hereafter collectively referred to as the 
―reportable arrangements provisions‖. 
 
According to a media release issued by SARS, the main purpose of the new reportable 
arrangements provisions is to counter tax abuse more speedily (SARS 2008).  SARS also 
stated that the number of transactions previously reported (under the former section 76A) 
was disappointing.
2
  In addition, some taxpayers raised technical points to avoid reporting 
or restructured their transactions to avoid the triggers for reporting.  As such, when SARS 
adopted the new General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR)
3
 in 2006, it granted them the 
opportunity to also revise the reportable arrangements legislation (SARS 2006a). 
 
                                                     
2
  According to the media release, fewer than 150 transactions, most of them involving well known hybrid 
instruments, were reported in the 25 months the legislation was in force. 
3













1.1.2  Reportable Arrangements 
 
A reportable arrangement is defined in section 80T of the Act as any arrangement 
contemplated in section 80M.  Such an arrangement must be reported to the Commissioner 
of SARS (the Commissioner) within 60 days in terms of the disclosure obligation of 
section 80O. 
 
Sections 80M(1) and (2) identify arrangements which are considered to be reportable to the 
Commissioner and section 80N(1) contains a list of arrangements that are specifically 
excluded from the reportable arrangements provisions.  Reportable arrangements can be 
classified into two categories.  One category is contained in section 80M(2) and refers to 
hybrid equity instruments, hybrid debt instruments and any arrangement identified by the 
Minister by notice in the Government Gazette as an arrangement which is likely to result in 
any undue tax benefit.   
 
The other category is contained in section 80M(1) and relates to arrangements that result in 
a tax benefit (as stated in the introductory requirement of section 80M(1)) and meet the 
requirements of one of five scenarios found in sections 80M(1)(a) to (e).   
 
One such scenario is the reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit requirement as 
contained in section 80M(1)(d), which is the focal point of this study.  The Act defines an 
arrangement as a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement if: 
 
―any tax benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant by virtue of that 
arrangement and the arrangement  does not result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for 
any participant.‖ 
 
Therefore, if the following requirements are met, the arrangement is reportable in terms of 
section 80M(1)(d): 
1.     An ―arrangement‖ (as defined) is entered into, 
2.     A ―tax benefit‖ (as defined) is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived, 
3.     By any ―participant‖ (as defined) by virtue of that arrangement and 
4.   The arrangement does not result in a reasonable expectation of a ―pre-tax profit‖ (as 













1.2  Problem Statement 
 
The ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ is a concept as a whole that was 
introduced to the Act for the first time on 1 April 2008.  Some of the elements of the 
requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement (as listed in paragraph 1.1.2 
above) are defined in section 80T of the Act.  Although a ―pre-tax profit‖ is defined, the 
concept of a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ is, however, not defined anywhere 
in the Act. 
 
This concept as a whole, in the context of reportable arrangements, has not appeared in 
South African law and has never been considered by our courts.  Furthermore, SARS has 
not issued any guidance or an Interpretation Note as to the application of section 
80M(1)(d).  The only guide currently issued by SARS is outdated as it still refers to the 
scrapped section 76A.  On 31 March 2010, SARS issued an updated Draft Guide to 
Reportable Arrangements for public comment (SARS 2010).  Since then, more than a year 
has passed and the Draft Guide has not been revised nor issued in its final format.  It will 
be seen in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 that the Draft Guide contains numerous anomalies and 
that the model developed by SARS for the application of the reportable arrangements 
provisions is flawed. 
 
As a result of the aforementioned, it is submitted that any interpretation regarding the 
meaning of the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ concept will be subjective, 
meaning that the view of any person interpreting this concept will be his own subjective 
view. It will be shown in Chapter 3 that this subjective interpretation could lead to 
considerable uncertainty in practice regarding the correct identification and application of a 
section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement (see, for example, SAICA 2004a, 2007a, 2007b, 
2008 and 2010a).   
 
As such, determining when arrangements should be reported to SARS remains both 
problematic and onerous.  South African taxpayers therefore still require easily 
understandable, objective standards against which to apply the ―reasonable expectation of a 














Due to this lack of local case law and implementation guidelines, the legislation and court 
cases of other countries must therefore be considered.  In the original Reportable 
Arrangements Guide, SARS (2005) refers to the international tax position regarding tax 
disclosure requirements.  One of the countries that is specifically mentioned in this guide is 
Canada, as it has well developed reportable transaction legislation in the form of tax shelter 
rules.  Moreover, following an extensive Internet and LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet 
search of comparative tax law, Canada appears to be the only country with tax legislation 
containing a similar requirement to South Africa‘s ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax 
profit‖. 
 
Section 248(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act (ITA) prohibits the deduction of personal 
and living expenses and refers to a ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ (REOP) test in 
determining whether or not an expense is for business or private purposes.  This test is 
long-established, resting on 70 years of research and court cases which helped Canadian 
taxpayers to formulate objective standards against which to apply their REOP test. 
 
It will be seen from the rules of interpretation discussed in Chapter 3, that, because the 
wording of the Canadian REOP test is similar to the wording contained in section 
80M(1)(d) of the Act, South African courts may consider applying the Canadian REOP test 
to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.   
 
1.3.  Research Objective 
 
The objective of this study is to conduct a critical analysis of the language of section 
80M(1)(d).   
 
Examining the meaning of the wording contained in section 80M(1)(d) will assist in 
determining the nature and scope of section 80M(1)(d).  This, together with the objective 
guidelines identified in the Canadian REOP test, will assist the development of a workable 
model that could be utilized by South African taxpayers in the identification and 
application of section 80M(1)(d) to an arrangement.  The accuracy, completeness and 
usability of the proposed model will be tested in a survey conducted among tax partners at 













1.4.  Importance and Value of the Research 
 
A section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement must be disclosed in terms of section 80O.  
Any participant to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement who fails to comply with 
the disclosure obligation shall be liable to a penalty of R1 million in terms of section 80S.  
It is therefore of the utmost importance that taxpayers and tax planners fully understand the 
precise meaning of the requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
A critical analysis of the wording of section 80M(1)(d) will establish the definition of the 
theoretical constructs to be used in the research.  The outcome of the detailed literature 
review will serve as a theoretical underpinning for the development of a workable model to 
assist South African taxpayers in the identification and application of section 80M(1)(d) to 
an arrangement. 
 
This workable model will serve as an aid to prevent taxpayers from spending valuable time 
and money on obtaining expensive tax advice to determine whether the ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of section 80M(1)(d) is met.  Moreover, by 
applying the proposed model, taxpayers could be prevented from incurring unnecessary 
costs in order to comply with the disclosure obligation when in fact they were under no 
obligation to report such an arrangement.   
 
The research findings resulting from the literature study, as well as the empirical study, 
will give more certainty to South African taxpayers by providing them with a clearer 
picture as to the correct identification and application of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable 
arrangement. 
 
The proposed research has already resulted in an article which was published in Meditari 
Accountancy Research, Volume 18(2) of 2010.
4
  The article, titled Applying the Canadian 
―reasonable expectation of profit‖ test to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement, 
submitted that the Canadian REOP test may be applied to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable 
                                                     
4
  Written permission to use the published article‘s sources and research findings in this dissertation was 














arrangement and may be of value in formulating objective standards against which to apply 




1.5.  Research Design, Method and Scope 
 
This study is qualitative by nature and specifically adopts an interpretive approach, which 
seeks to develop understanding through detailed description and to develop theory or build 
models which can be tested empirically in later research (Cooper & Schindler 2011:162). 
 
Although the research is mainly qualitative in its approach, it also has a positivist 
underpinning, as it is based on the broad premise that an ideal norm or standard exists 
against which to identify and apply the requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable 
arrangement (Stiglingh 2008:19).  The study does not merely seek to understand, but to 
develop a model based on an ideal standard. 
 
The main outcome of the research is the development of a workable, usable model that 
could be used by South African taxpayers in the identification and application of a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
Both a literature study and an empirical study will be performed.  As the analysis of 
section 80M(1)(d) of the Act can be done with reference to already published data, the 
literature study will consist of a literature review of both foreign and local statutory laws, 
court decisions and published articles and textbooks.  The outcome of the literature review 
will serve as a theoretical underpinning for the development of the proposed workable 
model. 
 
                                                     
5  This article, however, only focused on some aspects of one of the chapters in this dissertation.  Chapter 4 
of this study examines the suitability of the Canadian REOP test in order to identify objective factors 
which may be applied in South Africa.  The chapter is an in-depth study on the origin and development of 
the Canadian test and the problems that have been encountered by Canadian taxpayers over the years.  The 
chapter also seeks to address some of these problems to enhance the applicability of the test in a South 
African environment.  Lastly, the study compiles a comprehensive list of objective factors that may be 














The completeness, accuracy and relevance of the model as well as the objective factors 
identified in the literature study to address the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ 
requirement, will be tested by a self-administered questionnaire to be completed by tax 
partners at a sample of leading audit and legal firms.  The results of both the literature and 
empirical studies will be used to ensure that the proposed model is indeed logical, 
workable and usable. 
 
The study will focus on a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.  The other four 
scenarios in section 80M(1)(a), (b), (c) and (e) fall outside the scope of this study.  The 
specific arrangements contained in section 80M(2) will also not be addressed in this study.  
 
Section 80N(1) of the Act contains four categories of arrangements that are specifically 
excluded from the reportable arrangements provisions.  The Minister has also excluded by 
way of notice in the Government Gazette (No. 30941 of 1 April 2008, Volume 514) any 
arrangement where the tax benefit from the arrangement: 
 
 does not exceed R1 million; or  
 is not the main or one of the main benefits of the arrangement. 
 
The excluded transactions fall outside the scope of this study, but the requirements of 
section 80N will be addressed briefly in order to facilitate understanding when section 
80M(1)(d) does not apply to an arrangement. 
 
1.6.  Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The main outcome of the present research takes the form of a dissertation.  A discussion of 
the structure of the dissertation is provided below. 
 
1.6.1  Chapter 2:  History and Development of Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the development of section 80M(1)(d) from its 
initial inception as section 76A on 1 March 2005 to its current format as part of the 













Due to the fact that courts often refer to the legislative history of a provision, it may be 
useful to compare the wording of the previous legislation to that of the current section 
80M(1)(d) as an aid in interpreting the wording of section 80M(1)(d). 
 
1.6.2  Chapter 3:  Examining the Language of Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the definitions and interpretations attached to the 
words contained in section 80M(1)(d) in order to determine their meaning.  This will firstly 
be done by observing their ordinary, grammatical meaning and thereafter by looking at the 
meaning the courts have ascribed to them.  The interpretation rules regarding foreign law 
will also be discussed.  This will assist in analysing the Canadian REOP test. 
 
Examining the meaning of the words in section 80M(1)(d) will aid in determining the 
nature and scope of section 80M(1)(d) and will also assist in applying the objective factors 
used in the Canadian REOP test. 
 
1.6.3  Chapter 4:  Examining the Reasonable Expectation of Profit (REOP) Test in 
Canada 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to compile a comprehensive list of objective factors used 
by Canadian tax practitioners in applying the REOP test.  This will assist in addressing the 
subjective nature of the wording of section 80M(1)(d).   
 
Chapter 4 explores the legislative history and development of the REOP test and discusses 
a number of practical problems that were encountered by Canadian taxpayers.  The 
objective factors identified in this chapter will be incorporated in the development of the 
workable model proposed in this study. 
 
1.6.4  Chapter 5:  Developing a Workable Model for the Identification and 
Application of a Section 80M(1)(d) Reportable Arrangement 
 













usable guide for South African taxpayers in the identification and application of a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
Chapter 5 first analyses the model developed by SARS and thereafter discusses the seven 
questions posed in the workable model developed in this study.  The chapter also examines 
the effect of section 80M(1)(d) on an arrangement, viz. the disclosure obligation in terms of 
section 80O as well as the penalty that could be levied in terms of section 80S. 
 
1.6.5  Chapter 6:  The Empirical Study 
 
Chapter 6 tests the completeness, accuracy and relevance of the proposed model as well as 
the objective factors identified in the literature study to address the ―reasonable expectation 
of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement.  This will be done by means of a self-administered 
questionnaire to be completed by the tax partners at selected audit and legal firms.   
 
This chapter describes the data collection method and process, the design of the data 
collection instrument (the self-administered questionnaire) and provides a statistical 
summary of the responses.   
 
1.6.6  Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the main research findings of each chapter in the 
dissertation.  Suggestions for areas of future research are provided and the chapter ends 
with a few concluding remarks. 
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an introductory discussion of the scope of the present research.  
The structure of the dissertation in achieving the stated objective was also considered.  The 
next chapter examines the history and development of section 80M(1)(d) as a starting point 


















History and Development of Section 












“… it is admissible for a court in construing a statute to have regard … to the 
history of the law and from the circumstances applicable to its subject matter.” 
 


















Those who don‘t know history are destined to repeat it.
6
 It is a well-known maxim that past 
behaviour is the best indicator of future actions.  In order to better understand the impact of 
a new statute, it is useful to analyse its history and development.  This way one can better 
understand the ―bigger picture‖ when the statute is viewed within its proper context. 
 
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the development of section 80M(1)(d) from its 
initial inception as section 76A on 1 March 2005 to its current format as part of the 
reportable arrangements provisions in sections 80M to 80T.  The tax disclosure rules of the 
United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA) and Canada, as well as the 




When it comes to interpreting statutory provisions, courts often refer to the legislative 
history of that statutory provision.  Solomon JA stresses the importance of the legislative 
history in Dadoo Ltd v. Krugersdorp Municipal Council (1920) [at paragraph 554]: 
 
―It is true that owing to the elasticity which is inherent in language it is admissible for a court in 
construing a statute to have regard not only to the language of the Legislature, but also to its object 
and policy as gathered from a comparison of its several parts, as well as from the history of the law 
and from the circumstances applicable to its subject matter.‖ 
 
De Koker (2010:par25.9) states that in order to ascertain the meaning of a provision, a 
court may have regard to its history and the form in which it appeared in earlier Acts.  
Examples of cases in which the court found recourse to the history of a provision, include 
the following: CIR v. Simpson (1949),
7
 New Union Goldfields Ltd v. CIR (1950),
8
 Buglers 
                                                     
6
  A quote by Edmund Burke, British Statesman and philosopher of the 1800s. 
7
  In which Watermeyer CJ went fully into the history of section 7(2) (then section 9(2)) of the Act in order to 













Post (Pty) Ltd v. SIR (1974),
9
 CIR v. Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd (1993),
10
 and COT v. F 




Meyerowitz (2008:par3.37) explains that when the legislature inserts an amendment into 
an existing act and, in so doing, clearly indicates the meaning of the context in which the 
amendment must be read, that meaning is the meaning of the context.  The position is 
therefore the same as if the enactment had originally been passed in the form in which it 
now stands.  He furthers notes that previous legislation cannot be invoked as an aid in 
construction unless the relevant provisions are ambiguous. 
 
The previous legislation may therefore be useful as an aid in interpreting the wording of 
the current provision.  As such, the next paragraph will examine the precursor to section 
80M, viz. section 76A, as well as the surrounding circumstances, or reasons, for the 
introduction of section 80M(1)(d), as rationalized by SARS. 
 
2.3  Section 76A of the Act 
 
Chapter 1 delineated the distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance.  It was noted 
that SARS required a more robust reporting system to counter tax evasion and to serve as 
an aggressive anti-avoidance tool.  This reporting system (in the form of the first reportable 
arrangements provisions) was introduced to the Act by section 76A which came into effect 
on 1 March 2005. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
profits or gains.  He said [at paragraph 282], that the answer ―was to be found in the history of the 
provision‖. 
8
  In which the court tried to find the meaning of the words ―distributed by way of dividend‖.  The court 
examined the history of the taxation of the undistributed profits of companies in order to discover its 
nature and purpose. 
9
  In which the court considered the scope of the words ―in respect of‖ by examining the legislation preceding 
the then paragraph 12(1)(d) of the First Schedule to the Act. 
10
 In which Nicholas AJA examined the use of the word ―actually‖ in ―actually incurred‖ in successive 
Income Tax Acts. 
11
  In which the court examined earlier income tax legislation in Zimbabwe since 1922 and found that the 













In terms of section 76A of the Act, every company or trust which derives or will derive a 
tax benefit in terms of a ―reportable arrangement‖ must report the arrangement to the 
Commissioner, at such place as the Commissioner may determine, within 60 days after the 
date that any amount is first received or accrues to any person or is paid or actually 
incurred by any person in terms of that arrangement.  A ―reportable arrangement‖ means: 
 
 any arrangement in terms of which  
- the calculation of interest as defined in section 24J, finance costs, fees or any 
other charges is wholly or partly dependent on the tax treatment of that 
arrangement; 
- provision is made for the variation of that interest or those finance costs, fees or 
any other charges should the actual tax treatment differ from the anticipated tax 
treatment (otherwise than by reason of any change in the provisions of the Act) 
or should the anticipated tax treatment be challenged by the Commissioner; and 
- the potential amount of the variation contemplated exceeds R5 million; 
 arrangements identified by the Minister by notice in the Gazette which are likely to 




Failure to report, in the case of wilful or reckless failure, results in a penalty not exceeding 
the tax benefits.  Other failures to report result in the stricter application of the general anti-
avoidance section 103 of the Act. 
 
Section 76A was an anti-avoidance section introduced to impose reporting rules for 
transactions that contained indicators of potential tax avoidance (Zulman, Stretch & Silke 
2008:parR17).  In its Reportable Arrangements Guide, SARS (2005) sets out the reasons 
as to why section 76A was introduced in the Act.  They are as follows: 
 
1.  The Commissioner will be able to evaluate the reportable arrangements from an anti-
avoidance point of view at an early stage of the implementation thereof; 
 
                                                     
12
 A tax benefit, as defined in former section 76A(1)(b), means any reduction in or postponement of the 
liability of a person for any tax, duty,  levy, charge or other amount in terms of any Act administered by 













2.   SARS is enabled to be proactive in respect of tax avoidance; and 
 
3.  Although various provisions in the Act enabled the Commissioner to request further 
information or detailed returns with respect to any matter from taxpayers,
13
 these 
existing procedures had certain limitations.  These limitations were that: 
 
(a)  The provisions were not sufficiently proactive due to the fact that the information 
was only obtained once the taxpayer had filed its return; and 
(b)  The provisions did not properly describe what was meant with ―structured finance‖ 
transactions. 
 
Section 76A was designed to address these deficiencies and to act as an early warning 
system to the Commissioner as to the type of tax structuring taking place in the market.  
Due to the fact that SARS refers to the international tax position in the Reportable 
Arrangements Guide (SARS 2005), it might be useful to refer to the tax disclosure rules of 
these overseas countries.  This will perhaps assist in placing the South African reportable 
arrangements provisions in a global context and might aid in the interpretation of the 
meaning of the words contained in section 80M(1)(d).  Accordingly, a brief summary of 
the disclosure rules of the UK, USA and Canada is provided in Annexure B. 
 
2.4  The New Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act 
 
As was stated in Chapter 1, section 76A was repealed on 1 April 2008 and replaced with a 
new Part IIB, inserted into the Act by section 6(1) of the Revenue Laws Second 
Amendment Act No. 21 of 2006.  Part IIB contains sections 80M to 80T and will apply to 
any arrangement entered into with effect from 1 April 2008.   
 
In order to better understand the evolution from section 76A to the new section 80M(1)(d), 
section 80M(1) must be regarded as a whole.  Please refer to Annexure A for the wording 
of the whole of section 80M(1).  Due to the fact that the courts may have regard to a 
statute‘s history and the form in which it appeared in earlier Acts in order to determine the 
                                                     
13
  These information gathering powers were contained inter alia in the then sections 66, 69, 74A, 74B and 













meaning of the statute, the next paragraph will compare the wording of the former section 
76A with the wording of the current section 80M(1)(d). 
 
2.5  Comparison of Section 76A and Section 80M(1)(d) 
 
Table 2.1 (on the following page) provides a comparison of the wording contained in 
sections 76A and 80M(1)(d).  Wording that is similar is indicated in bold text. 
 
The only similarity with the previous section 76A definition of a reportable arrangement 
(in section 76A(1)(a)) is found in section 80M(1)(a), whereby the calculation of interest is 
dependent on the tax treatment of the arrangement.  In terms of section 76A, the 
arrangement was reportable if the variation of that interest exceeded R5 million.  In terms 
of section 80N, the arrangement already becomes reportable if the tax benefit exceeds            
R1 million (or is not the main or one of the main benefits of the arrangement).  By 
decreasing the amount by which an arrangement becomes reportable, the scope and 
application of the reportable arrangements rules have considerably widened. 
 
The definition of a ―tax benefit‖ also remained mostly similar.  In section 76A(1)(b) a ―tax 
benefit‖ was defined as a reduction in or postponement of a liability for tax, whereas in 
section 80T it is defined so as also to include the avoidance of any liability for tax.  The 
requirement of the ―anticipated‖ tax treatment fell away. 
 
By extending the list of specifically reportable arrangements from one type of transaction 
in section 76A to five types of transactions in section 80M(1), the Commissioner has now 
greatly expanded the application of the reportable arrangements provisions.  The idea, 




















Table 2.1:  A comparison of section 76A and section 80M(1)(d) 












 (i) the calculation of interest as 
defined in section 24J, finance 
costs, fees or any other charges is 
wholly or partly dependent on the 
tax treatment of that 
arrangement; 
 
(ii) provision is made for the 
variation of that interest or those 
finance costs, fees or any other 
charges should the actual tax 
treatment differ from the anticipated 
tax treatment (otherwise than by 
reason of any change in the 
provisions of the Act) or should the 
anticipated tax treatment be 
challenged by the Commissioner; 
and 
 
(iii) the potential amount of the 
variation contemplated exceeds R5 
million. 
An arrangement is a reportable 
arrangement if it is listed in 
subsection (2) or if any tax benefit is 
or will be derived or is assumed to 
be derived by any participant by 





contains provisions in terms of 
which the calculation of interest as 
defined in section 24J, finance 
costs, fees or any other charges is 
wholly or partly dependent on the 
assumptions relating to the tax 
treatment of that arrangement 
(otherwise than by reason of any 
change in the provisions of this 
Act or any other law administered 








Amounts excluded in section 80N 
(by way of notice in the Gazette, nr 
30941 of 1 April 2008): 
The tax benefit does not exceed R1 
million or is not the main or one of 
the main benefits of the 
arrangement. 
Tax benefit Section 76A(1)(b): 
Any reduction in or postponement 
of the liability of a person for any 
tax, duty, levy, charge or other 
amount in terms of any Act 
administered by the Commis-
sioner based on the anticipated tax 
treatment of the arrangement. 
Section 80T:  
Includes any avoidance, 
postponement or reduction of any 
liability for tax. 
“Tax” includes any tax, levy, duty 
or other liability imposed by this 
Act or any other Act administered 
by the Commissioner. 
Reasonable 
expectation 
of a pre-tax 
profit 
None Subsection (d): 
Does not result in a reasonable 














The reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit requirement, as contained in section 
80M(1)(d), certainly did not evolve from the former section 76A.  The ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ is a concept as a whole that was introduced into the Act for 
the first time on 1 April 2008.     
 
It is interesting to note that SARS is also silent on comments made specifically relating to 
the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement.  In a Response Document 
released by SARS on 31 October 2006, all the written commentary (other than as noted 
below) made by the various industry role-players were responded to by the Portfolio 
Committee on Finance and SARS (either by noting, accepting or rejecting the comments).  
However, on page 16 of the Response Document, the Banking Association of South Africa 
(BASA) made a comment to which SARS did not respond.  Instead, and somewhat 
ominously, SARS left an open space and continued on page 17 with the next comment and 
response.  The comment made by BASA reads as follows (SARS 2006b:17): 
 
―Transactions are reportable where there is no reasonable expectation of pre-tax profit. This measure 
turns on its head a substantial body of tax law, which holds that tax expenditures do not have to be laid 
out in the expectation of profit.  Indeed, the number of transactions that have no such immediate intent is 
vast. This provision condemns all of these transactions with all of the onerous requirements that this 
entails.‖ [own emphasis]. 
 
It will become clear in Chapter 3 that BASA did, indeed, make a valid comment.  Even 
though most of the wording in section 80M(1)(d) is defined in the Act, it will be seen in 
Chapter 3 that there could be much uncertainty in practice as to the application of section 
80M(1)(d) to an arrangement.  This lack of response by SARS (and the lack of objective 
guidelines or an Interpretation Note), further necessitates the examination of the meaning 




















2.6  Conclusion 
 
The previous disclosure requirements of section 76A were introduced in 2005 to provide 
SARS with a more pro-active tool against tax avoidance.  However, the number of 
transactions that were actually reported thereafter was disappointing. As a result, SARS 
introduced the new reportable arrangements provisions of sections 80M to 80T on 1 April 
2008.   
 
It was determined, by a comparison of the wording contained in sections 76A and 
80M(1)(d) that the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement did not evolve 
from previous legislation.  Devenish (1992:133) states that before a prior Act (i.e. section 
76A) can serve as a guide in the interpretation of a later Act (i.e. section 80M(1)(d)), the 
two Acts must be ―kindred legislation‖.  This requires that they must deal with identical 
subject matter, not merely give effect to a single policy. 
 
Therefore, because section 76A and section 80M(1)(d) do not contain similar wording, the 
repealed section 76A cannot be used to assist in the interpretation of section 80M(1)(d).  
This, together with the lack of objective guidelines from SARS, further strengthens the 
submission that will be made in Chapter 3, namely that the Canadian REOP test may be 
applied to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
Having explored the development of section 80M(1)(d), it is now necessary to determine 
the meaning of the words contained therein.  Chapter 3 will therefore analyse the language 
of section 80M(1)(d), as this will assist in determining the nature and scope of section 
























Examining the Language of Section 












“The process of interpretation therefore starts with the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of words, but should never end with it.” 
 


















The meaning of words is of extreme importance in statutory construction, as is evidenced 
by Smalberger JA in Public Carriers Association and Others v. Toll Road Concessionaries 
(Pty) Ltd and Others (1990) [at paragraph 942I]: 
 
―The primary rule in the construction of statutory provisions is to ascertain the intention of the 
Legislature. It is now well-established that one seeks to achieve this, in the first instance, by giving 
the words of the enactment under consideration their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do 
so would lead to an absurdity so glaring that the Legislature could not have contemplated it.‖  
[Own emphasis]. 
 
Devenish (1992:289) warns, though, that it must never be assumed that even if the ordinary 
meaning of words used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, such ordinary meaning is the 
legal meaning.  He states that the words must be read in light of their immediate linguistic 
context as well as their wider legal and jurisprudential context.  Devenish thus summarises 
the approach that will be followed in this chapter: 
 
―The process of interpretation therefore starts with the ordinary grammatical 
meaning of words, but should never end with it.‖ 
 
Kellaway (1995:92) states that meaning must be given to every word where the context 
lends itself to it.  The cardinal rule that effect must be given, where possible, to every 
word, unless necessity or absolute intractability of language dictates otherwise, emanates 
from the English case of The Queen v. Bishop of Oxford (1897).  In CIR v. Golden Dumps 
(Pty) Ltd (1993) the court noted that although surplusage and tautology is not wholly 
unknown in a statute, a statute is never supposed to use words without meaning.  Kellaway 
(1995:92) comments that the reason for this is that it must be supposed that the law-giver 
will choose its words carefully in order to express its intention correctly and will therefore 














It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the definitions and interpretations attached to 
the words of section 80M(1)(d) in order to determine their meaning.  Each term contained 
in the general requirement of section 80M(1), subsection (d), as well as the exclusions 
provisions of section 80N -  whether defined in section 80T or not -  will be examined in 
turn. This will firstly be done by observing their ordinary, grammatical meaning and 
thereafter by looking at the meaning the courts have ascribed to them.  The impact of the 
relevant proposals of the Tax Administration Bill and the Draft Taxation Laws 
Amendment Bill will also be considered. 
 
Examining the meaning of the words in section 80M(1)(d) will aid in determining the 
possible nature and scope of section 80M(1)(d) (refer to Chapter 5) and will also assist in 
applying the objective factors contained in the Canadian REOP test (refer to Chapter 4). 
 
3.2  Background 
 
As section 80M(1)(d) is a subsection of section 80M(1), the general requirement of section 
80M(1) must first be met.  Section 80M(1) states that an arrangement is a reportable 
arrangement if: 
 
―any tax benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant by virtue of that 
arrangement‖. 
 
If the introductory requirement of section 80M(1) is met, the requirement of subsection (d) 
must then be considered: 
―does not result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any participant.‖ 
 
Therefore, if the following requirements are met, the arrangement is reportable in terms of 
section 80M(1)(d): 
 
1. An ―arrangement‖ (as defined) is entered into, 
2. A ―tax benefit‖ (as defined) is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived, 
3. By any ―participant‖ (as defined) by virtue of that arrangement and 
4. The arrangement does not result in a reasonable expectation of a ―pre-tax profit‖ (as 













As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ is a 
concept as a whole that was introduced into the Act for the first time on 1 April 2008.  
Some of the elements of the requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement 
(as listed above) are defined in section 80T of the Act.  Although a ―pre-tax profit‖ is 
defined, the concept of a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ is, however, not 
defined anywhere in the Act. 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 1 that this concept as a whole has not appeared in South 
African law and, in the context of reportable arrangements, has never been considered by 
our courts.  Furthermore, SARS has not issued any guidance or an Interpretation Note as to 
the application of section 80M(1)(d).  The only guide currently issued by SARS is 
outdated, as it still refers to the scrapped section 76A.   
 
On 31 March 2010, SARS issued an updated Draft Guide to Reportable Arrangements for 
public comment (SARS 2010).  The Draft Guide, which seeks to address the new 
reportable arrangements provisions, has not been issued in its final format and no response 
document to public commentary has been released by SARS yet.
14
  Therefore, more than a 
year after the release of the Draft Guide, there is still no finalised, updated guide available 
to address the new reportable arrangements provisions. 
 
As a result of the aforementioned, it is submitted that any interpretation regarding the 
meaning of the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ concept will be subjective, 
meaning that the view of any person interpreting this concept will be his own subjective 
view.  This subjective interpretation could lead to considerable uncertainty in practice (as 
will become evident in the rest of this chapter), regarding the correct identification and 
application of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.   
 
De Koker (2010:par25:16) states that the interpretation by SARS of any provisions of the 
Act will not influence the courts to place a construction upon that provision that the 
language of the section will not allow.  The court noted, however, in ITC 1572 (56 SATC 
175) [at page 186] that: 
                                                     
14 In e-mail and telephone correspondence with SARS‘ Legal & Policy Division, SARS could not confirm if 













―Departmental practice is not necessarily, of course, an indication of what the law means.  
However, it seems to me that the departmental practice is a very sensible approach to what should 
be done in this type of case.  Plainly the procedure and the practice laid down by the Commissioner 
in that regard, is, if nothing else, commercial wisdom and good sense.‖ 
 
In light of the above, even though SARS has not released an Interpretation Note or even a 
finalised, updated guide that refers to the amended reportable arrangements provisions, the 
Draft Guide might give an indication of the meaning of the words contained in section 
80M(1)(d).
15
 As such, this chapter will include SARS‘ interpretation of the relevant 
terminology, including the practice prescribed by the Draft Guide. 
 
It is pertinent at this stage to briefly refer to the proposed Tax Administration Bill (TAB) 
which was introduced in Parliament on 23 June 2011.  According to the Draft Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Draft Tax Administration Bill (SARS 2009:1), the drafting of the 
TAB was announced in the 2005 Budget Review as a project to incorporate into one piece 
of legislation certain generic administrative provisions, which are currently duplicated in 
the different tax Acts. The Minister of Finance (SARS 2011:1) stated that: 
 
―The Bill seeks to facilitate tax compliance, provides consistency in the application of tax law and 
to further improve the levels of tax compliance in South Africa.‖ 
 
In terms of the proposed TAB, the reportable arrangements provisions will be removed 
from the Act and will henceforth be included as sections 34 to 39 in Part B of Chapter 4 
―Returns and Records‖ of the TAB.  The penalty provision of section 80S of the Act will 
be included as section 212 in Part B ―Fixed Amount Penalties‖ of Chapter 15 
―Administrative Non-compliance Penalties‖ of the TAB.  Except for the penalty provision 
and the definition of ―arrangement‖, the remainder of the reportable arrangements 
provisions are transferred verbatim from the Act to the TAB.  If the TAB is to be enacted 
in its current format, section 80M(1)(d) will henceforth be known as section 35(1)(d).   
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 Unfortunately, due to the lack of any response document and SARS‘ inability to disclose any particulars 
about comments received (and the parties who commented) on the Draft Guide, only the comments made 
by SAICA were obtained.  An extensive Internet search was conducted, but SAICA was the only role-














The only change in the wording of the reportable arrangements provisions is that of the 
penalty provision and the definition of an ―arrangement‖.  The penalty provision of both 
section 80S of the Act and the proposed section 212 of the TAB will be discussed in 
Chapter 5.  The proposed definition of ―arrangement‖ will be discussed in paragraph 3.4 of 
this chapter. 
 
Due to the fact that the reportable arrangements provisions are unchanged in the proposed 
TAB, and also because the TAB is not yet enacted, only sections 80M to 80T are referred 
to throughout this study.  Accordingly, the survey which was conducted among tax 
partners at a sample of leading audit and legal firms (see Chapter 6) also referred to 
sections 80M to 80T. 
 
3.3  Rules of Interpretation 
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par2.1) remark that income tax is essentially the creature of 
statute, and the principles of construction which apply to statutes generally apply equally to 
the interpretation of taxation statutes.  They further observe that the interpretation of 
statutes is often a difficult task, and that the rules of construction, which vacillate from a 
literal application to one based on the aims and context of the legislation, are not applied 
consistently.  It is considered to be beyond the scope of this study to discuss the rules of 
interpretation or the intricacies and difficulties in interpreting fiscal legislation.   
 
There are two broad approaches to the interpretation of statutes in common law tradition, 
namely the traditional and the modern approach. Du Plessis (2002:93-98) explains that 
each of these approaches consists of two general theories to interpretation.  In the case of 
the traditional approach, there are the literalism and intentionalism theories and in the case 
of the modern approach, the purposivism and contextualism theories.   
 
Irrespective of which approach or theory is applied, De Ville (2000:par8.3) states that the 
role of the courts is to ensure that statutes comply with the requirements of the 
Constitution.  As such, the next paragraph will examine the interpretation of fiscal 














3.3.1  Applying Constitutional Principles to the Interpretation of Fiscal Legislation 
 
The principles for the interpretation of statutes are to be derived from the Constitution.  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996, as amended (the 
Constitution) was promulgated in 1993 and enacted in 1996. Section 1 of the Constitution 
indicates that the Constitution is superior to all other legislation, as the Bill of Rights 
applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state.  Section 3 determines that when applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural 
or juristic person, a court, in order to give effect to a right in the Bill: 
 
―(a)    …must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not 
give effect to that right; and 
 (b)   may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in  
accordance with section 36(1).‖ 
 
As regards constitutional and statutory interpretation, sections 39(1) and (2) state the 
following: 
 
―(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum – 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
 
   (2)  When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law,   
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.‖ 
 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution gives specific instructions on how to interpret the Bill of 
Rights. Section 39(2) deals with the interpretation of any other legislation. These sections 
command a similar interpretative approach to both the Constitution and statutes. Statutory 
interpretation is therefore to be seen not as a search for the intention of the legislature but 
an enforcement of constitutional values (De Ville 2000:par8.3). 
 
Thus, the primary aim of statutory interpretation should be to ensure that the statute is in 













of Rights specifically and other sections of the Constitution in general (including fiscal 
legislation by implication) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  
 
Goldswain (2008:115) indicates that sections 39(1) and 39(2) oblige the judiciary, when 
interpreting statutes to, inter alia, promote the protection of the liberty of persons, their 
property and the enforcement of the principles of human dignity, equality and fairness. He 
notes that these qualities are central to the purposive theory to the interpretation of statutes. 
 
Goldswain (2008:119) concludes that if the judiciary interprets a provision without 
attempting to establish the intention or purpose of the legislature, such an omission would 
constitute grounds for a constitutional challenge to the decision. Goldswain  thus indicates 
that the Constitution requires a modern approach to the interpretation of statutes. 
 
De Ville adopts a similar view (2000:par8.4.1). He indicates that the Constitution requires 
statutes to be interpreted by following a broad contextual approach. The context in which 
the statute is interpreted should include the constitutional values, the statute‘s background 
and purpose (viewed in the light of the aims of the Constitution), other statutes as well as 
the social, political and economic context and (where relevant) comparative and foreign 
law. 
 
The next paragraph will therefore address interpretation in the context of comparative and 
foreign law. 
 
3.3.2  Foreign Law 
 
It is important to note that the Bill of Rights (in section 39(2)) requires the courts to 
consider international law and allows them to consider foreign law.  While there is no one, 
specific body of international law, the term is understood to mean the collection of treaties, 
customs, and multilateral agreements governing the interaction of nations and 















  Foreign law consists of the rules governing the domestic laws of individual 
foreign countries (Duke Law 2011). Du Plessis (2010:151) distinguishes between 
international and foreign law as follows:  
 
―Foreign law, in the domestic context, can never have more than persuasive force while some 
international law may well be as binding or prescriptive as domestic laws.‖ 
 
 When referring to the income tax decisions of foreign courts, De Koker (2010:par25.4) 
cautions that one should always bear in mind that they may be based upon a differently 
worded statute from the statute under consideration.  However, they may be most valuable 
and may very well influence South African courts, particularly when they deal with a point 
of law that also occurs in the South African Act.   
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par2.4.2) also emphasise that even though the judgments of the 
courts of other countries are not binding on South African courts, they are of significance 
because they do have persuasive value.  Such judgments are often quoted in the courts of 
the Republic and are sometimes even applied.  These cases include, amongst others, CIR v. 
Paul (1956), ITC 827 (21 SATC 194), ITC 836 (21 SATC 330) and Joffe & Co v. CIR 
(1946). 
 
Section 248(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act prohibits the deduction of personal and 
living expenses and refers to a ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ test in determining 
whether or not an expense is for business or private purposes.  This long-established test 
has helped Canadian taxpayers to formulate objective standards to serve as a guide for the 
application of the Canadian REOP test. 
 
Both the South African Act and the Canadian Income Tax Act contain a similar REOP 
requirement.  The principle that foreign cases were relevant when they were dealing with 
language similar to that in the South African Act was established by Watermeyer CJ in 
Joffe & Co v CIR (1946).   
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 According to the Legal Information Institute (2011), public international law concerns itself only with 
questions of rights between several nations or nations and the citizens of other nations.  In contrast, private 
international law deals with controversies between private persons (natural or juridical), arising out of 













Also, by applying the in pari materia
17
 principle when a statute (such as section 80M(1)(d) 
of the Act) is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the 
same subject matter (such as section 248(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act). 
 
Therefore, the Canadian court cases (and the Canadian REOP test) are relevant when 
interpreting a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement, since the Canadian REOP test 
deals with language similar to that in the South African Act.  As such, the Canadian REOP 
test, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, can be of immense value in assisting 
South African taxpayers to formulate objective standards against which to apply the 
section 80M(1)(d) reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit requirement.  
 
Having briefly addressed the rules of interpretation, it is now necessary to analyse the 
wording of section 80M(1)(d), by first examining the meaning of the term ―arrangement‖.   
 
3.4  Arrangement 
 
Before the reportable arrangements provisions can apply, an arrangement must first be 
entered into.  An arrangement, according to section 80T, means any transaction, operation 
or scheme. 
 
―Transaction‖, ―operation‖ and ―scheme‖ are not defined in the Act.  One therefore has to 
look at the meaning the courts have ascribed to them as well as their ordinary, grammatical 
meaning.  Also, the precise identification of the transaction, operation or scheme is of vital 
importance to the taxpayer to avoid any misunderstanding in determining whether or not 
the ―arrangement‖ is reportable.  The ordinary meaning of the words ―arrangement‖, 
―transaction‖, ―operation‖ and ―scheme‖ can be found in any reputable dictionary and are 
as follows: 
 
Arrangement ·noun  a plan for a future event;
18
  an agreement.
19
 
                                                     
17 Meaning: ―upon the same matter or subject‖.  According to Devenish (1992:134), if two statutes are in 
pari materia, any judicial decisions as to the construction of one is a sound rule of construction for the 
other.  Or, stated differently, if two statutes are in pari materia, it is assumed that uniformity of language 
and meaning was intended. 
18

















Operation ·noun  the action or process of operating or being active;
18 
an action 
or series of actions which have a particular effect.
19
  
Scheme ·noun  a systematic plan or arrangement for achieving a particular object                              
or effect;
18




An arrangement therefore encompasses a wide range of steps or actions in order for a 
future event to take place.  De Koker (2010:par19.4) states that an arrangement requires a 
conscious involvement of two or more participants who arrive at an understanding.  It 
presupposes a meeting of the minds or an expectation by each party that the other will act 
in a particular way.  Support for this can be found in Newton v. COT (1958) where Lord 
Denning expressed the view [at paragraph 760] that: 
 
―[T]he word ‗arrangement‘ is apt to describe something less than a binding contract or agreement, 
something in the nature of an understanding between two or more persons…‖ 
 
Thus, an arrangement includes different kinds of concerted action by which persons may 
arrange their affairs to produce a particular effect.  The terms ―transaction, operation or 
scheme‖ were considered in Meyerowitz v. CIR (1963) which was decided under section 90 
of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 1941.  The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
agreed with the following finding of Watermeyer J in the court a quo [at paragraph 300]: 
 
―The word ‗scheme‘ is a wide term and I think that there can be little doubt that it is sufficiently 
wide to cover a series of transactions‖. 
 
In the Meyerowitz case, the appellant submitted that the transactions he entered into were 
not a preconceived plan and that the continuity of operations and connection between the 
different steps were lacking in such a degree as not to constitute a scheme. 
 
However, the Appellate Division held that from beginning to end, the transactions 
constituted a scheme even though they were not all contemplated at the outset.  The 
important test that the Appellate Division applied, is as follows: if the different steps, upon 
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examination in retrospect, appear to be so connected with one another that they could 
ultimately lead to the avoidance of taxation, the transactions are a scheme.  As stated in the 
Meyerowitz case [at paragraph 299]: 
 
―Merely because the final step to secure this objective is left unresolved at the outset, and decided 
on later, does not seem to me to rob the scheme of the necessary unity to justify its being called an 
‗arrangement‘.‖ 
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.2) maintain that the fact that the intention to avoid the 
payment of tax appears only from later steps is of no consequence.  This argument is 
supported by CIR v. Louw (1983), where the court found that if there was sufficient unity 
between the ultimate step and what has gone before, having regard to the ultimate 
objective, then together they might be regarded as being part and parcel of a single scheme.  
Moreover, in the Meyerowitz case, an act which did not form part of the scheme when it 
was entered into could become part and parcel of the scheme if it was later pressed into the 
service of the scheme. 
 
Also noteworthy, is the fact that in Ovenstone v. CIR (1980) it was held [at paragraph 68] 
that, in respect of an arrangement, ―entered into‖ does not mean ―formulated‖: 
 
―Because of its context it has, I think, a connotation of implementation that is similar to ‗carried 
out‘. Probably both expressions were used because it was considered that ‗carried out‘ is more 
appropriate to connote the implementation of a ‗scheme‘, while ‗entered into‘ is more apposite to 
connote the implementation (i.e. the taxpayer‗s actually engaging in ) of a ‗transaction‘ or 
‗operation‘.‖ 
 
Therefore, ―carried out‖ is considered by the courts to be similar to ―formulated‖ and is to 
be used in the context of a ―scheme‖.  The phrase ―entered into‖, is considered more 
appropriate in the context of ―transactions‖ and ―operations‖, as the taxpayer engages in 
the implementation thereof. 
 
As previously stated in Chapter 1, SARS introduced the reportable arrangements 
provisions after the new GAAR provisions were brought into effect.  SARS wanted to link 
the reportable arrangements legislation to the factors that are indicative of a lack of 













refer to the GAAR provisions if they contain definitions similar to those of the reportable 
arrangements provisions. One of these similarities is found in the definition of an 
―arrangement‖.  Section 80L of the GAAR provisions defines an arrangement so as to 
mean: 
 
―any transaction, operation, scheme, agreement or understanding (whether enforceable or not), 
including all steps therein or parts thereof, and includes any of the foregoing involving the 
alienation of property.‖ 
 
Table 3.1 provides a comparison of the definition of an ―arrangement‖ as contained in 
sections 80T and 80L.  Similarities are indicated in bold text. 
 
Table 3.1:  Comparison of the definition of “arrangement” 
Section 80T Section 80L 
Any transaction, operation or scheme. Any transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding (whether 
enforceabl  or not), including all steps 
therein or parts thereof, and includes any of 
the foregoing involving the alienation of 
property. 
 
Clearly, the section 80L GAAR definition has a wider scope than the section 80T 
reportable arrangements definition.  The section 80L definition also refers to an 
―understanding‖ (whether enforceable or not).  The ordinary meaning of the word 
―understanding‖ is as follows: 
 







De Koker (2010:par19.4) suggests that regardless of whether an agreement is reduced to 
writing and explicitly records all the terms and conditions, or whether it merely constitutes 
a verbal broad understanding of proposed future conduct which will more than likely take 
place, it will constitute an arrangement.  In BNZ Investments Ltd v. CIR (2000) the word 
―understanding‖ suggested [at paragraph 732]: 
 
―something like a dealing between two or more persons, so that a taxpayer who deliberately 













readily enough could be held to be part of at least an understanding to that effect.  A taxpayer who 
actually knows all the details, and proceeds nevertheless, is of course, at equal or greater risk.‖ 
[Own emphasis]. 
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.2) illustrate this principle with an example:   
 
 Trust A does not anticipate making profits out of its businesses; 
 Trust B is a tax exempt trust; 
 Trust A has a broad understanding with the trustees of Trust B that any profits will 
more likely than not be distributed to Trust B; 
 Thus, although Trust B cannot enforce this understanding, the authors submit that it 
could constitute part of an avoidance arrangement between the parties. 
 
It is suggested (De Koker 2010: par19.4) that the descending order of the terms transaction, 
operation, scheme, agreement or understanding may suggest descending degrees of 
enforceability.  While an agreement is ordinarily (but not necessarily) legally enforceable, 
an understanding may not be. 
 
The section 80L definition of ―arrangement‖ furthermore includes ―all steps therein or 
parts thereof‖.  The section 80T definition contains no such phrase.  The terms ―steps‖ and 
―parts‖ are not defined.  De Koker (2010:par19.4) suggests that each connotes a distinct 
transactional element of the whole.  Thus, the ―steps‖ or ―parts‖ constitute arrangements in 
themselves and the Commissioner has the power to apply the GAAR to each such step or 
part.   
 
Due to SARS‘ stated objective of minimising tax avoidance and countering tax abuse more 
quickly, it is submitted that SARS should amend the section 80T definition of an 
―arrangement‖ to align it with the section 80L GAAR definition.  This should assist in 
widening the potential scope of the reportable arrangements provisions, thereby combating 
tax avoidance more effectively.  
 
At first glance it is gratifying to observe that the Draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill (the 
DTLAB) of 2011 proposes a revised section 80T definition for ―arrangement‖ (in the 













DTLAB defines an ―arrangement‖ so as to mean any transaction, operation, scheme, 
agreement or understanding (whether enforceable or not), including all steps therein or 
parts thereof, and includes any of the foregoing involving the alienation of property.  If 
enacted, the new definition will come into operation on 1 April 2012. 
 
The proposed amendment widens the scope of an ―arrangement‖ considerably. However, 
more careful consideration reveals that the TAB contains a different definition of an 
―arrangement‖ which supersedes the definition in the Act (and thus also the amendment in 
the DTLAB).
20
  The proposed section 34 of the TAB (which is part of the reportable 
arrangements provisions) defines an ―arrangement‖ so as to mean a transaction, operation, 
scheme, agreement or understanding (whether enforceable or not).  Although it is more 
broadly defined than the current section 80T, it will not have the same reach as the 
proposed definition in the DTLAB. 
 
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the interpretation and application of the reportable 
arrangements provisions is due to the very broad definition of a tax benefit.  The next 
paragraph will address this problematic term. 
 
3.5 Tax Benefit 
 
A tax benefit is defined in section 80T so as to include any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax.  The tax referred to here, is also defined in section 80T.  
This definition includes any tax, levy, duty or other liability imposed by this Act or any 
other Act administered by the Commissioner.
21
  The definition of a tax benefit clearly 
                                                     
20 Section 4(3) of the TAB states that in the event of any inconsistency between the TAB and another tax 
Act, the other Act prevails. A ―tax Act‖ is defined in section 1 of the TAB so as to mean the TAB or an 
Act, or portion of an Act, referred to in section 4 of the SARS Act, excluding the Customs and Excise Act. 
Section 1 of the TAB defines the ―SARS Act‖ as meaning the South African Revenue Service Act No. 34 
of 1997.  The Act is included in the list of Acts in section 4 (read with Schedule 1) of the SARS Act.  The 
Act (and by implication section 80T) will therefore prevail over the TAB (and therefore section 34) in the 
event of any inconsistency.  However, the reportable arrangements provisions will be removed from the 
Act once the TAB is enacted;  consequently, there will no longer be any inconsistency.  The provisions of 
the TAB will therefore prevail.  
21













encompasses a wide range of taxes and benefits.  It is precisely this broad definition that 
results in many of the anomalies surrounding reportable arrangements.  SAICA (2007b) 
states that the scope of this legislation is too wide and that it affects an ―absurd amount of 
routine transactions‖. 
 
As previously stated, the GAAR provisions might prove helpful in interpreting the 
reportable arrangements provisions.  Section 80L also contains a definition for ―tax 
benefit‖, the wording of which is exactly the same as that of section 80T, namely 
 
―any avoidance, postponement or reduction of any liability for tax.‖ 
 
Section 80L also defines ―tax‖ so as to include 
 
 ―any tax, levy or duty imposed by this Act or any other Act administered by the Commissioner.‖ 
 
Table 3.2 provides a comparison of the definition of a ―tax benefit‖ as contained in 
sections 80T and 80L.  The wording is exactly the same.   
 
Table 3.2:  Comparison f the definition of “tax benefit”  
Section 80T Section 80L 
Any avoidance, postponement or reduction 
of any liability for tax.   
Any avoidance, postponement or reduction 
of any liability for tax. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
 Donations‘ tax in terms of the Act;  
 Secondary Tax on Companies (STC), which will be replaced by Dividends Tax on 1 April 2012, in 
terms of the Act (as announced by Finance Minister Gordhan (Treasury 2011:30) when he delivered 
the National Budget Speech on 23 February 2011);  
 Turnover tax in terms of the Act;  
 Securities Transfer Tax, in terms of the Securities Transfer Tax Act No. 25 of 2007;  
 Customs and excise duties in terms of the Customs and Excise Act No. 91 of 1964;  
 Estate duty in terms of the Estate Duty Act No. 45 of 1955;   
 Skills development levies in terms of the Skills Development Levies Act No. 9 of 1999;  
 Transfer duty in terms of the Transfer Duty Act No. 40 of 1949;  
 Value-added tax in terms of the Value-Added Tax Act No. 89 of 1991; and 
 Unemployment insurance contributions in terms of the Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 














Table 3.3 provides a comparison of the definition of ―tax‖ as contained in sections 80T and 
80L.  The wording is materially the same, except in section 80T where ―or other liability‖ 
is also included (see underlined text in Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3:  Comparison of the definition of “tax”  
Section 80T Section 80L 
Any tax, levy, duty or other liability 
imposed by this Act or any other Act 
administered by the Commissioner.  
Any tax, levy or duty imposed by this Act 
or any other Act administered by the 
Commissioner. 
 
SARS has not provided any reason for this difference.  The section 80T reference to ―other 
liability‖ possibly widens the application of the reportable arrangements provisions.  In the 
Draft Guide, SARS (2010:10-11) considers the following to form part of the definition of a 
―tax benefit‖: 
 
 any deductions, allowances, exemptions and tax credits (including foreign tax credits) 
that are, or will be, or which are anticipated to be claimed by a participant; and 
 any deferral of the receipt or accrual of income claimed or included.  
 
SARS (2010:12) also prescribes that a tax benefit is calculated by considering the tax 
benefit derived over the period of the arrangement.  As a result, annual recurring tax 
benefits will be taken into account.  Projected tax flows over the period of the arrangement 
are taken into account on a nominal basis, i.e. they are not discounted (except in the case of 
section 80M(1)(e)). 
 
As the definition of ―tax benefit‖ refers to the avoidance, postponement or reduction of any 
liability for tax, the meaning of these words must also be taken into consideration.  The 
following paragraphs will provide an in-depth analysis of these terms. 
 
3.5.1  Liability for Tax 
 
The section 80T definition of a tax benefit includes the avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any ―liability for tax‖.  The term ―liability for tax‖ occurs in the section 80T 
definition of a tax benefit, but the term itself is not defined.  This phrase also appears as the 













section 80M(1)(c) reportable arrangement is defined as an arrangement that results in a tax 
benefit and which: 
 
―is or will be disclosed by any participant as giving rise to a financial liability for purposes of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice but not for purposes of this Act.‖ 
 
Even though section 80M(1)(c) falls outside the scope of this study, the fact that it refers to 
―financial liability for purposes of Generally Accepted Accounting Practice‖ (GAAP) 
might shed light on the ―liability for tax‖ requirement.   
 
GAAP has specific International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in place for the measurement and recognition of financial 
liabilities.  The Act, however, only deals with the calculation and payment of tax, and not 
the recognition of liabilities.  Thus, the exact meaning of a ―liability for tax‖ will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs by comparing the accounting definition for 
―liability‖ with the statutory interpretation followed by the courts. 
 
(a) Accounting Definition 
 
According to a SAICA Circular (SAICA 2004b), South Africa has been harmonising its 
Statements of GAAP with international standards.  In 2004, the harmonisation was 
completed and the Accounting Practices Board (APB) has since agreed to issue IFRS as 
Statements of GAAP without amendment.  The effective dates of the improved statements 
are for financial periods commencing on or after 1 January 2005 with earlier application 
encouraged.   
 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Framework sets out the concepts 
that underlie the preparation and presentation of financial statements for external users.  
The Framework defines the elements that are directly related to the measurement of 
financial position in the balance sheet (i.e. assets, liabilities and equity) as well as those 
elements directly related to the measurement of performance in the income statement (i.e. 














A ―liability‖ is defined in the Framework (IASB 2010b), at paragraph 49(b), as a present 
obligation of the entity arising from past events, the settlement of which is expected to 
result in an outflow from the entity of resources embodying economic benefits. 
 
The Framework notes, at paragraph 60, that an essential characteristic of a liability is that 
the entity has a present obligation.  An obligation is a duty or responsibility to act or 
perform in a certain way.  The Framework further states that obligations may be legally 
enforceable as a consequence of a binding contract or statutory requirement.  An example 
is the amount payable for goods and services received.  It is furthermore noted that 
obligations also arise from normal business practice, custom and a desire to maintain good 
business relations or act in an equitable manner. 
 
Noteworthy is the fact that the Framework clearly distinguishes (at paragraph 61) between 
a present obligation and a future commitment.  An example provided is a decision by the 
management of an entity to acquire assets in the future.  This decision does not, of itself, 
give rise to a present obligation.  An obligation normally arises only when the asset is 
delivered or the entity enters into an irrevocable agreement to acquire the asset. 
 
In the case of an irrevocable agreement, the Framework explains that the irrevocable 
nature of the agreement means that the economic consequences of failing to honour the 
obligation, for example, because of the existence of a substantial penalty, leave the entity 
with little, if any, discretion to avoid the outflow of resources to another party. 
 
The Framework states (at paragraph 62) that the settlement of a present obligation usually 
involves the entity giving up resources embodying economic benefits in order to satisfy the 
claim of the other party.  Settlement may occur in a number of ways,
22
 for example, by: 
 Payment of cash; 
 Transfer of other assets; 
 Provisions of services; 
 Replacement of that obligation with another obligation; or 
 Conversion of the obligation to equity. 
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 The Framework notes (at paragraph 62) that an obligation may also be extinguished by other means, such 













The Framework maintains (at paragraph 64) that some liabilities can be measured only by 
using a substantial degree of estimation.  It is noted that some entities describe these 
liabilities as provisions, but in other countries, such provisions are not regarded as 
liabilities because the concept of a liability is defined narrowly so as to include only 
amounts that can be established without the need to make estimates. 
 
However, the definition of a liability in paragraph 49 follows a broader approach.  Thus, 
when a provision involves a present obligation and satisfies the rest of the definition, it is a 
liability even if the amount has to be estimated.  Examples include provisions to be made 
under existing warranties and provisions to cover pension obligations. 
 
The recognition, measurement and disclosure rules of an accounting ―liability‖ are 
addressed in IAS 37, Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets (IASB, 
2010c).  Paragraph 10 reiterates the Framework definition of a ―liability‖ by stating that it 
is a present obligation as a result of past events whereby the settlement thereof is expected 
to result in an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits. 
 
IAS 37 states, at paragraph 10, that an obligating event is an event that creates a legal or 
constructive obligation that results in an entity having no realistic alternative to settling 
that obligation. 
 
Furthermore, a ―legal obligation‖ is defined as an obligation that derives from: 
 A contract (through its explicit or implicit terms); 
 Legislation; or 
 Other operation of law. 
 
Also, a ―constructive obligation‖ is defined as an obligation that derives from an entity‘s 
actions where: 
 By an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific 
current statement, the entity has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain 
responsibilities; and 
 As a result, the entity has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties 













For the purposes of section 80M(1)(c), the accounting definition of ―financial liability‖ 
specifically is relevant and is stated here for the sake of completeness and ease of 
reference.
23
 However, for the purposes of section 80M(1)(d), only the accounting 
definition of ―liability‖ is deemed appropriate. 
 
An accounting ―financial liability‖ is defined in paragraph 11 of IAS 32, Financial 
Instruments: Presentation (IASB 2010d), as any liability that is: 
 
           ―(a)   a contractual obligation: 
    (i)    to deliver cash or another financial asset to another entity; or 
   (ii)   to exchange financial assets or financial liabilities with another entity under conditions that 
are potentially unfavourable to the entity; or 
 
(b)   a contract that will or may be settled in the entity‘s own equity instruments and is: 
    (i)   a non-derivative for which the entity is or may be obliged to deliver a variable number of the 
entity‘s own equity instruments; or 
   (ii)   a derivative that will or may be settled other than by the exchange of a fixed amount of cash or 
another financial asset for a fixed number of the entity‘s own equity instruments.  For this 
purpose the entity‘s own equity instruments do not include instruments that are themselves 
contracts for the future receipt or delivery of the entity‘s own equity instruments.‖ 
 
Furthermore, as will be seen from the discussion in the next paragraph, the contrast 
between an ―existing‖ and ―anticipated‖ liability is of great importance.  Or, to use the 
wording in IAS 37, the contrast between a ―present obligation‖ and a ―future commitment‖ 
is of great importance.  For this reason, the IAS definition of ―contingent liability‖ is also 






                                                     
23 The Draft Guide (SARS 2010:20) states that where one party does not know that another party intends to 
disclose the arrangement as a financial liability for accounting purposes, the first party may not realise that 
the arrangement is required to be disclosed.  In this case, SARS acknowledges that this is a factor that will 














A ―contingent‖ liability is defined in IAS 37, paragraph 10, as a 
 
―(a)   possible obligation that arises from past events and whose existence will be confirmed only by the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of one or more uncertain future events not wholly within the control 
of the entity;  or 
 (b)   a present obligation that arises from past events but is not recognised because: 
                (i)  it is not probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to 
settle the obligation; or 
(ii)  the amount of the obligation cannot be measured with sufficient reliability.‖ 
 
The recognition criteria of IAS 37 determine that an entity may not recognise a contingent 
liability (paragraph 27). 
 
A ―contingent liability‖ does not meet the recognition criteria of IAS 37, paragraph 27, and 
as such, an entity may not recognise a contingent liability in its financial statements.  The 
contingent liability must be disclosed (in terms of paragraph 86), unless the possibility of 
an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote. 
 
It is submitted that the requirement of an entity having a ―present obligation‖ is the 
distinguishing factor between an ―existing‖ liability and an ―anticipated‖ liability.  IAS 37 
notes, at paragraph 15, that it rarely unclear whether there is a present obligation.  In these 
rare cases, a past event is deemed to give rise to a present obligation if, taking account of 
all available evidence, it is more likely than not that a present obligation exists at the end of 
the reporting period. 
 
The entity must therefore, at the end of the reporting period, take into account all available 
evidence, including the opinion of experts.  Additional evidence provided by events after 
the reporting period must also be considered.  If, on the basis of such evidence, it is more 
likely than not that a present obligation exists, the entity recognises a liability.  Otherwise 
the entity discloses a contingent liability (unless the possibility of an outflow of economic 
benefits is remote). 
 
To summarise:  the following elements must be present in order for an entity to recognise a 














 A present obligation (or, in other words, an existing obligation); 
 Arising from past events; 
 The settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of resources 
embodying economic benefits; and 
 The amount must be reliably estimated. 
 
Figure 3.1 (below) provides a summary of the interaction between the accounting 
requirements of a ―liability‖ and a ―contingent liability‖.   
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The ordinary definition of the word ―liability‖ is as follows: 
 
Liability ·noun  a thing for which someone is liable;
18




The ordinary definition concurs with the accounting definition of the word, i.e. there has to 
be a debt or obligation.  This, it is submitted, implies an existing liability, and not an 
anticipated (or contingent) liability.  This approach, however, seems to contradict the 
interpretation adopted by the courts. 
 
(b) Interpretation by the Courts 
 
In order to avoid, postpone or reduce the ―liability for tax‖, the liability first has to exist.  
The question whether a ―liability for tax‖ exists and has been avoided by the taxpayer has 
been considered by the courts on numerous occasions.  In all the court cases referred to in 
this paragraph, the courts attempted to ascertain whether a liability for tax existed and, if 
so, whether it was avoided.  This paragraph overlaps, to a certain extent, with the 
discussion of an ―avoidance‖ of a liability for tax in paragraph 3.5.2. 
 
 In CIR v. King (1947) Watermeyer J pointed out [at paragraph 161] that: 
 
―There are many…ordinary and legitimate transactions and operations which, if a taxpayer carries 
them out, would have the effect of reducing the amount of his income to something less than it was 
in the past, or of freeing himself from taxation on some part of his future income…yet it cannot be 
imagined that Parliament intended…to do such an absurd thing as to levy a tax upon persons who 
carry out such operations as if they had not carried them out.‖ 
 
Also, in Smith v. CIR (1964) the Supreme Court held [at paragraph 133] that the ordinary, 
natural meaning of avoiding a liability for tax is to: 
 
―get out of the way of, escape or prevent an anticipated liability‖. [Own emphasis]. 
 
The court in Smith found that the arrangement concerned avoided Mr Smith‘s anticipated 













Smith‘s, for the GAAR to operate.  Smith‘s case thus indicates that it is not a requirement 
that it be shown that the taxpayer is avoiding the tax on what is in reality his income. 
 
De Koker (2010:par19.5) maintains that the liability for tax that was sought to be avoided, 
postponed or reduced for the proper application of the GAAR is not an accrued or existing 
liability, since such a liability cannot be avoided, but was an anticipated liability.  This has 
been interpreted, in the case of Hicklin v. SIR (1980), as meaning a liability for tax that the 
taxpayer anticipates will or may fall on him in the future.   
 
Determining the existence of a tax benefit therefore typically requires one to identify 
income which might otherwise have accrued to the taxpayer.  It is this problem that has 
faced the courts in most of the reported cases.  However, in the case of CIR v. Louw (1983) 
there was no such income, as the directors of a private company which had previously 
acquired their partnership business, caused the company to make loans to them in lieu of 
increased salaries.  In this case, the court adopted the broad approach to the circumstances 
in which a liability for tax can be said to have been avoided, holding [at paragraph 142] 
that: 
 
―In order to determine whether the advancing of the loans enabled respondents to get out of the way 
of, escape or prevent an anticipa ed liability for tax one must, I think, ask oneself the question 
whether, but for the loans, equivalent or even lesser amounts would probably have been received by 
respondent  in a taxable form, i.e. as salary or dividend.‖ 
 
The court thus accepted that salaries would have been paid had the loans not been made.  
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.3) consider this approach to be incorrect, as it involves 
the creation of notional income on which tax might have been paid.  The argument being 
that the company and the taxpayer were parties to the arrangement and a clear choice 
existed whether to distribute the surplus after tax income of the company by way of 
dividend (which would have been taxable) or to accumulate it or to make it available by 
way of loan, or to pay it out by way of salary, each with its differing tax effects.  The 
authors submitted that to hold otherwise would lead to the absurd results alluded to in CIR 














Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.4.6) consider the United Kingdom approach to be correct.  
There, the relevant transaction is ascertained and it is that transaction which the 
Commissioner is entitled to subject to tax (as the relevant transaction must produce the 
same end result in the form of legal rights and obligations).  In Hicklin v. SIR (1980) it was 
held [at paragraph 179] that a liability for tax: 
 
―May vary from an imminent certain prospect to some vague, remote possibility…In Newton‘s 
case…Lord Denning spoke of ‗a liability which is about to fall on you‘, which suggests one of some 
imminence.  However, it is unnecessary and hence unadvisable to decide here whether a vertical 
line should be drawn somewhere along that wide range of meanings in order to delimit the 
connotation of ‗an anticipated liability‘.‖ 
 
It is therefore submitted that the accounting and ordinary, grammatical meaning of a 
―liability for tax‖ differs from the meaning attached to it by the courts, i.e. that an 
―anticipated‖ liability is, in terms of accounting principles, not a liability, but a contingent 
liability to be disclosed, instead of recognised, in the financial statements. 
 
Notwithstanding the above submission, the remainder of this chapter will examine the 
meaning of a ―liability for tax‖ in light of its construction as applied by the courts.  The 
next paragraph will briefly consider the proposed tax treatment of contingent liabilities as 
envisaged in the recently decided Ackermans case. 
 
(c) The Ackermans case and contingent liabilities 
 
The ability to claim a deduction of contingent liabilities in the context of the disposal of a 
business or assets has recently been considered in the case of Ackermans Limited v. CSARS 
(2011).  The Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that, where the seller sold its business as a 
going concern on terms whereby the purchaser took over those contingent liabilities in 
return for a reduced purchase price, the liabilities in question had not been ―actually 
incurred‖ and were therefore not deductible by the seller in terms of section 11(a) of the 
Act. 
 
Thereafter, SARS issued binding Class Ruling 029 (on 10 May 2011) in respect of the 













company in the same group of companies.  National Treasury has subsequently released 
the DTLAB which proposes the new sections 11F and  24CA. 
 
The proposed new section 11F (which is to become effective on 1 April 2012) will permit 
a deduction for the seller in precisely the circumstances of the Ackermans decision.  As 
PWC (2011:7) succinctly remarks: 
 
―Perhaps only a tax lawyer can understand SARS‘ stance in fighting, tooth and nail, the taxpayer‘s 
claim for a deduction, whilst simultaneously drafting amending legislation that would permit such a 
deduction.‖ 
 
In terms of the proposed new section 24CA (which is to become effective on 1 January 
2012), the value of contingent liabilities assumed by the purchaser will be added to the 
consideration paid by him for the purchase of the business.  This will be added to cost price 
or base cost (depending on whether the consideration is allocated to trading stock or capital 
assets), but the purchaser will simultaneously claim an upfront allowance of the same 
amount. This allowance will be added back as income in the following year and rolled 
forward in subsequent years, until the real liability becomes expenditure actually incurred. 
If the contingent liability never occurs, then the purchaser will have had an amount 
included in income.  
 
The next paragraph will address the first problem related to a ―liability for tax‖, namely the 
avoidance of such a liability. 
 
3.5.2  Avoidance of a Liability for Tax 
 
The section 80T definition of a tax benefit includes the avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax. Tax avoidance is the topic of much conducted research 
any many court cases.  It is not the purpose of this study to elaborate on the GAAR 
requirements of sections 80A to 80L (which deal with tax avoidance) but it is, however, 















The avoidance of tax has two implications:  it firstly triggers the GAAR provisions in 
sections 80A to 80L, and secondly, it could trigger the reportable arrangements provisions 
of sections 80M to 80T.  Unfortunately, from the taxpayer‘s perspective, an arrangement 
entered into to achieve a tax benefit will not necessarily succeed simply because it 
negotiates the hurdles imposed by these various provisions.  De Koker (2010:par19.4) 
notes that the substance-over-form doctrine must be applied in cases involving potential 
arrangements.  Furthermore, Clegg and Stretch (2010:par2.7.1) suggest that a clear 
distinction needs to be drawn between economic substance and legal substance. 
 
The economic substance is the commercial reality of a transaction
24
 or the accounting 
treatment of a transaction,
25
 to determine, for example, whether a particular expense is of a 
revenue or capital nature.  The legal substance refers to actual facts, which must include 
the legal reality of the agreements entered into.
26
 The legal substance of an agreement is of 
relevance when its form does not give clear guidance as to the relationship between the 
parties, which will usually occur when the agreement is poorly or confusingly drafted 
(Clegg & Stretch 2010:par26.7.3). 
 
However, the legal form may be overruled by the ―sham transaction‖ test, which is applied 
where the parties have purposefully disguised the true nature of the transaction between 
them through the adoption of a form which is intended to be different to its nominal form 
(Clegg & Stretch 2010:par26.7.5). 
 
Based on the substance-over-form doctrine (which emanated in tax law from IRC v. Duke 
of Westminster (1936)),
27
 the court must regard the legal substance of the matter.  Stark J, 
in Jaques v. FCT (1924), added the qualification that while the taxpayer had such an 
inalienable right, his success or otherwise depended on the particular legislation.  Lord 
Wilberforce affirmed (WT Ramsay Ltd v. IRC 1981) that the proper approach was to 
examine both the substance and the form and whether it fitted within the language and 
policy of the Act. 
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 CIR v. General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd (1982). 
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 ITC 1636 (60 SATC 267). 
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 CIR v. George Forest Timber Company Limited (1924). 
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In the South African context, Wunsh J held that the test to be applied in determining 
whether a transaction had the effect of avoiding tax was to ask whether the taxpayer would 
have suffered tax but for the transaction.  He also pointed out in ITC 1625 (59 SATC 383) 
[at paragraph 383] that: 
 
―if the transaction in issue…had not been entered into, the taxpayer would not have acquired the 
property, it would not have earned the income and it would not have incurred the interest 
expenditure.‖ 
 
Thus, in the case of a wholly new income earning structure, the court found that, strictly 
speaking, it would be impossible for the Revenue to show that tax had been avoided since, 
without the existing income stream, it would be impossible to show that there was any 
anticipated liability. 
 
In light of the above, Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.3) state that before an avoidance of 
tax is deemed to have occurred for the purposes of GAAR, the following conditions must 
first be met: 
 
 The accrual of a stream of income must be anticipated with some degree of likelihood 
in the sense that a contracted basis must exist for income to accrue to the taxpayer 
(whether in the near or distant future); 
 The income will be subject to tax in the hands of the taxpayer if it is received by or 
accrues to him; and 
 After the entering into of the arrangement, the tax on the income in the hands of the 
taxpayer or a third party is less than it would have been without the arrangement. 
 
It is clear, then, that in applying the law, the substance of the transaction, rather than its 
form, determines the tax consequences.  Concerning a reportable arrangement, the courts 
will have to focus on the legal rights and obligations of the parties and not on the labels 
attached to the arrangement.  The fact that the reportable arrangements legislation refers to 
the avoidance of tax opens the door wide for litigation and aggressive tax planning.  The 
next paragraph will address the second problem related to a ―liability for tax‖, namely the 














3.5.3  Reduction of a Liability for Tax 
 
The section 80T definition of a tax benefit includes the avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―reduce‖ is as 
follows: 
 




The word ―reduction‖ poses an interesting problem.  It implies that there was an existing 
tax liability to reduce and thus it can only be measured against a certain comparative 
liability.  It goes without saying that the arrangements concerned will be the only ones 
entered into and as such it may be problematic to identify what comparative arrangement 
with a lesser liability is to be selected for this purpose (Clegg & Stretch 2010:par26.3.3). 
 
Assume that there are three possible methodologies available for achieving the same 
commercial end result, each of which has a different potential tax liability.  Assume further 
that the middle methodology is chosen.  How does one then determine whether there is a 
reduction (or conversely, an increase) in a tax liability?  Which methodology should be 
regarded as the benchmark?   
 
Bearing in mind the R1 million penalty (in terms of section 80S) that the Commissioner 
may impose on failure to disclose a reportable arrangement, it is advisable to err on the 
side of caution.  Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.3) maintain that the tax liability must be 
compared with any reasonably common commercial alternative for achieving the same end 
results. 
 
An issue related to this matter of identifying the alternative arrangement, is that of 
quantifying the tax liability where the alternative arrangement is entirely hypothetical.  
Assume that a taxpayer shows that, except for the arrangement he had actually entered 
into, he would not have entered into any other arrangement.  The question now arises as to 














The Australian answer to this question can be found in the case of FCT v. Spotless Services 
Ltd (1996) where the Australian High Court rejected an argument that the anti-avoidance 
provision could not apply because it was not possible to identify an alternative course of 
action the taxpayer might have taken but for the tax avoidance arrangement. 
 
SARS (2010:11) acknowledges that although it may be argued that the participant could 
have implemented the arrangement in a different manner, or could have entered into a 
different type of transaction, had the one in question not been entered into, and use the 
hypothetical differences in the tax result of these arrangements, it is not always practical to 
use the hypothetical differences in the tax result as it involves too many potential variables 
to properly facilitate objective comparison.  SARS is, however, prepared to consider 
properly motivated exceptions to the rule for the sake of fairness. 
 
The next paragraph will address the third problem related to a ―liability for tax‖, namely 
―any‖ such liability. 
 
3.5.4  Any 
 
The section 80T definition of a tax benefit includes the avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―any‖ includes: 
 




It is submitted that the insertion of the word ―any‖ has the effect of potentially including  
an indefinitely large number of routine transactions.  In Hayne and Co v. Kaffrarian Steam 
Mill Co Ltd (1919) [at paragraph 371] and in CIR v. Ocean Manufacturing Ltd (1990) [at 
paragraph 618H], it has been held that in its natural and ordinary sense (unless restricted by 
the context) ―any‖ is an indefinite term which includes all of the things to which it relates. 
 
De Koker (2010:par25.7I) concurs that the word ―any‖ is a word of wide and unqualified 
generality.  It may be restricted by the subject matter or the context, but prima facie it is 
unlimited.  He further states that unless the context requires differently, it should be given 













The following examples are just two of the numerous ordinary, routine, operating 
transactions that could become reportable if the rest of the section 80M requirements are 
met. 
 
(a)  Expenditure incurred 
 
The general deduction formula of section 11(a), read with section 23(g), of the Act allows 
the deduction, by any person from carrying on any trade, of expenditure actually incurred 
in the production of income, unless it is of a capital nature.  Normal, routine trade 
expenditure incurred by a company is usually deductible in terms of section 11(a).  
Examples include the purchase of stationery or the payment of salaries.  Usually, these 
expenses are actually incurred in the course of carrying on a trade, are in the production of 
income and are not of a capital nature. 
 
Because the expenditure is deductible under section 11(a), the taxpayer‘s taxable income is 
reduced.  This, in turn, reduces the liability for tax for the year of assessment.  Thus, a tax 
benefit is obtained and this routine transaction could become reportable (assuming that the 
rest of the requirements of section 80M(1) are complied with). 
 
(b)  Acquisition of an asset 
 
The acquisition of an asset by a taxpayer for use in his trade, usually qualifies for a wear-
and-tear allowance. These allowances reduce the taxpayer‘s taxable income, and as such, 
also reduce the tax liability for the year of assessment.  Thus, a tax benefit is obtained and 
this routine transaction could become reportable (assuming that the rest of the requirements 
of section 80M(1) are met). 
 
Even though the excluded transactions fall outside the scope of this study, the requirements 
of section 80N will be addressed briefly in order to facilitate understanding when section 
80M(1)(d) does not apply to an arrangement.  In terms of section 80N(1), an arrangement 















        ― a)        a loan, advance or debt in terms of which— 
i)       the borrower receives or will receive an amount of cash and agrees to repay at least the 
same amount of cash to the lender at a determinable future date; or 
ii)      the borrower receives or will receive a fungible asset and agrees to return an asset of the 
same kind and of the same or equivalent quantity and quality to the lender at a 
determinable future date; 
b)        a lease; 
c)       a transaction undertaken through an exchange regulated in terms of the Securities Services Act, 
2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004); or 
d)       a transaction in participatory interests in a scheme regulated in terms of the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002).‖ 
 
In terms of subsection (2), the subsection (1) exclusions will only apply to an arrangement 
that: 
 
          ―a)      is undertaken on a stand-alone basis and is not directly or indirectly connected to, or directly 
or indirectly dependent upon, any other arrangement (whether entered into between the same or 
different parties); or 
b)      would have qualified as having been undertaken on a stand-alone basis as required by 
paragraph (a), were it not for a connected arrangement that is entered into for the sole purpose 
of providing security and where no tax benefit is obtained or enhanced by virtue of that security 
arrangement.‖ 
 
There are further requirements, contained in subsection (3), which determine that 
subsection (1) does not apply to any arrangement that is entered into 
 with the main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit; or 
 in a specific manner or form that enhances or will enhance a tax benefit. 
 
Fortunately, in terms of subsection (4), the Minister may determine an arrangement to be 
an excluded arrangement by notice in the Gazette, if he or she is satisfied that the 
arrangement is not likely to lead to an undue tax benefit.  The Minister has excluded by 
way of notice in the Government Gazette (nr 30941 of 1 April 2008, Volume 514) any 
arrangement where the tax benefit from the arrangement: 
 
 does not exceed R1 million; or  














SAICA (2007a) notes that they consider the scope of section 80M to be too wide and that it 
affects an absurd amount of routine transactions.  Even though the Minister has excluded 
arrangements where the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million, some taxpayers could 
easily exceed this cut-off amount with just a few routine transactions.  To this end, SAICA 
(2007a) has proposed the inclusion of numerous specific transactions in the section 80N(1) 
list of exclusions as they are unlikely to lead to an undue tax benefit. Table 3.4 (below) is 
largely based on SAICA‘s recommendations to SARS and proposes an extended list of 
excluded transactions. 
 
Table 3.4  Proposed extended list of excluded transactions 
Transaction Description of 
transaction 
Reason for exclusion 
1.  Acquisition of any asset, 
trading stock, consumables 
and services on credit. 
 Expense is deductible 
in terms of the general 




 These items generally 
comprise trade debts and 
form the basis of the 
majority of transactions 
between suppliers and 
customers. 
 This does not give rise to 
an undue tax benefit. 
2.  Acquisition of fixed 
property, including fixed 
property acquired with the 
purpose of earning rental 
income. 
 The property can be 
financed by a mortgage 
bond or other form of 
financing. 
 These items usually 
comprise long-term 
finance of an asset 
acquired. 
 This does not give rise to 
an undue tax benefit. 
3.  Acquisition of household 
items and motor vehicles, 
motor cycles and other 
personal assets. 
-  This does not give rise to 
an undue tax benefit 
4.  Various credit facilities  Bank overdrafts 
 Credit cards 
 Discounting of trade 
debtors or other 
receivables 
 Acquisition of trade 
debtors or other 
receivables 
 These do not give rise to 
an undue tax benefit 
 
SARS (2010:11) concedes that the strict interpretation of ―tax benefit‖ will result in many 
everyday transactions falling within the ambit of a ―tax benefit‖, leading to uncertainty for 













transactions, for example, the purchase of stationery or the payment of salaries, which are 
incurred in the ordinary course of business, should be disclosed to SARS. The ―main or 
one of the main benefits‖ test is aimed at eliminating the need to disclose such routine 
transactions to SARS, whereas the R1 million threshold test introduces a de minimis rule.   
 
However, as will be discussed in paragraph 3.9.4, the ―main benefit‖ requirement is 
subjective and difficult to comply with.  It is therefore submitted that the section 80N(1) 
list of plain-vanilla, excluded transactions should be extended to also include other routine, 
operating transactions such as the acquisition of any asset, trading stock, consumables and 
services on credit. 
 
Some of the other problematic terms in section 80N will be addressed in paragraph 3.9.  
The next paragraph will examine the meaning of the word ―assumed‖ which is contained in 
the introductory requirement of section 80M(1). 
 
3.6  Assumed 
 
Section 80M(1) states that an arrangement is a reportable arrangement if any tax benefit is 
or will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant by virtue of that 
arrangement.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―assume‖ is as follows: 
 
Assume ·verb  accept as true without proof or take responsibility or control.
18 
 
Based on the ordinary meaning of the word, it is clear that someone must take 
responsibility for establishing whether or not a tax benefit has arisen.  It is unclear, though, 
upon whom this responsibility to establish the tax benefit will rest.  Will SARS assume that 
a tax benefit was obtained by the participant, or must the taxpayer make that assumption?   
 
Firstly, the definition of a participant must be considered (this definition will be addressed 
in detail in paragraph 3.8). A participant in relation to a reportable arrangement is defined 















      ―(a)   any promoter; or 
(b)   any company or trust which directly or indirectly derives or assumes that it derives a tax benefit or 
financial benefit by virtue of a reportable arrangement.‖ 
 
Secondly, the definition of a ―financial benefit‖ is also contained in section 80T and means 
any reduction in the cost of finance, including interest, finance charges, costs, fees, and 
discounts in the redemption amount.  From the above definitions, it would seem that the 
participant has to make the assumption that a tax benefit was obtained, as the definition of 
a participant includes the phrase ―any company or trust which directly or indirectly 
assumes that it derives‖.  In this case, ―it‖ refers to the company or trust. 
 
However, based on the arguments set out below, it is submitted that this is not the case - 
the Commissioner will have to assume that a tax benefit was derived. 
 
As previously stated in paragraph 3.5.2 regarding the avoidance of tax, it could be useful to 
refer to tax avoidance court cases and research that deal with the assumption of whether or 
not a tax benefit has arisen.  Applying the GAAR principles and court cases might assist in 
ascertaining on whom the burden of proof lies. 
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.3) state that is incumbent upon the Commissioner to 
show, on a balance of probabilities, that a tax benefit has arisen as a consequence of an 
arrangement as defined, before the specific terms of section 80A (one of the GAAR 
provisions) can even be considered.  Cilliers (2008:104) places the burden of proof on the 
Commissioner, stating that: 
 
―A tax-avoider‘s goal is always primarily to secure an advantage for himself, even if his action 
should happen to be accompanied by an attitude of insouciance or one-upmanship towards the 
fiscus.  At any rate, it is submitted, the onus in this regard must rest on the fiscus.  To place the onus 
on the taxpayer in this context would be absurd.‖ 
 
De Koker (2010:par19.5) submits that in order for the Commissioner to show that a tax 
benefit has indeed arisen, it is firstly necessary for him to establish and show what 
arrangement would otherwise have been entered into to produce the commercial result and 













enough for the Commissioner simply to aver that a tax benefit has arisen – he must be 
sufficiently clear in his mind as to the nature of the alternative arrangement, to quantify the 
benefit. 
 
Meyerowitz, Emslie and Davis (2007:160) are also of the opinion that the burden of proof 
must be placed on the Commissioner and state that: 
 
―With respect it is also our view that although section 82 of our Act casts the onus upon the 
taxpayer to prove the assessment to be wrong he will have discharged this onus if the Court accepts 
that the requirements of section 80A (other than the misuse or abuse provisions) are not met, and it 
is then for the fiscus to convince the court that the taxpayer has misused or abused the relevant 
provisions.‖ 
 
In respect of the GAAR provisions, section 80G contains a presumption test.  Once it has 
been established that an avoidance arrangement exists, section 80G(1) creates a 
presumption that it was entered into or carried out for the sole or main purpose of obtaining 
the tax benefit identified.  The party obtaining that tax benefit may rebut that presumption 
by proving that obtaining a tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose of the avoidance 
arrangement.   
 
In SIR v. Gallagher (1978), the court found that the section 80G presumption placed a 
heavy burden of proof on the taxpayer, since the mere assertion by him that his purpose 
was not the avoidance of tax does not carry a great amount of weight.  The taxpayer has to 
be able to point to some compelling reasons for entering into the arrangement but the court 
must also be satisfied that the tax benefit was not the sole or main purpose.  Clegg and 
Stretch (2010:par26.3.4) submit that the courts must take an objective view of the facts and 
circumstances (which includes the ipse dixit of the taxpayer) to determine the actual 
purpose of the transaction.   
 
It is unnecessary for a taxpayer to prove any point beyond a reasonable doubt or even for 
him to be faced with too high a standard of proof.  Furthermore, the onus is discharged if 
the court has no reason to disbelieve the taxpayer and his evidence is not contradicted by 
objective facts.  On the other hand, mere statements not corroborated by evidence are 













Consequently, an important point to bear in mind is the onus of proof as determined by 
section 82 of the Act.  According to section 82, the burden of proof as to exemptions, 
deductions, abatements, disregarding or exclusions shall be upon the taxpayer.  This 
suggests that the onus to disprove a tax benefit is likely to be placed on the taxpayer.  This 
opinion is strengthened by the fact that the reportable arrangements provisions contain no 
special presumption to indicate otherwise. 
 
In light of the above discussion, it would seem that the Commissioner must assume that a 
tax benefit was obtained by the participant before invoking the reportable arrangements 
provisions.  The onus to disprove this assumption will probably rest on the taxpayer.  The 
above argument is substantiated by the following statement made by SARS (2010:7): 
 
―The onus is on the participant to an arrangement to determine whether it needs to be disclosed to 
SARS.‖ 
 
SAICA (2007b) contends that the words ―assumed to be derived‖ is meant to cover 
situations where it is uncertain whether any tax benefit would flow.  In such a case, SAICA 
suggests that the words ―assumed to be derived‖ be replaced by ―may be derived‖.  
Furthermore, it is SAICA‘s view that it is a factual enquiry whether a tax benefit is or will 
be derived.  This study concurs with SAICA‘s submission. 
 
However, the Draft Guide states that the assumed tax treatment of an arrangement is 
apparent from the agreements as well as from the financial model (if any) which 
accompanies the arrangement (SARS 2010:9).  It further states that there is normally 
consent among the parties as to what these assumed tax benefits are, as they sign off on the 
agreements which underpin the model. 
 
According to SARS, there is little room for debate as to what is meant by ―assumed‖ 
(SARS 2010:9).  However, SAICA notes that not all parties to these transactions are given 
insight to the financial models contained in these arrangements (SAICA 2010a).  It is 
therefore possible that a participant, for example a company, may not be aware of the 
assumed tax treatment of the arrangement other than to the extent that it directly has an 














Furthermore, the Draft Guide requires a participant to calculate the tax benefit of the 
arrangement by taking into account the assumed tax effect in the hands of each participant 
and comparing this with the position had the arrangement not been entered into (SARS 
2010:11).  Again, SAICA (2010a) notes that not all parties might be privy to the financial 
models which underpin these arrangements and, as such, may not be aware of the assumed 
tax effect in the hands of each participant other than to the extent that it directly has an 
impact on the tax liability of that company (or trust).  That participant will thus be unable 
to determine the assumed tax effect in the hands of each participant and will be unable to 
make the required comparison. 
 
Law firm Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr (2010:4) concurs and deems this problem to be an 
obvious one.  They note that in a complex transaction, for example, many of the 
participants may not necessarily be aware who the other parties are, and may not know 
which parties may, or may not have a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit. 
 
SARS (2010:11) cautions that in order to prevent exposure to a R1 million penalty, all 
participants to such arrangements should consider not only their own, but other parties‘ tax 
benefits.   
 
However, it is submitted that SAICA‘s view is correct and that SARS should specifically 
address circumstances where not all the parties are given insight to the financial models 
contained in the arrangements.  This will assist in ensuring that participants will not be 
expected to make assumptions relating to arrangements to which they are not fully privy. 
 
The next paragraph will examine the meaning of the term ―by virtue of‖, due to the fact 
that a tax benefit is derived by virtue of the arrangement. 
 
3.7  By Virtue Of 
 
Section 80M(1) states that an arrangement is a reportable arrangement if any tax benefit is 
or will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant by virtue of that 


















Thus, it is on account of the arrangement entered into, that a tax or financial benefit is 
derived  (or assumed to be).  In other words, the benefit is caused by the arrangement. In 
Miller v. CIR (1928) the phrase ―by virtue of‖ were held to be equivalent to ―for‖. 
 
This concept of a causal link has been dealt with in, amongst others, section 11(a) of the 
Act.  In order for an expense to be deductible, it must be, inter alia, incurred in the 
production of income.   
 
In the case of Port Elizabeth Tramway Co Ltd v. CIR (1936) the taxpayer concerned was a 
transport company.  One of its drivers had suffered injuries during an accident while 
driving one of the company‘s cars.  The company was compelled to pay damages to the 
dependants of the deceased driver and the court held that the compensation was incurred in 
the production of income (and was therefore deductible).  Watermeyer AJP explained how 
closely the expenditure had to be linked to the business operation in order to be deductible, 
stating that [at page 17]: 
 
―…whether such expenditure are necessary for its performance or attached to it by chance or are 
bona fide incurred for the more efficient performance of such operation provided they are so closely 
connected with it that they may be regarded as part of the cost of performing it.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Thus, the expenditure must be closely connected with the activity in order to be deductible.  
Or, to state it differently, the expense must be a necessary concomitant of the business 
activity. 
 
The concept of causation is also an essential element of delictual liability in South African 
law.  Midgley and Van der Walt (2005:par129) state that causation in the law of delict (in 
other words in the legal sense) comprises two fundamental aspects or elements: factual 
causation and legal causation.
28
 
                                                     
28 The question of legal causation is not a logical concept, but a moral reaction, involving a value judgment 
and applying common sense.  It is aimed at assessing whether the result can fairly be said to be imputable 














The enquiry as to factual causation is generally conducted by applying the so-called ―but-
for‖ test, which implies that an act is a necessary condition if, but for the particular act, the 
consequence would not have occurred.  Furthermore, if knowledge and experience indicate 
a factual nexus between an act and a particular consequence, the act is considered to be a 
cause-in-fact of the consequence (Midgley & Van der Walt 2005:par129). 
 
Thus, causation, from a delictual point of view, aims to establish a causal link between a 
person‘s actions and the consequences arising from those actions.  The same argument 
holds true for certain provisions in the Act.  There has to be a causal link, for example, 
between an expense incurred and the income produced by that expense, before a taxpayer 
may claim a section 11(a) deduction. 
 
It is therefore submitted that the meaning of the term ―by virtue of‖ implies that a causal 
link must be established.  In the context of reportable arrangements, the causal link 
between the arrangement entered into and the tax or financial benefit that was obtained, 
must be established.  Or, to state it differently, the arrangement and the benefit must be 
closely connected.   
 
It light of the above submission, the ―but-for‖ criterion of factual causation could be 
helpful in indicating a causal link.  In other words, the tax benefit would not have been 
derived, but for the arrangement entered into.  Only by first proving this causal nexus, can 
a benefit be derived ―by virtue of‖ an arrangement.   
 
The next paragraph will address the meaning of the terms ―participant‖ and ―promoter‖, as 
the disclosure obligation rests on these persons.   
 
3.8  Participant 
 
As was previously stated, a participant in relation to a reportable arrangement is defined in 
section 80T so as to mean: 
 
      ―(a)   any promoter; or 
(b)   any company or trust which directly or indirectly derives or assumes that it derives a tax benefit or 













3.8.1  Promoter 
 
The section 80T definition of a promoter in relation to a reportable arrangement means  
 
 ―any person who is principally responsible for organising, designing, selling, financing or 
managing that reportable arrangement. ― 
 
The ordinary meaning of the word ―promoter‖ is as follows: 
 






The definition of a promoter did not appear in the previous section 76A.  Due to the fact 
that SARS (2005) referred to the international position of countries such as the USA and 
the UK when it introduced the reportable arrangements provisions (refer to Chapter 2), one 
could infer that the concept of a promoter originated from the legislation of these countries. 
SAICA (2008) is of the opinion that SARS has introduced legislation that is unsuitable for 




The UK definition of a promoter is contained in section 307 of the United Kingdom 
Finance Act that deals with notifiable arrangements (the UK equivalent of South Africa‘s 
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 SAICA‘s reasons being:  
(a) The market for these types of products (or arrangements) is vast in the UK and the USA, whereas in 
South Africa, the market is extremely small or limited.  As a result, targeting these types of 
activities becomes difficult. 
(b) It was the practice of professional advisors based in the UK and the USA to deliberately develop 
extensive tax practices which had as their main objective the development, marketing and 
implementation of so-called ―tax products‖. This marketing included call centres devoted to ―cold 
calling‖ potential clients or targets.  This practice is in contrast with the practices of the majority of 














             ―(a)  in relation to a notifiable proposal, if, in the course of a relevant business- 
(i) he is to any extent responsible for the design of the proposed arrangements, or 
(ii) he makes the notifiable proposal available for implementation by other persons, 
and 
(b)  in relation to notifiable arrangements, if he is by virtue of paragraph (a)(ii) a promoter in 
relation to a notifiable proposal which is implemented by those arrangements or if, in the 
course of a relevant business, he is to any extent responsible for –  
(i) the design of the arrangements, or 
(ii) the organisation or management of the arrangements.‖ 
 
The ―relevant business‖ mentioned above refers to any trade, profession or business which 
involves the provision of tax services or is carried out by a bank or a securities house.
30
 
Essentially, the definition excludes persons in respect of whom certain tests, viz. the 
―benign tax advice‖, ―non-tax advisor‖ or ―ignorance test‖, apply (SAICA 2008). 
 
The UK and South African definitions of a promoter differ slightly.  Unlike the current 
South African definition, professional tax advisors are excluded from the UK definition 
under certain circumstances.  In addition, the South African definition is significantly 
broader than the UK definition by virtue of the insertion of the word ―or‖ in the South 
African definition.   
 
SAICA (2008) suggests that the South African definition be amended as follows in order to 
bring it in line with the UK definition: 
 
―A promoter in relation to a reportable arrangement means any person who is principally 
responsible for 
(a)  designing and selling or 
(b)  designing or selling and organising or managing 
that reportable arrangement.‖ 
 
Furthermore, SAICA (2008) does not believe that the person responsible for managing the 
transaction should be included in the definition of promoter.  Banks often appoint an 
outside party, unrelated to the transaction, to act as ―facility agent‖ or ―inter-creditor 
agent‖.  If that person played no part in setting up the transaction and is merely there to 
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ensure that the interests of the parties are adequately catered for, there is no reason to 
include them in the definition of promoter.  It is submitted that SAICA‘s recommendation 
is correct and that, as an alternative to the above proposed definition, the word ―managing‖ 
should be deleted from the current section 80T definition of a promoter. 
 
SARS concedes that, by definition, ―promoter‖ is a very wide term (SARS 2010:26).  The 
Draft Guide recommends that if any doubt exists as to whether a particular participant is 
the promoter, a letter should be obtained from the disclosing promoter as contemplated in 
section 80O(3).   
 
SAICA (2010a) is of the opinion that the Draft Guide is incomplete without a detailed 
discussion of the various parties who are required to disclose reportable arrangements.  It is 
therefore proposed by SAICA, and, again, this study concurs, that SARS should also 
specifically address the following circumstances where: 
 
 the promoter is not based in South Africa; 
 the promoter is a member of a profession, such as an accountant or lawyer; and 
 there is no promoter, for example in-house arrangements. 
 
It is important, however, to take cognisance of the client/attorney privilege if the promoter 
is a lawyer.  Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) office provides guidelines in 
such cases (HMRC 2011:par3.8), as schemes promoted by lawyers fall within the scope of 
the disclosure rules in the same way as for other promoters.  The HMRC states that where 
an advisor who would ordinarily be a promoter is prevented by reason of legal professional 
privilege from providing any of the information needed to make a full disclosure, that 
advisor has no obligation to make a disclosure.  
 
Furthermore, unless there is another promoter who has an obligation to disclose the 
scheme, it must be disclosed by any person in the UK who enters into any transaction 
forming part of it.  It is noted that the client of the lawyer has the option of waiving any 
right to legal privilege.
31
  If legal privilege is waived the lawyer is required to disclose.  
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In South Africa, taxpayers may lawfully refuse to supply information to the Commissioner 
which is subject to legal professional privilege.  Law firm Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs 
(2011:11) explains that in principle, legal professional privilege applies where a person 
seeks legal advice from an attorney or advocate on a professional basis (the so-called 
"advice privilege") or where advice is sought in anticipation of litigation from an attorney 
or advocate acting in a professional capacity (the so-called "litigation privilege").   
 
Noteworthy is the fact that legal privilege is only extended to qualified attorneys or 
advocates of the High Court.   However, it does not follow that simply by virtue of the 
person being an advocate or an attorney, legal privilege will be afforded to everything said 
by or to the advocate or attorney;  he or she must have acted as an advisor in a professional 
capacity (Perry 2008).  Therefore, before legal professional privilege can be claimed, any 
communication between a client and attorney or advocate must have been made to a legal 
advisor acting in a professional capacity, in confidence, for the purpose of pending 
litigation or for the purpose of obtaining professional advice (Croome 2007:52). 
 
It should be pointed out that under existing statutory provisions, tax advice supplied by an 
accountant to a client is not subject to legal professional privilege (Edward Nathan 
Sonnenbergs 2011:14).  It should be cautioned that where an accountant provides tax 
advice (including advice on the structuring of arrangements that might fall within the ambit 
of the reportable arrangements provisions), such advice is not protected by legal 
professional privilege.
32
   
 
It is therefore submitted that SARS should take the client/attorney privilege into 
consideration so as to adequately address the scenario where the promoter is also a lawyer.  
                                                                                                                                                                
 any waiver must be made within sufficient time to enable the lawyer to disclose within five days of 
the scheme being made available; otherwise the client must make the disclosure within five or 30 
days, as applicable, of the first transaction; and 
 any waiver can be limited by the client so as to apply only to the extent necessary to enable the 
lawyer to comply with the disclosure obligation and to have no relevance for any other purpose. 
32
 Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs (2011:14) contends that, if called on by SARS, such advice would (on the 
face of it) be required to be supplied to SARS.  This could place attorneys and advocates in a preferential 
position in advising clients on tax matters.  It should be noted that the TAB currently does not contain a 













It is furthermore proposed that legal professional privilege should also be extended to 
accountants who act as tax advisors.  The next paragraph will address the term ―directly or 
indirectly‖ which is also contained in the section 80T definition of a ―participant‖. 
 
3.8.2  Directly or Indirectly 
 
Part (b) of the section 80T definition of a participant (in relation to a reportable 
arrangement) refers to any company or trust which directly or indirectly derives or assumes 
that it derives a tax benefit or financial benefit by virtue of that arrangement.  The ordinary 
meaning of the words ―directly‖ and ―indirectly‖ are as follows: 
 






Indirectly ·adverb  not direct;
18
 not going straight to the point; not 




In the case of SIR v. Consolidated Citrus Estates Ltd (1967) Galgut JA explained [at 
paragraph 148] that: 
 
―Directly appears to have been deliberately added in order to serve some purpose that the 
Legislature had in mind.  The purpose, I think, was to postulate that the connection between the 
taxpayer‘s incurring the expenditure and the object for which it was incurred…should be direct, i.e. 
straight and close, not devious and remote.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Thus, the word ―directly‖ implies an exact, straight and close manner.  The word 
―indirectly‖ implies something devious and remote, or not straightforward.  As the words 
―directly‖ and ―indirectly‖ are antonyms, by using them simultaneously, the scope of 
section 80M(1) has been widened.  An arrangement can therefore directly or indirectly 
cause a benefit to be derived. 
 
The next paragraph will examine the meaning of the words contained in section 80N(3), 















3.9  Section 80N(3) Terminology 
 
Of specific interest is the wording of section 80N(3), namely that the excluded list of 
section 80N(1) does not apply to any arrangement that is entered into with the main 
purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit.  The meaning of the terms ―main 
purpose‖, ―enhance‖, ―undue‖ and ―main benefit‖ will be analysed. 
 
3.9.1  Main purpose 
 
The ordinary meaning of the word ―purpose‖ is as follows: 
 
Purpose ·noun  the reason for which something is done or for which something 
exists;
18
 the object or aim in doing something
19
. 
             ·verb  have as one‘s objective
18





Tax avoidance is based on the purpose of the arrangement or the person undertaking the 
arrangement as the essential distinction between permissible tax planning and 
impermissible tax avoidance.  The word ―purpose‖ appears in the opening words of section 
80A of the GAAR provisions: 
 
―An avoidance arrangement is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if its sole or main purpose 
was to obtain a tax benefit…‖ [own emphasis]. 
 
Note the clear reference to the purpose of the arrangement itself (by using the determiner 
―its‖) and not to the purpose of the taxpayer.  Based on Lord Denning‘s judgment in 
Newton v. COT (1958), purpose in this sense means not intention, but the effect which it 
sought to achieve, i.e. the end accomplished or achieved.  It is thus not a subjective test, 
but an objective one. 
 
De Koker (2010:par19.6) contends that the words ―purpose‖ and ―effect‖ have usually 
been construed in case law as a composite term.  If an arrangement has a particular 
purpose, then that will be its intended effect (i.e. the intention of the taxpayer is irrelevant).  
If an arrangement has a particular effect, then that will be its purpose.  Oral evidence to 













arrangement itself, is irrelevant to the determination of the question whether the 
arrangement has (or purports to have) the purpose or effect of in any way altering the 
incidence of income tax. 
 
However, in the reportable arrangements provision of section 80N(3) the wording is 
slightly different.  Section 80N(3)(a) states that subsection (1) does not apply to any 
arrangement that is entered into with the main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax 
benefit. 
 
Section 80N(3) thus refers to the situation where the arrangement was entered into with the 
main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit.  It refers, therefore, to the intention 
of the taxpayer (in this case the participant to the arrangement) and not to the effect which 
it sought to achieve.  It is therefore submitted that the proper test to apply in this case, is a 
subjective test, and not an objective test. 
 
In the case of SIR v. Geusteyn, Forsyth and Joubert (1971), a subjective test was applied.  
In the case of SIR v. Gallagher (1978), the subjective test took as its criterion the purpose 
that those carrying out the scheme intended to achieve by it.  Thus, the question to be 
asked is: what was in the mind of the taxpayer who entered into the transaction? 
 
It was determined in CIR v. Conhage (1999) that where a taxpayer is presented with a 
choice between two single transactions as alternative methods of achieving the same 
commercial end result, but which have quite different tax consequences – for example the 
choice between lease finance and suspensive sale finance of a moveable asset – it is 
considered that, irrespective of which transaction type is selected, the main purpose of that 
transaction cannot be the obtaining of a tax benefit. 
 
This judicial approach emanated from the so-called principle of choice expounded in IRC 
v. Duke of Westminster (1936) where  Lord Tomlin expressed that taxpayers are entitled to 
order their affairs so the tax attaching is less than it otherwise would be.
33
   
                                                     
33
 The choice principle proceeds on the footing that the taxpayer is entitled to create a situation by entering 
into a transaction which would attract tax consequences for which the Act makes a specific provision.  The 













In the South African context, the choice principle was affirmed by the Conhage case.  The 
court confirmed that where two alternative methods of achieving largely the same 
commercial results are available to a taxpayer, his purpose in choosing the alternative 
which carries the more advantageous tax consequences amounts to a subsidiary or 
incidental purpose, and not the main or sole purpose of the transaction.  The main purpose 
remains that of achieving the commercial result. 
 
In ITC 1636 (60 SATC 267) Kroon J cited various cases to ascertain the meaning of ―solely 
or mainly‖ in the context of section 103(1).  The first case that he referred to, was ITC 983 
(25 SATC 55), where the court dealt with section 90(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act No. 31 of 
1941.  This provision contained words similar to those in section 103(1), viz. ―solely or 
mainly for the purpose‖.  The court stated the following [at page 58]: 
 
―… for the section to operate the avoidance of tax must at least have been the principal purpose of 
the taxpayer. In the present case the court is satisfied that although the avoidance or reduction of 
tax was one of the purposes, it was not the main purpose. The main purpose was to obtain a 
production unit which could go into immediate operation, as indeed the Appellant company did.‖ 
 
Thereafter, Kroon J referred to ITC 1307 (42 SATC 147) which dealt with a previous 
version of section 103(1) which contained the words ―the sole or one of the main 
purposes‖.  The court investigated the meaning of the word ―main‖ and found it to mean 
[at page 153]: 
 
―... principal, major and most important, and the ascertainment of a main purpose involves a 
weighing against each other of the various purposes of a scheme. In a case such as the present, 
where at most two purposes have been suggested (a saving on income tax and a saving on estate 
duty), if one purpose preponderates over the other it cannot be said that the other is a main 
purpose.‖ 
 
Kroon J concluded that the mere fact that one purpose is regarded as not being of the same 
importance as another purpose, it does not preclude the former purpose from being one of 
the main purposes.  He stated [at page 334], that: 
                                                                                                                                                                















―It is not necessary, for more than one purpose to qualify for the epithet of 'main', that each of the 
purposes be of equal importance. Provided that a particular purpose, viewed by itself, is of 
sufficient importance to attract the description of 'main' in the sense of being a major inducing 
consideration, it matters not that another purpose featured more prominently. …  In short, to qualify 
as the main purpose, the purpose in question must preponderate over any other purpose (or, 
possibly, at least be as important as any other purpose).‖ [own emphasis]. 
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.4) note that an issue which has never been considered by 
the courts is exactly how a main purpose is to be determined.  The commercial 
consequences of a transaction may have both quantitative (i.e. numerical) and qualitative 
(i.e. business efficiency) components, whereas the tax benefit to be weighed in the balance 
is purely quantitative.  The question then arises as to how one must give weight to 
qualitative consequences? 
 
As indicated earlier by the Conhage case, single step arrangements with real substantive 
commercial advantages for the taxpayer will always have as its main purpose a non-tax 
benefit.  In the case of multi-step transactions, however, there may be elements present 
where the commercial advantages are less clearly dominant, notwithstanding that they 
contribute to the overall commercial result.   
 
Clegg and Stretch (2010:par26.3.4) suggest that in such situations, the question should be 
whether that particular step is commercially necessary in achieving the final commercial 
result or whether it could be dispensed with without affecting the commercial end.  The 
authors submitted that if that step can be dispensed with, the main reason for its 
incorporation would be the tax benefit. 
 
A final question to be addressed is determining the time the arrangement was entered into.  
Should the main purpose be determined at the time when the arrangement was 
implemented or when it was first conceived?  In Ovenstone v. CIR (1980) Trollip JA 
delivered the judgment [at page 68] that: 
 
―even if the purpose or effect of [a] scheme when it is formulated is not to avoid liability for tax, it 
may have that effect or that may become one of the taxpayer‘s main purposes when he subsequently 













Thus, the purpose of a scheme when it is first formulated may not be to avoid tax but this 
may become the purpose at the time of implementation.  The next paragraph will discuss 
the meaning of the word ―enhance‖. 
 
3.9.2  Enhance 
 
Section 80N(3) refers to the enhancing of a tax benefit.  The ordinary meaning of the word 
―enhance‖ is as follows: 
 




In order to enhance a tax benefit, it presupposes the existence of a tax benefit.  This, in 
itself, is problematic, as was discussed in earlier paragraphs.  One must therefore consider 
two things when interpreting the meaning of the word ―enhance‖.  Firstly, the existence of 
a tax benefit must be established and secondly, the value of that tax benefit has to increase 
after the arrangement was entered into.  SARS identifies two methods for determining a 
tax benefit (SARS 2010:10): 
 
(a)  Comparative method  
 
This is the method favoured by SARS.  This test compares the situation where the parties 
did not enter into an arrangement (i.e. they did nothing) with the position following the 
implementation of an arrangement.  The tax benefit is discounted over the period of the 
transaction to the date of the first cash flow of the arrangement, unless the participant is 
able to prove a more reasonable alternative method.  
 
(b)  Control transaction method  
 
The control transaction method compares the tax benefit obtained by the arrangement in 
question with the benefit that would have been obtained by a comparable transaction not 
considered to have been entered into to achieve a tax benefit. If the participants, or SARS, 
wish to rely on the control transaction method to prove that a tax benefit had not, or had, 
been attained, they must justify why the proposed method would be more appropriate than 













It is submitted that the above methods could also be used to determine whether or not a tax 
benefit was enhanced.  For example, by applying the ―comparative method‖ to an existing 
tax benefit, the participant could compare the position before and after the arrangement 
was entered into.  The value of the tax benefit is therefore compared before and after the 
implementation of the arrangement in order to determine whether it was enhanced. 
 
The next paragraph will consider the meaning of the word ―undue‖. 
 
3.9.3  Undue 
 
Section 80N(4) of the Act states that the Minister may determine an arrangement to be an 
excluded arrangement by notice in the Gazette, if he or she is satisfied that the arrangement 
is not likely to lead to an undue tax benefit.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―undue‖ is 
as follows: 
 






The dictionary definition seems to imply that an undue tax benefit, obtained by the 
participant to the arrangement, is excessive or unjustifiable.  How, exactly, should the 
excessive portion be determined and by whom? 
 
SAICA (2004a) states that the term ―undue‖ attempts to second-guess the intention of the 
legislature.  This statement is explained by the fact that in a South African tax context, the 
concepts of tax evasion and tax avoidance already exist.  ―Undue‖ introduces a new 
concept which implies that even where there is no question of tax evasion or tax avoidance, 
and where there is undisputed compliance with tax law, it must now be decided whether or 
not a legitimate tax effect of the legislation is ―undue‖. 
 
SAICA (2004a) suggests that the terms ―undue tax benefit‖ be replaced with the term 
―reporting requirement‖.  This study concurs, as the term ―reporting requirement‖ should 
achieve the intention of including and excluding specially Gazetted arrangements without 














However, the yardstick that SARS will employ to determine the excessive amount, is not 
yet evident.  It is unclear whether the R1 million exclusion in section 80N(4) is meant to be 
the yardstick.  The next paragraph will address the term ―main benefit‖. 
 
3.9.4  Main benefit 
 
The term ―one of the main benefits‖ found in section 80N(4) is, in SAICA‘s phrasing, 
―difficult to comprehend‖ (SAICA 2010a).  The plural use of the word ―benefit‖ is 
problematic as the term ―main‖ implies that there can be only one (singular) main benefit. 
 
Furthermore, the Draft Guide states that an objective test is applied in determining whether 
a tax benefit constitutes one of the main benefits and the subjective purpose of the taxpayer 
is not taken into account (SARS 2010:5).  The Draft Guide does not explain why SARS 
has adopted this approach in determining what a ―main benefit‖ is.  SAICA submits that 
while a ―tax benefit‖ can be objectively quantified (as set out in paragraph 6.3 of the Draft 
Guide), it is not possible to objectively determine whether that tax benefit is the ―main‖ 
benefit in a commercial arrangement (SAICA 2010a). 
 
SAICA (2010a) correctly argues that there may be many benefits to an arrangement; for 
example a restructuring of corporate groups may lead to commercial benefits (such as 
corporate synergy and enhanced efficiency) as well as tax benefits.  But it is unclear as to 
how SARS will objectively determine which of these benefits is more significant and is 
thus the ―main‖ benefit.  This argument is further strengthened by the section 80T 
definition of a ―tax benefit‖, i.e. the ―avoidance‖, ―postponement‖ and ―reduction of tax‖, 
as these are all purposive acts by a taxpayer.   
 
However, the Draft Guide does seem to address this predicament (SARS 2010:26) by 
stating that benefits, including commercial benefits (to the extent that these are 
quantifiable) are to be taken into account in determining whether the tax benefit is the main 
or one of the main benefits of the arrangement.  SARS points out that a quantitative 
analysis is to be carried out, and that the participant will need to demonstrate on a balance 
of probabilities that the tax benefit does not constitute the main or one of the main benefits 













The rest of the chapter is devoted to examining the meaning of the section 80M(1)(d) 
requirement of ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖.  The next paragraph will 
address the term ―reasonable‖. 
 
3.10  Reasonable 
 
Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act refers to the reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any 
participant.  The term ―reasonable‖ is the first part of the section 80M(1)(d) reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit requirement to be examined.  The ordinary meaning of the 
word ―reasonable‖ is as follows: 
 
Reasonable ·adjective  not extravagant or excessive; moderate;
18
 sensible; 





The ordinary meaning of the word ―reasonable‖ is described as moderate, fair or rational.  
The term ―reasonable‖ is nowhere defined in the Act.  South Africa‘s common law, 
however, does contain guidance on the definition of a ―reasonable person‖, as this term is a 
legal fiction representing an objective standard against which any individual‘s conduct can 
be measured. 
 
It is submitted that by applying these common law principles, one could infer that a 
―reasonable expectation‖ is similar to a ―reasonable person‘s expectation‖.  This paragraph 
will therefore briefly explore the characteristics of a reasonable person. 
 
The criterion of the reasonable person is the embodiment of a standard that is always 
objective and which varies only in regard to the exigencies arising in any particular 
circumstance (Jones NO v. Santam Bpk 1965).  This standard of the diligens 
paterfamilias
34
 is a standard which is one and the same for everybody under the same 
circumstances.  Or, to state it differently, the reasonable person is the legal personification 
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 Meaning ―careful father‖ (or ―careful head of the family‖);  used to describe the way the law expects 













of the ideal standard to which everyone is required to conform (Midgley & Van der Walt, 
2005:par121).   
 
A reasonable person could be characterised as one who: 
 takes reasonable chances (Herschel v. Mrupe (1954)); 
 is not a chronic pessimist who fears the worst (Coetzee and Sons v. Smit and Another 
(1955)); 
 has the knowledge required for his work (Fred Saber (Pty) Ltd v. Franks 1949); and 
 knows and complies with the law (McMurray v. HL & H (Pty) Ltd 2000).   
 
A reasonable person is not considered to have special skills and a lack of skill or 
knowledge does not per se constitute negligence (Midgley & Van der Walt 2005:par121).  
But a reasonable person must have the necessary skills and knowledge usually associated 
with the proper discharge of his duties, as is illustrated by the commentary in the Supreme 
Court case of Durr v. Absa Bank Ltd and Another (1997) [at paragraph 11]: 
 
―It is not negligent not to be a lawyer. But those who undertake to advise clients on matters 
including an important legal component do so at their peril if they have not informed themselves 
sufficiently on the law.‖ 
 
It is therefore submitted that if a reasonable person expects to generate a profit from a 
transaction, he has a reasonable expectation of a profit.  Thus, if a promoter entered into an 
arrangement and expected to generate a profit from that arrangement, he or she can only be 
considered to have a ―reasonable expectation of a profit‖ if that promoter is deemed to be a 
reasonable person.  Cleary, this is a subjective test and a more objective approach than the 
―reasonable person‖ test is required.   
 
The next paragraph will explore the meaning of the term ―expectation‖. 
 
3.11  Expectation 
 
The term ―expectation‖ is the second part of the section 80M(1)(d) reasonable expectation 
of a pre-tax profit requirement to be examined.  The ordinary meaning of the word 

















The word ―expectation‖ is derived from the term ―expect‖, which has an ordinary meaning 
defined as follows: 
 
Expect ·verb  to require something as rightfully due or appropriate in the 
circumstances;
18




The ordinary meaning of the word ―expectation‖ is described as a strong belief that 
something is likely to happen and which is appropriate in the circumstances.  This is in 
contrast with the term ―assumption‖, which has the following ordinary meaning: 
 
Assumption ·noun  a thing that is accepted as true r as certain to happen;
18
 




An assumption is therefore a certainty that something will happen (as was alluded to in the 
paragraph 3.6 discussion of ―assume‖ earlier in this chapter), whereas an expectation is a 
belief that something is likely to happen.  Consequently, expecting a pre-tax profit is not 
akin to being certain of generating a profit.   
 
It will be seen in Chapter 4 that, as regards the Canadian REOP test, the existence of a 
reasonable expectation is not to be determined by the presence of subjective hopes or 
aspirations (no matter how genuine or deep-felt they may be), nor of an expectation that 
the taxpayer in good faith entertains the effect that a profit will eventually be realised.  The 
expectation must be proven by objective factors.  It is submitted that the same holds true 
for the South African ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement. 
 
The term ―expectation‖ is nowhere defined in the Act.  Although not directly related to the 
objectives of this study, it might be appropriate to draw attention to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectation in administrative law. Quinot (2004:543) states that South African 
administrative law has protected individuals‘ legitimate expectations at least since the 













administrator to adhere to the audi alteram partem
35
 principle where the individual 
concerned has a legitimate expectation of a favourable decision or of a hearing before a 
decision is taken.   
 
The principle at the root of the doctrine is the so-called Rule of Law, which requires 
regularity, predictability and certainty regarding the government‘s dealing with the public 
(Watkin 2009:18).  An expectation could be based on an express promise, or representation 




Interestingly, this doctrine takes into account past action, whereas the reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit requirement seems to require a consideration of future 
actions or events.  At any rate, there is clearly a need for objective guidelines in 
determining the existence of a ―reasonable expectation‖.  To conclude the discussion of the 
section 80M(1)(d) requirement, the next paragraph will explore the meaning of the term 
―profit‖. 
 
3.12  Profit 
 
The term ―profit‖ is the third part of the section 80M(1)(d) reasonable expectation of a pre-
tax profit requirement to be examined.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―profit‖ is as 
follows: 
 
Profit ·noun  the net gain made in a commercial transaction or series of                           
transactions;
18




The ordinary meaning of the word ―profit‖ is deceptively plain.  As will be seen from the 
following definition in the Act, profit is somewhat more difficult to determine.  The term 
―pre-tax profit‖ is defined in section 80T so as to mean: 
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 This literally means to ―hear the other side‖.  It is most often used to refer to the principle that no person 
should be judged without a fair hearing in which each party is given the opportunity to respond to the 
evidence against them. 
36














―the profit of a participant resulting from that arrangement before deducting any normal tax, which 
profit must be determined in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Practice after taking 
into account all costs and expenditure incurred by that participant in connection with the 
arrangement and after deducting any foreign taxes paid or payable by that participant.‖ 
 
The reference to GAAP necessitates a closer look at the accounting definition of a profit.  
Thus, in order to determine the meaning of profit, the IAS definition applies.  An 
accounting ―profit or loss‖ is defined in paragraph 7 of IAS 1, Presentation of Financial 
Statements (IASB 2010a), as the total of income less expenses, excluding the components 
of other comprehensive income. 
 
―Income‖ is defined in the Framework (IASB 2010b), paragraph 74, so as to encompass 
both revenue and gains.  Revenue, which is also defined in paragraph 74, arises in the 
course of the ordinary activities of an entity and is referred to by a variety of different 
names, including sales, fees, interest, dividends, royalties and rent. 
 
―Gains‖, as defined in paragraph 75, represent other items that meet the definition of 
income and may, or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities of an entity.  
Gains represent increases in economic benefits and as such are no different in nature from 
revenue.  The Framework includes examples such as gains arising from the disposal of 
non-current assets and also includes unrealised gains (resulting, for example, from 
increases in the carrying amount of long-term assets). 
 
The accounting definition of ―income‖ therefore differs from the tax treatment of income.  
―Income‖ is defined in section 1 of the Act so as to mean the amount remaining of the 
gross income of any person for any year or period of assessment after deducting therefrom 
any amounts exempt from normal tax under Part 1 of Chapter II. 
 
Gross income is also defined in section 1 of the Act as the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of the taxpayer during the year of 
assessment, but excludes receipts or accruals of a capital nature.  As a result, with the 
exception of amounts subject to capital gains tax in terms of the Eighth Schedule of the 
Act, it is only receipts or accruals of a non-capital nature that are included in taxable 













income, but at an inclusion rate of 25% in the case of natural persons (or special trusts) and 
50% in the case of legal entities.  In the accounting definition, the full amount of the gain, 
i.e. the amount which is capital of nature, is included in ―income‖. 
 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to expound on the many court cases that distinguish 
between ―income‖ and ―capital‖ amounts.  In CIR v. Visser (1937), Maritz J summarised 
the distinction as follows [at paragraph 276]: 
 
―If we take the economic meaning of ―capital‖ and ―income‖, the one excludes the other. 
―Income‖ is what ―capital‖ produces, or is something in the nature of interest or fruit as opposed 
to principal or tree. This economic distinction is a useful guide in matters of income tax, but its 
application is very often a matter of great difficulty, for what is principal or tree in the hands of one 
man may be interest or fruit in the hands of another.‖ 
 
―Expenses‖ is defined in the Framework (IASB 2010b), paragraph 78, so as to encompass 
losses as well as those expenses that arise in the course of the ordinary activities of the 
entity (for example, cost of sales, wages and depreciation). 
 
―Losses‖, as defined in paragraph 79, represent other items that meet the definition of 
expenses and may, or may not, arise in the course of the ordinary activities of the entity.  
Losses represent decreases in economic benefits and as such they are no different in nature 
from other expenses.  The Framework includes examples such as losses resulting from 
disasters such as fire and flood, as well as those arising on the disposal of non-current 
assets. 
 
―Other comprehensive income‖, in turn, is also defined in IAS 1, paragraph 7, and 
comprises items of income and expense (including reclassification adjustments) that are 
not recognised in profit or loss as required or permitted by other IFRS provisions.
37
   
                                                     
37 The components of other comprehensive income include: changes in revaluation surplus, actuarial gains 
and losses on defined benefit plans, gains and losses arising from translating the financial statements of a 
foreign operation, gains and losses from investments in equity instruments measured at fair value through 















Thus, when determining the meaning of the term ―pre-tax profit‖, effect must be given to 
the accounting treatment thereof.  Briefly, a pre-tax profit is the total of income less 
expenses and excludes comprehensive income.  Also, an accounting ―income‖ takes the 
full amount of a capital gain into account, whereas a tax ―income‖ excludes amounts of a 
capital nature. 
 
In terms of section 80T, the pre-tax profit must be determined before deducting normal tax, 
but after taking into account costs and expenditure incurred in connection with the 
arrangement and after deducting foreign tax paid or payable.  One could question whether 
it is not redundant for the definition to state that the costs of the arrangement must be 
deducted from the pre-tax profit, as presumably, these costs would already have been 
deducted as part of accounting expenses.  Also questionable is the deduction of foreign 
taxes, as the section 80T definition is in respect of a pre-tax profit.   
 
The next paragraph will address the meaning of the term ―resulting from‖ as the section 
80T definition of a ―pre-tax profit‖ refers to the profit resulting from that arrangement. 
 
3.13  Resulting From 
 
Section 80T of the Act defines a pre-tax profit and refers to the profit of a participant 
resulting from that arrangement.  The ordinary meaning of the word ―result‖ is as follows: 
 
Result ·verb  to arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion from some action;
18
                                                                                                     




Thus, the word ―result‖ refers to the end or outcome of an arrangement.  It also refers to 
the effect of the arrangement, as evidenced by Lord Denning‘s statement in Newton v. COT 
(1958) [at paragraph 763] that the word ―effect‖ means the end accomplished or achieved.  
Moreover, as was also stated in the Newton case, the effect of an arrangement must be 
determined objectively, irrespective of the motive of the parties.   
 
It is thus necessary for an objective standard to determine whether or not a pre-tax profit 













whether section 80M(1)(d) is applicable, the result of an arrangement has to be a 
reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit, which result must be objectively measured. 
 
The next, and final paragraph, will briefly incorporate the few criteria for a ―reasonable 
expectation‖ that have been identified by South African courts. 
 
3.14  South African Criteria for a “Reasonable Expectation” 
 
The term ―reasonable expectation‖ (which is only one element of the ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ concept) has been considered by our Courts a few times 
when determining whether or not an expense incurred in connection with immovable 
property let at a loss, is an allowable deduction in terms of section 11(a).  The principle 
that expenses incurred in connection with rental losses do not qualify as a deduction unless 
there is a reasonable expectation of realising a rental profit is found in, amongst others, 
ITC 561 (13 SATC 313), ITC 1292 (41 SATC 163) and ITC 1367 (45 SATC 39).   
 
These court cases, however, only refer to the specific instances of rental losses and do not 
provide objective guidelines applicable to any other arrangement.  Furthermore, the above-
mentioned cases appeared before the Income Tax Court, which is not a court of law.  It has 
no inherent jurisdiction (as is possessed by the Highest Court of Appeal) and is not bound 
by its own decisions (Clegg & Stretch 2010:par2.4.1).  A decision of the Special Court is 
only binding on the parties to the specific case (Stiglingh, Koekemoer, van Schalkwyk, 
Wilcocks, de Swardt & Jordaan 2011:8). The term ―reasonable expectation‖ is thus only 
addressed specifically in the context of rental losses and the judgments from these court 
cases are also not binding.   
 
However, for the sake of completeness, the factors identified in the above court cases will 
be included in the model which will be discussed in Chapter 5.  The model (as well as the 
table of objective factors identified in the Canadian REOP test in Chapter 4) will be 
submitted as part of the questionnaire for the survey which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
In ITC 561 (13 SATC 313) the court considered whether there was hope of profit being 













repayment of the loan taken out to finance the purchase and other expenses.  The court 
found [at page 131] that the prospects of earning a profit at the time of the purchase were 
non-existent but were not per se decisive.  The taxpayer was expected to have made some 
inquiries as to the viability of the proposition. 
 
In ITC 1292 (41 SATC 163) the court held that the intention to make a profit from farming 
activities must be a genuine intention.  The court noted that because intention is always 
subjective it is difficult to determine if it is genuine or not;  it could only be determined 
with regard to the objective facts.  Furthermore, the person's ipse dixit cannot be decisive; 
if his activities are in no way reconcilable with his ipse dixit then his ipse dixit cannot be 
accepted.  If, however, his ipse dixit is supported by objective facts, his intention is 
regarded as genuine. 
 
The court laid down the following test [at page 165-166]: 
 
 ―If the possibility to earn a profit is excluded by the evidence, as is the position in the present case, 
then such expenses are not deductible. The test is the real hope to make a profit. Such hope must not 
be based on fanciful expectations but on reasonable possibility.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
In ITC 1367 (45 SATC 39) the court concluded [at paragraph 47] that the fact that profits 
may be earned at some future date cannot influence the decision in relation to a particular 
year where no profits were made unless that possibility has been established to be a 
reasonable possibility. The court held that, although the taxpayer did not have a reasonable 
prospect of making a profit in each year, he did have a reasonable prospect of making a 
profit in the future. 
 
In CSARS v. Smith (2002), a case similar to the Canadian ―hobby farm‖ cases (which are 
discussed in Chapter 5) appeared before the Supreme Court of Appeal.  The issue was 
whether farming operations could be carried on as contemplated in section 26(1) of the Act 
in the absence of a reasonable prospect that profit will be derived from such operations.  
Hefer AJA held [at page 14-15]: 
 
―Neither the words of our statute nor the context of section 26 provide a discernible reason for 













intention to make a  profit.  As far as the contention that such an objective element is necessary to 
facilitate the Commissioner's evaluation is concerned, it is commonplace in our law to refer to  
objective criteria in order to determine a subjective intention ...  That is, however, no reason to 
elevate the objective facts above the subjective element...‖. 
 
Notably, the Court did not regard the objective criteria as elevated above the taxpayer‘s 
subjective intention.  
 
These ―rental loss‖ criteria unfortunately do not add any usable objective factors to assist 
in determining whether or not there is a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ in the 
context of any other arrangement.  As such, the objective guidelines identified by Canadian 
courts and tax practitioners in the application of the Canadian REOP test are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  It will be seen that, based on the REOP test, a reasonable expectation must be 
proven by objective factors, and not the taxpayer‘s subjective expectations. 
 
3.15  Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that many of the terms in section 80M(1)(d) are defined in section 80T, 
some of these definitions are difficult to apply in practice.  Other terms have not been 
defined at all.  This chapter examined the meaning of the words in section 80M(1)(d) in 
order to determine the nature and scope of section 80M(1)(d) and to assist in applying the 
objective factors contained in the Canadian REOP test.   
 
It was determined that the primary aim of statutory interpretation should be to ensure that 
the statute is in accordance with the aim and values of the Constitution.  The Bill of Rights 
encourages the courts to consider international law and allows them to consider foreign 
law.  Thus, the rules of interpretation determine that a statute may be viewed in the context 
of comparative and foreign law.  Granted, foreign case law (and thus the Canadian REOP 
test) is not binding on our courts.  But, provided the REOP test does not violate the 
principles and the jurisprudence of our common law, it may be of considerable assistance 
and of persuasive value in shedding light on how other legal systems (most notably 















Numerous submissions were made in an effort to clarify the meaning of section 80M(1)(d);  
many of which are included in the survey conducted among tax partners at a sample of 
audit and legal firms (see Chapter 6).  The complete list of submissions and 
recommendations is contained in Annexure C. 
 
Having examined the language of section 80M(1)(d), it is evident that the ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement is subjective and that a more objective 
approach is required.  Chapter 4 will identify some objective guidelines by examining the 




























Examining the  
Reasonable Expectation of Profit 










“The reasonable expectation of profit  
is an objective determination to be made from all the facts.” 
 













CHAPTER  4 
Examining the REOP test in Canada 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The meaning of the words contained in section 80M(1)(d) was examined in Chapter 3 and 
was found to be subjective.  This subjective interpretation could lead to much uncertainty 
in practice and the need for objective guidelines is clearly evident.   
 
Chapter 2 noted that in the Reportable Arrangements Guide (SARS 2005), the 
international tax position is referred to regarding tax disclosure requirements.  One of the 
countries that is specifically mentioned in this guide is Canada, as it has well developed 
reportable transaction legislation in the form of tax shelter rules.   
 
As was stated in Chapter 1, Canada appears to be the only country that contains a similar 
requirement to South Africa‘s ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement as 
contained in section 80M(1)(d).  Section 248(1) of the Canadian ITA prohibits the 
deduction of personal and living expenses and refers to a REOP test in determining 
whether or not an expense is for business or private purposes.
38
  The test has been 
developed over 70 years of research and court cases and has led to the emergence of 
objective standards used by Canadian tax practitioners.   
 
As was discussed under the rules of interpretation in Chapter 3, both the South African Act 
and the Canadian ITA contain a similar ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ requirement.  As 
such, the Canadian court cases (and the Canadian REOP test) are relevant when 
interpreting a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.  Accordingly, it is submitted that 
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  In that sense, the purpose of the REOP test is perhaps more similar to the general deduction formula of 
section 11(a), read with section 23(g), of the Act, although the wording echoes that of section 80M(1)(d).  
The REOP test has a much wider application compared with section 80M(1)(d), as the latter only forms 
part of the reportable arrangements provisions, wheras the REOP test could apply in any scenario.  One 
could therefore argue that, although there are contextual differences, the wider scope of the REOP test 
automatically encompasses arrangements falling within the narrower scope of the reportable arrangements 
provisions.  As such, the REOP test may be of use in establishing whether the ―reasonable expectation of a 













South African courts may consider applying the Canadian REOP test to a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to compile a comprehensive list of objective 
factors to address the subjective nature of section 80M(1)(d).  This will be done by 
analysing the Canadian REOP test.  The legislative history of the REOP test and Canada‘s 
source of income rules will be examined.  This chapter will also address various practical 
problems of the REOP test encountered by Canadian taxpayers. 
 
4.2  Background 
 
The Canadian income tax system is largely based on the ―source of income‖ rule – a 
fundamental assumption that only gains and losses that flow from a source of income are 
to be taken into account to determine a taxpayer‘s income and resulting tax. 
 
The Interpretation Bulletin IT-334R2, Miscellaneous Receipts, issued by the Canada 
Revenue Agency (CRA) states that in order for any activity or pursuit to be regarded as a 
source of income, there must be a REOP.  Where such an expectation does not exist, 
neither amounts received nor expenses incurred are included in the income tax calculation 
(CRA 1992).  A judicial doctrine is thus relied upon to identify a source of income by 
testing for a REOP.   
 
Williamson and Chapman (2010:175) state that the REOP test was often used by the 
Canadian tax authorities to determine whether a business venture had a serious profit-
making objective or whether it was an enterprise that, for one or more reasons, had less 
focus on profit-making and a greater focus on another objective. 
 
The legislative history and development of the REOP test will be examined in the next 

















4.3  The Legislative History and Development of the REOP Test 
 
The REOP test was developed as part of the ―personal and living‖ expenses provisions of 
the Canadian tax laws.  The first reference to personal and living expenses is found in 
Canada‘s first income tax legislation - the Income War Tax Act (IWTA).  Paragraph 6(f) 
was introduced to the IWTA in 1927, thereby disallowing the deduction of personal or 
living expenses.  The rationale for this prohibition is explained in the case of Maurice 
Samson v. Minister of National Revenue (1943:64): 
 
―It is obvious that the determination of what the taxable income of a taxpayer shall be cannot 
depend upon or be left to the taxpayer’s own choice.‖  [Own emphasis]. 
 
Two court cases were instrumental in the development of the REOP test.  The first of these 
was the Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Field (1933:877-878) where the US Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that: 
 
―if the right to deduct losses under the statute required that profit appear to the court to be possible, 
that requirement would be quite general and would be applicable to any enterprise, whether it was 
farming, manufacturing, or promotion of any character.  We may not, in this way, foredoom any 
business venture.‖ 
 
The same case made another important point [at paragraph 878]: 
 
  ―…we think the respondent embarked in these enterprises with the expectation of making profits;  
at least he did so, with an earnest and honest intention.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
A few years later, the case of Hatch v. MNR (1938:98) found that a venture operated in 
good faith for profit constituted a business.  It is clear from the above two cases that the 
courts considered the genuineness of the taxpayer‘s intention to generate a profit and not 
whether they had, realistically speaking, a reasonable expectation to do so (Steenkamp 
2010:75).   
 
The IWTA was amended in 1939 to add the requirement that the taxpayer had to have a 
good-faith intention to earn profits as well as a reasonable expectation of doing so.  This 













expenses‖.  Subparagraph 2(r)(i) was added which defined ―personal and living expenses‖ 
so as to include: 
 
―the expenses of properties maintained by any person for the use or benefit of any taxpayer or any 
person connected with him by blood relationship, marriage or adoption, and not maintained in 
connection with a business carried on bona fide for a profit and not maintained with a reasonable 
expectation of profit.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Thus, the concept of a REOP test was first introduced to Canadian tax law in 1939 during 
the second reading of the IWTA Amendment Bill in the House of Commons (Canada 
House of Commons 1939).  The Minister of National Revenue explained the introduction 
of the test as follows: 
 
―The effect of this section is to make it impossible for taxpayers to deduct as a business 
expense…the expenses of properties…not maintained in connection with a business carried on bona 
fide for profit, and not maintained with a reasonable expectation of profit.‖ [Own emphasis].   
 
The examples above include gentleman farming operations and private stables that are not 
carried on bona fide for profit and are not maintained with any reasonable expectation of 
profit.  These operations are of such a nature that they sometimes incur heavy losses.  But, 
as was noted in Steenkamp (2010:75), since there is no REOP, these losses are not 
deductible as they are considered to be personal expenses (i.e. not from a source of 
income). 
 
In 1948 the IWTA was replaced by the ITA and the definition of ―personal and living 
expenses‖ was reworded.  This definition is now contained in section 248(1) of the ITA 
and reads: 
 
―the expenses of properties maintained by any person for the use or benefit of the taxpayer or any 
person connected with the taxpayer by blood relationship, marriage or adoption, and not 
maintained in connection with a business carried on for profit or with a reasonable expectation of 
profit.”  [Own emphasis]. 
 
The new definition effected two distinct changes, namely the deletion of the words ―bona 













Prior to this change, the taxpayer had to demonstrate that he was conducting a business 
with a bona fide profit motive and that he had a reasonable expectation to generate a profit 
from that business.   
 
Steenkamp (2010:76) states that the case of McLaughlin Executor v. MNR (1952) 
contained two compelling arguments as to why the change in wording was confusing.  
Firstly, the new either/or test makes the wording of ―reasonable expectation‖ questionable, 
as presumably, the required profit motive would always be present where there was a 
REOP.  Secondly, the deletion of bona fide was probably intended to make the test stricter 
so that an actual profit was required.  However, the deletion rendered the first profit 
criterion redundant, since these situations are presumably covered by the second REOP 
criterion. 
 
Fien (1995:1292) suggests that a REOP is an inherent ingredient of a business.  He 
logically questions why the need exists to include the words ―for profit‖ or ―with a 
reasonable expectation of profit‖ in the definition of personal or living expenses.   
 
As the REOP test must be applied in order to determine a ―source of income‖, the next 
paragraph will address the evolvement of Canada‘s source rules. 
 
4.4  The Evolvement of Canada‟s “Source of Income” Rules 
 
The ―source‖ concept was initially derived from the English taxation statutes (Arnold, 
Edgar & Li 1993:49).  Section 3 of the IWTA defined ―income‖ so as to include: 
 
 ―the annual net profit from a trade or commercial or financial or other business… and also the 
annual profit or gain from any other source.‖ 
 
Section 3(a) of the ITA defines the calculation of income for the year as an attempt to: 
 
―determine the total of all amounts, each of which is the taxpayer‘s income for the year (other than 
a taxable capital gain from the disposition of a property) from a source inside or outside Canada, 
including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the taxpayer‘s income for the year 













The ITA contains no other definition of ―source‖ and thus common law principles are 
applied to define a source.  In Nathan v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1918:189), 
the word ―source‖ was not viewed as a legal concept, but something which a practical man 
would regard as a real source of income.  The Canadian courts have also referred to a 
source as an originating cause of receipts (The Queen v. Kuhl et al 1974:6032).  
Traditionally, the courts have referred to a source as that which ―bears the fruit of the tree‖ 
(Front & Simcoe Ltd v. MNR 1960:1087). 
 
According to Hansen (1978:142), income, as stated in conformity with the source concept, 
is characterised by the following attributes: 
 
 recurring on a periodic basis, 
 proceeding from a productive source, and 
 representing the creation of new wealth. 
 
Fien (1995:1296) states that the concept of a business, as determined from early case law, 
was consistent with this notion of source and that it involves two components, namely 
 
(a) the pursuit of profit (or, in other words, intention) and 
(b) habitual activity (or, in other words, behaviour). 
 
As the ITA refers to ―business‖ in the income definition, it is necessary to ascertain what 
the meaning of ―business‖ is.  A ―business‖ is defined in section 248(1) of the ITA, so as to 
include a profession, calling, trade, manufacture or undertaking of any kind whatsoever 
and an adventure or concern in the nature of trade. A business does not, however, include 
an office or employment. 
 
Steenkamp (2010:77) regards the time the business was started as an important point to 
consider, as a taxpayer must carry on a business in the fiscal period during which the 
expense was incurred.  To this end, the CRA issued the Interpretation Bulletin IT-364, 
Commencement of Business Operations, providing guidelines as to when a business is 














 A business commences whenever some significant activity is undertaken that is a 
regular part of the income-earning process in that type of business or is an essential 
preliminary to normal operations; 
 There must be a fairly specific concept of the type of activity to be carried on; and 





Until the 1970s, the existence of a source did not appear to be dependent on a REOP (Fien 
1995:1296). The income tax cases that dealt with losses from farming activities 
(commonly referred to as the ―hobby farm‖ cases) only started referring to the source issue 
in the early seventies.   
 
One earlier case, J.S. Stewart v. MNR (1964:5338), which concerned the raising of dogs 
for use in a display advertising business, did suggest the REOP as a condition for the 
existence of a business.  The court stated that the business had to be carried out in good 
faith with a reasonable expectation of generating a profit.  Later, in O. Dorfman v. MNR 
(1972:154), the following judgment was made which confirmed this earlier decision: 
 
 ―the words ‗source of income‘ are used in the sense of a business, employment, or property from 
which a net profit might reasonably be expected to come‖.  
 
Duff (2004:399) explains that until the 1970s, Canadian courts affirmed a narrow approach 
to the application of tax legislation, according to which these statutes were interpreted in a 
strict and literal manner.  Tax consequences were based on the legal character of 
transactions and arrangements irrespective of their commercial or economic substance and 
the absence of any non-tax purpose for their existence. 
 
These judicially-established norms of literalism and formalism were highly conducive to 
tax avoidance (Sherbaniuk 1968:430) and account for much of the length and complexity 
of Canadian tax legislation.  The legislation has been drafted and amended in order to 
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 This requirement is applicable whether the projected business is intended to be a continuing one or is to be 














anticipate and respond to restrictive interpretations by the courts and taxpayer efforts to 
avoid tax burdens that might otherwise apply (Bowman 1995:1183). 
 
Steenkamp (2010:77) observes that in the 1970s, two Federal Court decisions came to 
different conclusions regarding the significance of the REOP concept.  In James v. MNR 
(1973:5341-5342), the court determined that a REOP is: 
 
―one of the indicia to be employed in determining whether or not a taxpayer in a given taxation 
year is in the business of farming.  But the converse is not true, i.e., the fact that a taxpayer in a 
given taxation year of for years before and after, had or appeared to have no reasonable 
expectation of profit is not proof in itself that he was not in the business of farming if other indicia 
establish or prove that such a taxpayer was in fact in the business of farming‖. [Own emphasis]. 
 
However, in D.A. Holley v. MNR (1973), the court stated [at paragraph 542]: 
 
―An undertaking must be carried on for profit or with a reasonable expectation of profit for it to 
come within the generally held concept of the commercial.  Profit or the reasonable expectation of 
it is inseparable from the basics of business.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Thus, in the James court case, REOP was only one of the indicia to be employed in 
determining whether or not a taxpayer in a given taxation year was in the business of 
farming.  Whereas, in the D.A. Holley court case, the court found that profit, or the 
reasonable expectation of it, was inseparable from the basics of business.  In this instance, 
the court clearly did not accept that the REOP was only one of the indicia to be considered 
in each case (Steenkamp 2010:77).  Fien (1995:299) suggests that the above cases might 
well have been the springboard to the CRA‘s adoption of a broadly-based REOP test. 
 
These differing court decisions were followed by years of court cases where the emphasis 
of the REOP test continued to shift.  Then, in 1977, the landmark Supreme Court case of 
Moldowan v. The Queen (1977) affirmed the status of the REOP test.   
 
In this case, the taxpayer had a horse-racing activity (which was considered to be a 
business) as well as a farm that suffered losses.  The court had to decide whether the 
taxpayer‘s farming was his chief source of income, in order for him to be permitted to fully 













―Although originally disputed, it is now accepted that in order to have a “source of income” the 
taxpayer must have a profit or a reasonable expectation of profit.  Source of income, thus, is an 
equivalent term to business.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Dickson J concluded that a taxpayer‘s chief source of income is decidedly not a pure 
quantum measurement, but depends upon objectively determinable economic criteria such 
as the taxpayer‘s reasonable expectation of income from his various revenue sources and 
his ordinary mode and habit of work. The Tax Court of Canada (Knight v. MNR 
1993:1259) confirmed the Moldowan findings, stating:  
 
―To have a source of income, a taxpayer must have a profit or a reasonable expectation of profit.  
Source of income, therefore, is an equivalent term to business. If a taxpayer does not have a profit 
or a reasonable expectation of profit, then he does not have a source of income.  And if he does not 
have a source of income, he does not have a business.‖  [Own emphasis]. 
 
Thus, it was affirmed that a ―source of income‖ was an quivalent term to business.  The 
carrying on of a business therefore presupposed a REOP.  Steenkamp (2010:78) notes that 
the deductibility of a private or living expense remained unchanged when the IWTA was 
replaced by the ITA in 1948.  The prohibition of a private or living expense is now 
contained in section 18(1)(h) of the ITA and reads as follows: 
 
―In computing the income of a taxpayer from a business or property no deduction shall be made in 
respect of personal or living expenses of the taxpayer, other than travel expenses incurred by the 
taxpayer while away from home in the course of carrying on the taxpayer‘s business.‖ 
 
To summarise:  in order for an incurred expense to be deductible, it must be a business 
expense (and not a private or living expense).  In addition, for an activity to qualify as a 
business, there must be a source of income.  In order to prove a source of income, the 
taxpayer must have a reasonable expectation of generating a profit from that activity.  The 
deductibility of an expense is illustrated by Figure 4.1 (Steenkamp 2010:78): 
 
Figure 4.1:  The deductibility of an expense – the Moldowan approach 
 
    Expense             Reasonable          Source of  
     incurred              expectation             income                 Business             Deductible 














However, the REOP test is regarded by many Canadian taxpayers as an unjust test as it 
was the CRA‘s favoured weapon in rejecting money-losing ventures as legitimate tax 
deductions (Reasonable expectation of profit 2002).  Fien (1995:1288) is of the opinion 
that there is little historical justification for the test as it can produce inconsistent and 
unjust results.  The next paragraph will explore an alternative to the REOP test. 
 
4.5  An Alternative Test 
 
In the years after Moldowan, the CRA relied on the REOP test to disallow the deduction of 
losses on numerous occasions – mostly in cases involving a personal element in which the 
activity engaged in by the taxpayer could be characterised as a hobby or other personal 
endeavour, but also in other cases involving ostensibly commercial activities. 
 
Due to the confusion and litigation caused by the REOP test, the need for an alternative 
test was soon realised (Steenkamp 2010:82).  It seemed, in 2002, that the Supreme Court of 
Canada had ―finally driven a stake through the heart of the REOP test‖ (Tax & Trusts E-
Newsletter 2002:19).   
 
In two landmark cases, Stewart v. Canada (2002) and Walls v. Canada (2002), a simple 
two-stage approach was established to determine whether a taxpayer had a source of 
income: 
 
1. Is the activity of the taxpayer undertaken in pursuit of profit, or is it a personal 
endeavour? 
2.  If it is not a personal endeavour, is the source of the income a business or property? 
 
The facts of the Stewart case are, briefly, as follows:  the taxpayer had purchased four 
condominium units as rental properties.  All the units were highly leveraged. The 
developer‘s projections contemplated negative cash flows and tax deductions for ten years, 
with the prospect of a capital gain at the end.  The taxpayer‘s interest expenses exceeded 














The CRA disallowed these losses on the basis that the taxpayer had no REOP, and 
therefore no source of income.  However, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the 
deduction, based on the two-step approach cited above.  It was found that the taxpayer had 
borrowed money to engage in a bona fide investment from which he had a reasonable 
expectation of income.  The court considered the anticipated gain in assessing the 
commerciality of the venture.  Consequently, the interest expense was deductible. 
 
The court emphasised that the pursuit of profit analysis is only required where a personal 
or hobby element exists.  Should this analysis be required, the REOP is one factor for 
consideration.  However, REOP is not the only factor and it is by no means conclusive 
(Tax & Trusts E-Newsletter 2002:19).   
 
To summarise:  based on the Stewart approach, in order for an incurred expense to be 
deductible, it must be a business or property expense (and not a private or living expense).  
For an activity to qualify as a business, there must be a source of income.  In order to prove 
a source of income, the taxpayer must prove that he had undertaken an activity in pursuit 
of profit.  The deductibility of an expense is illustrated by Figure 4.2 (Steenkamp 2010:83): 
 
Figure 4.2:  The deductibility of an expense – the Stewart approach 
 
 
        Expense              Pursuit                Source of            Business           Deductible                                                                    




As the Federal Court of Appeal suggested in the Tonn et al v. The Queen (1996) case, the 
REOP test does not contradict the common law definition of a business, but merely adds to 
the requirement of a subjective profit-making purpose an objective REOP requirement in 
order to assess this subjective purpose when other, more direct forms of evidence are 
lacking. 
 
However, Steenkamp (2010:83) remarks that the pursuit-of-profit test in Stewart did not 
replace the REOP test and was certainly never included in Canadian legislation.  As such, 














Fien (1995:1310) submits that the appropriate test for the existence of a ―source‖ ought not 
to be whether there is a REOP, but whether the taxpayer can establish that: 
 
1.  His predominant intention is to make a commercial profit in the activity, and 
2. The activity is carried out in accordance with objective standards of business-like 
behaviour. 
 
Fien‘s test recognises the importance of a taxpayer‘s intention, but also requires that the 
intention is substantiated by the taxpayer‘s conduct.  In order to constitute a business, there 
must be a requisite amount of effort and commitment to further the activity‘s profit-making 
prospects (Fien 1995:1310). 
 
A further benefit of this test is that it does not expose the CRA to any material risk.  Fien 
(1995:1311) argues that the requirement of predominant intention to profit favours the 
CRA where there is an ambiguous motive, as the requirement of a commercial profit 
excludes expenditures incurred merely to effect a tax reduction. 
 
The evidentiary burden on the taxpayer under this proposed test was confirmed by Lorentz 
v. MNR (1985:132), where it was stated that: 
 
―[The taxpayer] must place evidence before the Court from which it can be objectively concluded 
that his conduct was that which could be expected of a reasonably prudent person becoming 
involved in a commercial undertaking designed to extract profit‖. 
 
Steenkamp (2010:83) is of the opinion that it is unfortunate that this test was never 
submitted to, or adopted by the courts, as it would have shifted the focus to the taxpayer‘s 
conduct and away from his business judgment.  Certainly, it would have been far less 
subjective than the so-called ―objective‖ REOP test. 
 
Annexure D contains a summary of a number of important REOP principles that have 
evolved from post-Moldowan case law.  Despite these established principles, there are 
numerous practical problems surrounding the application of these principles.  The next 














4.6  Practical Problems in Applying the REOP Test 
 
Steenkamp (2010:78) states that the REOP test was typically used by the CRA in hindsight 
to deny losses and expenses incurred in a large number of unprofitable, but bona fide 
commercial ventures.  As the test is highly uncertain in its application to any given 
situation, it caused a high volume of tax litigation (Tax & Trusts E-Newsletter 2002:19).  
 
In the Moldowan case, the Supreme Court stated [at paragraph 5215] that the REOP was an 
objective determination to be made from all the facts.  Additionally, the Tax Court of 
Canada stated in Kerr & Forbes v. MNR (1984:1095) that: 
 
―The existence of a reasonable expectation of profit is not to be determined by the presence of 
subjective hopes or aspirations, no matter how genuine or deep-felt they may be.  The issue is to be 
decided by objective testing.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
Moreover, the Federal Court of Canada (W. Chequer v. The Queen 1988:259) confirmed 
the objective test by stating that: 
 
―There exists a burden of proof on every taxpayer who claims a deduction of net losses resulting 
from a business adventure, to establish that there was, at the time he engaged in and carried on with 
the business, a reasonable expectation of profit.  The reasonableness of the expectation must be 
viewed objectively and cannot merely consist of an expectation that the taxpayer in good faith 
entertains the effect that a profit will eventually be realised.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
 
It is clear, then, that the courts intended (at least since the Moldowan case) for the REOP 
test to be an objective one (Steenkamp 2010:78).  In 1995, the CRA issued the 
Interpretation Bulletin IT-504R2, Visual Artists and Writers, to provide the criteria that the 
CRA considers relevant in determining whether artists and writers have a REOP (CRA 
1995).  It states that any undertaking or activity of a taxpayer that results in profits or has a 
reasonable prospect of profits would be viewed as the carrying on of a business.   
 
In the bulletin, the CRA emphasises that the REOP test is an objective determination to be 
made from all the facts.  It acknowledges that the relevant factors to be considered in 














In Kaye v. The Queen (1998) Bowman J emphasised [at paragraphs 4 to 5] that one 
cannot view the reasonableness of the expectation of profit in isolation.  He rightly 
stated that the question to be asked by the court should be: 
 
―Would a reasonable person, looking at a particular activity and applying ordinary standards of 
commercial common sense, say ‗yes, this is a business‘?‖  
 
In answering this question, Bowman J stated that the hypothetical reasonable person would 
look at such things as capitalisation, knowledge of the participant and time spent. One 
would also have to consider whether the person claiming to be in business has gone about 
it in an orderly, businesslike way and in the way that a business person would normally be 
expected to do. 
 
The Kaye case affirmed that the REOP test boils down to a common sense appreciation of 
all of the factors, in which each is assigned its appropriate weight in the overall context.  
Bowman J acknowledged that, even though entrepreneurial vision and imagination should 
not be discounted, they are hard to evaluate at the outset.  He concluded by stating [at 
paragraph 7]: 
 
―Simply put, if you want to be treated as carrying on a business, you should act like a businessman.‖ 
 
The CRA also acknowledg s that it is possible that a taxpayer may not realise a profit 
during his lifetime but may still have a REOP.  However, the bulletin emphasises that in 
order to have a REOP, the endeavours must be carried on in a manner such that, based on 
the criteria above, they may be considered for income tax purposes to be the carrying on of 
a business, rather than a hobby. 
 
In Nichol v. The Queen (1993)  Bowman J expressed his doubts as to the singular 
importance the CRA placed on the REOP concept.  He stated [at paragraph 1218] that: 
 
―[The taxpayer] made what might, in retrospect, be seen as an error in judgment but it was a matter 
of business judgment and it was not one so patently unreasonable as to entitle this Court or the 
Minister of National Revenue to substitute its or his judgment for it, or penalize him for having 
made a judgment call that, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, that Monday morning quarterbacks 













Despite the fact that the CRA and courts have established objective factors for 
consideration, Steenkamp (2010:79) contends that the vague language of the REOP test 
left the door wide open for subjective and inconsistent interpretation.  Some of these 
anomalies are explored in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.6.1  Meaning of Profit 
 
The first question to arise is what is meant by ―profit‖.  The REOP test is a common law 
concept that was developed by the courts.  But, according to Fien (1995:1304), the 
Canadian common law has no regime of calculating income or profit.  Thus, in applying 
the REOP test, accounting principles must be used in determining a profit (Steenkamp 
2010:79).   
 
Canada has its own set of GAAP that regulates its accounting rules and provisions.  It 
should be noted that, according to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(CICA), the implementation process for the adoption of IFRS and IAS provisions is 
underway.  Mandatory adoption of IFRS relating to accounting years beginning on or after 
1 January 2011 applies to any Canadian company that qualifies as a publicly accountable 
enterprise
40
 (CICA 2010).  Private enterprises and not-for-profit organisations will be 
permitted to adopt IFRS, but are not yet required to do so. 
 
Thus, in order to determine the meaning of profit, the IAS definition applies.  As was 
previously discussed in Chapter 3, an accounting ―profit‖ is defined in paragraph 7 of IAS 
1, Presentation of Financial Statements (IASB 2010a), as the total of income less 
expenses, excluding the components of other comprehensive income.  Chapter 3 elaborated 
on the elements ―income‖, ―expenses‖ and ―comprehensive income‖. 
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 According to CICA‘s ―20 Questions Directors and Audit Committees Should Ask about IFRS Conversions‖ 
(CICA 2010:3), a publicly accountable enterprise is defined as an entity, other than a not-for-profit 
organisation, or a government or other entity in the public sector that: 
(i) has issued, or is in the process of issuing, debt or equity instruments that are, or will be, 
outstanding and traded in a public market; or 














A fairly recent Canadian Tax Court case further expounded on the meaning of ―profit‖ for 
income tax purposes.  In BBM Canada v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) (2008) 
the court considered the meaning of the term ―profit‖ in a variety of contexts.  The court 
examined the ordinary commercial meaning of profit found in various dictionaries and 
concluded that these definitions did not make express reference to an activity related to 
commerce or business.  
 
Section 9(1) of the ITA states that a taxpayer‘s income for a taxation year from a business 
or property is the taxpayer‘s profit from that business or property for the year.  Although 
the term ―profit‖ is not defined in the ITA, the court interpreted it in the BBM Canada case 
[at paragraph 24] to mean the difference between the receipts in a period and the 
expenditures laid out to earn those receipts.  It further found that the commercial and 
accounting definition of ―profit‖ concurred.  
 
As was previously stated, income is based on the source rule.  If no source can be 
identified, then an amount is excluded from the tax calculation.  In addition, income (as 
defined by the ITA) does not include capital gains from the disposal of property.  In other 
words, capital gains are not regarded to be derived from a source.  Thus, the potential to 
generate capital gains does not create a source.  A prospect of generating a profit other than 
an expectation of a capital gain must therefore exist (Steenkamp 2010:80). 
 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the capacity for profit is to be determined after 
taking into account any capital allowances (Moldowan v. The Queen 1977).  In the case of 
assets that are subject to accelerated write-off rates, the CRA deems it appropriate to 
amortise the cost of the asset under GAAP to determine whether an activity has a REOP 
(Fien 1995:1304).   
 
In The Queen v. Matthews (1974), the treatment of non-depreciating assets, such as farm 
land, is identified as follows [at paragraph 6197]: 
 
―the conduct of a business whose profits are not expected to reimburse the capital cost of an asset 
that is not subject to waste or depreciation in the process of production nor to obsolescence by the 













so as to lead to the conclusion that the business is not being carried on for profit or with a 
reasonable expectation of profit‖. 
 
Therefore, the business treatment of non-depreciating assets is also in accordance with 
ordinary commercial principles and should not adversely affect the determination of a 
REOP. 
 
4.6.2  Commercial Profit 
 
Fien (1995:1304) is of the opinion that recent (at that stage) Canadian case law has tilted in 
the direction of first identifying a commercial profit in order for there to be a source.  
According to this line of thinking, the prospect of tax savings is in itself not sufficient to 
qualify as a source.  Moloney v. The Queen (1992:6570) confirmed this view by stating 
that in order for an activity to qualify as a business (and thus a source of income) it: 
 
―must not only be one engaged in by the taxpayer with a reasonable expectation of profit, but that 
profit must be anticipated to flow from the activity itself rather than exclusively from the provisions 
of the taxing statute.‖ 
 
Steenkamp (2010:80) therefore notes that not only must a taxpayer prove a REOP, their 
profit must also fulfil the ―commercial‖ criterion in order for it to qualify as a source. 
 
4.6.3  How Much Profit? 
 
In formulating the REOP test, neither the courts nor the CRA has stated the amount of 
profit that will be deemed sufficient.  When one considers the losses incurred during the 
past or the amount of capital or time invested in an activity, how much profit must be 
anticipated in order to pass the REOP test? 
 
In The Queen v. Matthews (1974:6197), the court suggested that the prospect of only a few 
revenue-generating years over a period even longer than a lifetime did not necessarily 
preclude the existence of a business.  The court also pointed out that the term ―reasonable 













Also, in Keeping v. The Queen (2001), it was concluded that the taxpayer should be 
allowed a reasonable period of time to get the business established. 
 
Thus, it is not the anticipated profit that must be reasonable, only the expectation thereof.  
This viewpoint further exacerbates the problem of determining the amount of profit.  After 
all, how does one determine what a reasonable profit is for each specific activity or 
business venture? In Kuhlmann et al. v. The Queen (1998), the Court pointed out that for 
an expectation of profit to be reasonable, it has to be not ―irrational, absurd and 
ridiculous‖. 
 
Furthermore, is the taxpayer‘s expectation assessed on an objective basis, or will subjective 
expectations also be relevant?  Even the CRA is ambiguous in its Interpretation Bulletin 
IT-504R2, Visual Artists and Writers (CRA 1995), acknowledging the fact that even 
though a taxpayer may not realise a profit during his lifetime, he still could have a 
reasonable expectation of profit. 
 
Steenkamp (2010:80) disparagingly concludes that is evident that there is no clear answer 
to this dilemma. 
 
4.6.4  Proportion of Profit to Risk 
 
In high-risk, high-return industries, for example the mining industry, there is a slim chance 
of generating a very large profit (Steenkamp 2010:80).  Obviously, these types of 
taxpayers face an uphill battle to prove a REOP at the outset of their ventures.  It has been 
held in various Canadian court cases that the venture‘s ability to produce large revenues 
could justify the undertaking of large risks and losses (Fien 1995:1305). 
 
As Steenkamp (2010:81) observes: once profits have been earned, it is easy, in hindsight, 
to prove that an activity was a business from the outset.  Conversely, if a business failed to 
generate profits, it is difficult, in hindsight, to prove that the activity had any REOP.  In the 
case of Belec v. The Queen (1995:123), it was stated quite succinctly that the CRA should 














―the fact that you lost money…proves that you did not have a reasonable expectation of profit, but 
as soon as you earn some money, it proves that you now have such an expectation‖. 
 
Clearly, there is a need to objectively test for REOP in high-risk industries, while making 
allowance for the fact that it may take a number of years before a profit might reasonably 
be expected. 
 
4.6.5  Financing 
 
In the Moldowan case, one of the factors identified by the court to determine the REOP, 
was the capability of the venture, as capitalised, to show a profit after charging capital cost 
allowance (refer to paragraph 4.6.1).  Steenkamp (2010:81) notes that the success of a 
business venture often depends on the manner in which the taxpayer has financed the 
business. For example, it may be highly geared, or there may be other external factors, 
such as market interest rates. 
 
Fien (1995:1306) questions the extent to which a source for income tax purposes should 
depend on the debt-to-equity ratio.  Or, phrased differently, why should a bona fide 
commercial venture as a source depend on whether the owner capitalises it with his own 
funds or with borrowed funds? 
 
Another practical implication is the manner in which financing is structured, where each 
way has a dramatic effect on the entity‘s bottom line. Consider a partnership, for example.  
The revenue projections for the partnership will differ greatly if the partners finance 
themselves externally (and contribute capital to the partnership) as opposed to a situation 
where the partnership is financed internally.  On what level should the REOP test be 
applied?  Is it at the partnership level or at the partner level?   
 
4.6.6  Annual Test 
 
Although the REOP test is applied annually, it applies to the entire period that the taxpayer 
can reasonably be expected to carry on the business (Cannon & Silverman 2004:23).  This 
raises the question of whether or not a cumulative profit has to be proven.  A taxpayer 













commences with the business, but may cease to have such an expectation in a subsequent 
year (Steenkamp 2010:81).  Does this then imply that the taxpayer has failed the REOP 
test?  After all, as the Court acknowledged in Milewski v. The Queen (1999), the period to 
establish a business will vary with the circumstances and may well be lengthy. 
 
Consider the following practical example (Cannon & Silverman 2004:24):  a taxpayer 
acquires a business in year one and incurs substantial losses in years one to four.  The 
taxpayer may reasonably expect the tide to turn and the business to become profitable in 
year five.  However, if the expected hold period is not sufficiently long to allow prior year 
losses to be recouped, the taxpayer may not have a reasonable expectation of a cumulative 
profit in year five.  Thus, he fails the REOP test and the CRA will disallow the deduction 
of his business losses. 
 
 A further implication of the annual test arises when a taxpayer considers disposing of or 
discontinuing a business (Cannon & Silverman 2004:24).  The period during which the 
taxpayer is reasonably expected to carry on the business is used in the REOP test.  If the 
taxpayer no longer expects to carry on the business, the relevant period for applying the 
test may be shortened accordingly (Steenkamp 2010:82).  The Court pointed out, in Nichol 
v. The Queen (1993) that the start-up and discontinuance of a business are decisions in 
which neither the taxing authorities nor the court should intervene. 
 
4.6.7  Subsidiaries 
 
In Steenkamp (2010:82), the scenario where a business is carried on through various 
operating subsidiaries was considered.  For example, the parent company owns four 
subsidiaries.  One of the subsidiaries is operating at a loss, or to state it differently, without 
a reasonable expectation of generating a profit.  The parent company allows the 
unprofitable subsidiary to carry on business as it supports the other subsidiaries‘ 
businesses.  The other three subsidiaries are all earning profits.  So, from a group 
perspective, the consolidated companies are profitable.  But, at what level should the 














Cannon and Silverman (2004:24) state that the REOP test is applied on an entity-by-entity 
basis.  Thus, an unprofitable subsidiary may not be entitled to claim losses, despite the fact 
that it is a member of a profitable group. 
 
4.7  Objective Factors to be Used in Applying the REOP Test 
 
Table 4.1 below lists a number of objective factors identified and used by the Canadian 
courts in the application of the REOP test.  The criteria was identified from various 
sources, including, inter alia, the Moldowan case, the CRA‘s Interpretation Bulletin IT-
504R2 and contributions by tax consultants in Informative Tax (2009:6-8).  The table 
compiled in Steenkamp (2010:83) is used as a basis and is expounded on in this study. 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Checklist of objective factors for the REOP test 
General factors Detailed elements 
Manner in which the activity is 
operated 
 Activity operated in a business-like manner 
 Activity held out to community as a business 
 Activity operated in a manner similar to comparable 
profitable businesses 
 Unsuccessful methods discontinued and new ones 
adopted 
 Formal books and records maintained 
 Separate bank account maintained 
 Record keeping system can determine segment profits 
and relevant costs 
 Detailed non-financial records maintained 
 Operating methods changed to improve profitability 
 Development plan formulated, followed and adjusted 
 Scale of operations sufficient to be profitable 
 Level of advertising or promotion undertaken 
Expertise of the taxpayer or 
advisors 
 Experience prior to the activity 
 Profit potential determined prior to entry 
 New or superior techniques developed 
 Taxpayer belongs to business-related associations 
 Membership in professional association 
 Pre- and post-entry advice sought and followed 
 Taxpayer‘s qualifications and education 
 Recognition from public and peers 
 Honours, awards and prizes received 
History of income or loss  Number of years activity has been in operation 
 Average ratio of receipts to disbursements 
 Average magnitude of losses 













 Percentage of years with profits 
 Trend of losses declining 
 Trend of gross revenue 
 Losses due to circumstances beyond the taxpayer‘s 
control 
Time and effort expended  Competent and well-trained manager employed 
 Competent labour employed 
 Average time spent on activity by taxpayer 
 Taxpayer withdrew from another business and devotes 
most of his time to the activity 
 Taxpayer did physical labour 
 Time devoted to promoting and marketing the work 
Financial status of taxpayer  Taxpayer‘s average income before activity loss 
 Extent of tax savings from net losses 
 Average ratio of activity losses to other income 
 Extent of other net assets of taxpayer 
 Amount of capital invested in the operation 
Success of taxpayer in other 
activities 
 Extent of experience in similar successful business 
 History of losses in similar activity 
 The absence of planning and the failure to adjust 
Amount of occasional profits  Ratio of average profit to average loss 
 Ratio of net losses to net assets 
 Amount of largest profit earned 
 The type of expenditures claimed 
 Relevance of expenditures to the endeavours 
Sale or discontinuance of activity  Activity sold or discontinued due to no chance of 
profit 
 Activity sold or discontinued for any reason 
Expected appreciation of asset 
value 
 Taxpayer expected property to appreciate in value as 
the major source of investment return 
 
 
4.8  Conclusion 
 
The Canadian income tax system is based on the ―source of income‖ rule. The REOP test 
is a judicial doctrine that identifies a source of income and was developed as part of the 
―personal and living‖ expenses provisions of the Canadian tax laws.  The definition of 
―personal and living‖ expenses refers to expenses incurred in connection with a business 
that is not maintained with a reasonable expectation of profit.   
 
The source concept was subsequently analysed and was found to mean the originating 
cause of receipts.  ―Business‖ is a term defined in the ITA and it was concluded that the 













case law, it did not appear that the REOP test was a condition precedent to the existence of 
a source. 
 
The evolution of the interpretation of the REOP test was also briefly explored as part of the 
legislative history of the REOP test.  There appears to be a lack of consensus regarding the 
significance of the REOP test, with some courts considering it to be only one of many 
indicia which determine a business.  The landmark case of Moldowan affirmed the status 
of the test and held that in order to have a source of income, the taxpayer must have a 
REOP.   
 
Due to the confusion and litigation caused by the REOP test, the need for an alternative 
test was soon realised.  The Stewart case gave rise to a two-step approach in determining 
whether or not a taxpayer had a source of income.  This alternative test was, however, 
never submitted to, or adopted by, the courts.   
 
Despite the fact that the REOP test is referred to as an objective standard, the reality is that 
the terminology is subjective.  Some of the anomalies encountered by Canadian taxpayers 
were explored; these included the meaning of profit, commercial profit, the amount of 
profit, the proportion of profit to risk, financing, the annual test and subsidiaries. 
 
Lastly, a number of objective factors to be used in the application of the REOP test were 
listed. Chapter 5 will incorporate these objective factors into the development of a 
workable, usable model to assist South African taxpayers in the identification and 
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“The flowchart aims to simplify decision making...” 
 














Developing a Workable Model for the Identification and Application of 
 a Section 80M(1)(d) Reportable Arrangement 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The decision process in determining whether or not an arrangement is reportable in terms 
of section 80M(1)(d) is somewhat tricky, due to the fact that the terminology of section 
80M(1)(d) (as was discussed in Chapter 3) is subjective and could lead to much uncertainty 
in practice. 
 
In the Reportable Arrangements Guide (SARS 2005), a decision tree (or flowchart) is 
provided to assist the taxpayer in determining whether or not an arrangement is reportable.  
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, this flowchart is outdated as it still refers to the repealed 
section 76A requirements and does not take into account the new sections 80M to 80T of 
the Act.   
 
In an attempt to provide greater clarity on the majority of the issues that are likely to arise 
in practice due to the ―new‖ reportable arrangements provisions, SARS (2010:31) included 
an updated flowchart in its Draft Guide to enable taxpayers to determine when an 
arrangement should be disclosed to the Commissioner.   
 
Despite SARS‘ well-meaning intention for the flowchart to simplify decision-making 
(SARS 2010:32), it is submitted that, due to the ambiguities contained in the wording of 
the Act as well as numerous anomalies in the Draft Guide model, this model is flawed and 
inappropriate for use by taxpayers. 
 
Thus, it is the purpose of this chapter to develop a workable, easily-understandable model 
to serve as a quick-reference, usable guide for South African taxpayers in the identification 
and application of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.  The Draft Guide model 
will be used as a starting-point and will be critically examined to identify any errors or 














5.2  The SARS Draft Guide Model 
 
The Draft Guide model (SARS 2010:31) consists of nine text boxes which are to be 
addressed in a specific order.  It is submitted that the model is not user-friendly and is not 
arranged in the optimal order.  Tax practitioners following this model may spend precious 
time answering certain questions that were unnecessary to address in the first place.  As a 
result, taxpayers may be overcharged when attempting to comply with the reportable 
arrangements provisions.   
 
Figure 5.1 (on the following page) is an exact copy of the Draft Guide model and all the 
wording was copied verbatim.  For the sake of clarity, numbers were inserted in the text 


































Figure 5.1  The Draft Guide Model (SARS 2010:31) 
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*Note, that for the sake of clarity, the researcher has inserted numbers in the text boxes.  
The model is unaltered in all other respects.  All the wording was copied verbatim.             
 
1.  Has a transaction, 
operation or scheme 
been entered into? 
4.  Has any tax 
benefit been 
derived by any 
participant? 
6.  Does the tax benefit 
exceed R1 million 
5.  Are the tax 
benefits the main 
or one of the main 
benefits of the 
arrangement? 
2.  This is an 
arrangement 
3.  Is the 
arrangement listed 
in s80M(2)? 
7.  Are any of the 
characteristics stated in 
s80M(1)(a) to (e) present? 
(see Flow Chart 2) 8.  Is the arrangement an 
excluded arrangement as 
provided for in s80N? 
9.  Has the arrangement been 
determined to be an excluded
arrangement by the Minister
through notice in the
Government Gazette? 
Transaction, operation or 
scheme not required to be 
disclosed to SARS in terms of 
the RA provisions contained in 
sections 80M to 80T of the Act 
Arrangement must be disclosed 
to SARS in terms of the RA 
provisions contained in sections 













5.2.1  Text box 1 and 2: “Has a transaction, operation or scheme been entered into?” 
 
An arrangement is defined in section 80T so as to include any transaction, operation or 
scheme.  Question one is not problematic as the term is defined and adequately addressed 
in the Draft Guide.  This is also the correct starting point for the decision tree, as there 
would be no potential reportable arrangement if no arrangement was entered into.  If the 
answer to this question is ―yes‖, the model states in the second text box ―This is an 
arrangement‖.  Text box 2 makes a statement and does not pose a question.  Yet, the arrow 
flowing from text box 2 indicates ―yes‖, despite the fact that no question was posed. 
 
It is proposed that a better phrasing of text box 1 would be: ―Has an arrangement been 
entered into?‖  The second text box should then be deleted.   
 
5.2.2  Text box 3: “Is the arrangement listed in s80M(2)?” 
 
The model indicates that if the arrangement is listed in section 80M(2), the arrangement 
should be disclosed.  It is submitted that this depiction is incorrect.  As previously stated, 
section 80N(4) (by way of the Government Gazette) excludes any arrangement where the 
tax benefit is not the main or one of the main benefits or where the tax benefit does not 
exceed R1 million.  Thus, irrespective of which category an arrangement falls into, namely 
sections 80M(1) or (2), the section 80N(4) exclusions prevail. 
 
However, the Draft Guide model does not allow for these exclusion provisions to apply to 
a section 80M(2) reportable arrangement.  SAICA (2010a) is also of the view that the Act 
and the Draft Guide are potentially inconsistent and that this discrepancy should be 
addressed in greater detail. 
 
It is proposed that this question be moved and addressed after text box 6 (refer to 
paragraph 5.2.3 below), i.e. after it has been determined whether or not a tax benefit was 
















5.2.3  Text box 4: “Has any tax benefit been derived by any participant?” 
 
If the answer to question three above is negative, question four addresses whether or not a 
tax benefit (as defined) was derived.  Notwithstanding the problems surrounding the term 
―tax benefit‖ which were discussed earlier, it is furthermore submitted that the subsequent 
order of the questions in text boxes 4, 5 and 6 is incorrect.  The reasons for this assertion 
are set out in paragraph 5.2.4 below. 
 
5.2.4  Text box 5: “Are the tax benefits the main or one of the main benefits of the 
arrangement?” and text box 6: “Does the tax benefit exceed R1 million?” 
 
Text boxes 5 and 6 are related to text box 4 and refer to the section 80N(4) exclusions 
already mentioned.  If no tax benefit was derived, then the arrangement is not reportable – 
in this case the model at text box 4 is correct.  However, if a tax benefit was derived, the 
arrows flowing from text box 4 to text boxes 5 and 6 both state ―yes‖.  It is unclear which 
question should be addressed first.  Despite the fact that text boxes 5 and 6 must both be 
addressed, the current order is unclear and potentially misleading. 
 
If the tax benefit is not the main or one of the main benefits (at text box 5), the model 
correctly indicates that the arrangement is not reportable.  However, if the answer is ―yes‖, 
the arrow flows directly from text box 5 to 7 and does not allow for the R1 million 
exclusion in text box 6 to apply.  It is submitted that this treatment is incorrect as the notice 
in the Government Gazette allows for two exceptions:  either the tax benefit is not the main 
benefit or the tax benefit is below R1 million. 
 
It is proposed that text boxes 5 and 6 be combined in one question that is addressed after 
text box 4.  Thus, if either of the Gazetted exclusions is applicable, the arrangement is not 
reportable.  If neither of the exclusions applies, text box 7 should then be addressed. 
 
Furthermore, text box 5 refers to ―tax benefits‖.  Although probably just a typing error, the 
plural use of the word ―benefits‖ is incorrect, due to the fact that the Government Gazette 
uses the singular word ―benefit‖ and also because ―benefits‖ (plural) cannot be the ―main 













5.2.5 Text box 7: “Are any of the characteristics stated in s80M(1)(a) to (e) present? 
(see Flow chart 2)” 
 
The Draft Guide contains two flowcharts.  The second flowchart (which is referred to in 
text box 7) and which appears in the Draft Guide (SARS 2010:32) seems to be aimed at 
further elucidating the first flowchart.  However, and this view is supported by SAICA 
(2010a), these two models are substantively identical.  It is proposed that the second model 
be deleted as it does not provide any additional guidance to the section 80M(1) reportable 
arrangements. 
 
If any one of the five scenarios of section 80M(1) is applicable, the arrangement is 
potentially reportable and the model then correctly flows to text box 8.  If none of the 
scenarios apply, the model correctly indicates that the arrangement is not reportable. 
 
5.2.6 Text box 8: “Is the arrangement an excluded arrangement as provided for in 
s80N?” 
 
As previously stated, section 80N(2) contains ―stand-alone‖ requirements that must first be 
met in order for an arrangement to be excluded.  Furthermore, section 80N(3) negates the 
exclusions if the main (or one of the main) benefits was to obtain or enhance a tax benefit.   
 
It is submitted that the wording in text box 8 is incomplete.  Text box 8 correctly indicates 
that if an arrangement is excluded, it is not reportable.  However, the question in text box 8 
refers to section 80N as a whole, but text box 9 again refers to the Gazetted exclusions of 
section 80N(4).  The model thus duplicates the question in text box 8 by once again 
referring to section 80N in text box 9. 
 
It is proposed that the wording of text box 8 should be more specific and refer to sections 
80N(1), (2) and (3) and not to section 80N as a whole.  The final text box then correctly 















5.2.7 Text box 9: “Has the arrangement been determined to be an excluded 
arrangement by the Minister through notice in the Government Gazette?” 
 
As discussed in paragraph 5.2.6 above, text boxes 8 and 9 should refer to the particular 
subsections of section 80N.  It is proposed that the reference to section 80N(4) be inserted 
in this text box 9.  It is submitted that there are two errors pertaining to the final question in 
text box 9.  These are: 
 
(a) The section 80N(4) exclusions in text box 9 are addressed earlier in the model by 
text boxes 5 and 6.  The model thus repeats a question that has already been 
addressed. 
(b) The ―yes‖ and ―no‖ answers to this last question have been transposed.  The model 
incorrectly indicates that if the arrangement was excluded by the Minister, it must 
be disclosed as a reportable arrangement. 
 
It is evident from the above analysis that the Draft Guide model contains numerous 
anomalies.  It is therefore submitted that this model is flawed and inappropriate for use by 
taxpayers.  An alternative model is presented in the remainder of the chapter.  The next 
paragraph provides a checklist of factors that may be of use as part of the application of the 
model developed in this study. 
 
5.3  Checklist of Objecti e Factors 
 
This paragraph provides a table of the few objective factors used by South African courts 
as identified in Chapter 3 (see Table 5.1 on the following page).  This, together with the 
comprehensive checklist of Canadian objective factors identified in Chapter 4 (see Table 
4.1 on page 106), could assist taxpayers in determining whether or not they satisfy the 
―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement.  These objective factors are to be 
used when the taxpayer considers question seven of the proposed model in paragraph 5.4.  
If the taxpayer can prove that there is a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit, the 
arrangement is not reportable.  If, however, the taxpayer fails to meet this requirement 













section 80M(1)(d).  The next paragraph will discuss the seven questions posed in the 
model. 
 
Table 5.1:  Checklist of South African criteria to determine  
a reasonable expectation of profit 
Taxpayer must consider the viability of the proposition. 
Taxpayer must have a genuine intention to earn a profit. 
As the intention is always subjective, the taxpayer‘s ipse dixit is not decisive, but must be 
supported by objective facts. 
Taxpayer must have a real hope to make a profit. 
Such hope must not be based on fanciful expectations, but on reasonable probability. 
Even though the taxpayer might not have a reasonable expectation in each year, he may have a 
reasonable prospect of making a profit in the future. 
 
5.4  The Proposed Workable Model 
 
The model developed in this study is adapted from the Draft Guide model.  Note that the 
Draft Guide model is applicable to all five scenarios contained in section 80M(1)), and not 
just to section 80M(1)(d), which is the focal point of this study.  This paragraph will not 
expound on the terminology contained in the proposed model, as the meaning of the words 
of section 80M(1)(d) was examined in Chapter 3.   
 
Figure 5.2 (on the following page) contains the workable model and poses seven questions 
to be addressed in that particular order to determine whether or not an arrangement is 
reportable.  Note that in question 7 of the model, any of the five scenarios of section 
80M(1)(a) to (e) could be inserted and addressed at this stage.  Due to the fact that this 
study specifically focuses on the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ criterion, 
section 80M(1)(d) was inserted as an example. 
 
The model developed in this study is similar to the Draft Guide model, but the questions 
are presented in a revised order with the primary focus on the section 80N exclusions.  It is 
submitted that the revised order (whereby the taxpayer first seeks to apply the exclusions) 
will result in less time wasted on addressing unnecessary questions where it is clear from 
the outset that the arrangement is non-reportable.  Also, the Draft Guide model makes no 
reference to (nor provides any guidance on) the objective factors necessary to satisfy the 













Figure 5.2  The workable model developed in this study 
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1.  Has an arrangement (i.e. 
a transaction, operation or 
scheme) been entered into? 
2.  Is a tax benefit or will a 
tax benefit be derived or 
assumed to be derived by 
any participant? 
3.  Does the tax benefit exceed R1 million 
OR is the tax benefit the main or one of the 
main benefits of the arrangement?   
Gazette & s 80N(4) 
 
6.  Is the arrangement entered 
into with the main purpose of 
obtaining or enhancing a tax           
benefit?  S 80N(3) 
5.  Does the arrangement fulfil the ―stand-
alone‖ requirements of s 80N(2)? 
7.  Is the arrangement listed in     
s 80M(2) or do any of the 5 
scenarios of  s 80M(1) apply? For 
example, the arrangement does 
not result in a reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit 
for any participant [s 80M(1)(d)]. 
4.  Does the arrangement fall within any of













The ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement is addressed in the last 
question, as it is the most onerous, time-consuming (and therefore most expensive) 
question in the model to address.  By leaving this question for last, the participant to the 
arrangement may qualify for an exclusion earlier in the model and the arrangement might 
already become non-reportable at that stage.  There would therefore be no need then for the 
participant to determine whether or not section 80M(1)(d) is applicable. 
 
The taxpayer could therefore be prevented from spending valuable time and money on 
obtaining costly tax advice to determine whether there is a ―reasonable expectation of a 
pre-tax profit‖. 
 
Question 1:  Has an arrangement been entered into? 
 
An arrangement is defined in section 80T so as to include any transaction, operation or 
scheme.  If an arrangement was entered into, the next step is to determine whether or not a 
tax benefit was obtained.  Obviously, if no arrangement was entered into, the arrangement 
is automatically non-reportable. 
 
Question 2:  Is a tax benefit or will a tax benefit be derived or assumed to be derived 
by any participant? 
 
The section 80T definition of a ―tax benefit‖ includes any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of any liability for tax.  If no tax benefit was obtained, the arrangement is already 
non-reportable at this stage.  In the Draft Guide model, this question was only posed after it 
was determined whether or not the arrangement was listed in section 80M(2).  By 
rearranging the questions in the proposed model, any arrangement may be excluded from 


















Question 3:  Does the tax benefit exceed R1 million or is the tax benefit the main or 
one of the main benefits of the arrangement? 
 
The third question is posed earlier than in the case of the Draft Guide model.  It is 
proposed that it is less time-consuming and thus more cost-effective to apply the 
exclusions at this point than later on.   
 
Section 80N(4) (by way of the Government Gazette) excludes any arrangement where the 
tax benefit is not the main or one of the main benefits or where the tax benefit does not 
exceed R1 million.  In the Draft Guide model the two exclusions are listed separately.  It 
was proposed in paragraph 5.2.4 that the two questions be combined as the section 80N(4) 
exclusion contains an ―either…or‖ requirement.   
 
If the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million or the tax benefit is not the main or one of the 
main benefits of the arrangement, then the arrangement is non-reportable and there is no 
need to work through the rest of the model.  If neither of the two section 80N(4) exclusions 
are applicable, question four must be addressed. 
 
Question 4:  Does the arrangement fall within any of the four exclusion categories of 
section 80N(1)? 
 
Question four refers to the ―plain-vanilla‖ transactions listed in section 80N(1) and is not to 
be confused with the Gazetted exclusions of section 80N(4) contained in question three.  If 
none of the section 80N(1) exclusions apply, the transaction could be regarded as 
reportable (if the rest of section 80M(1)(d) is complied with).  If, however, any of the 
section 80N(1) exclusions are applicable, the arrangement must still meet the requirements 


















Question 5: Does the arrangement fulfil the stand-alone requirements of section 
80N(2)? 
 
Section 80N(2) contains ―stand-alone‖ requirements that must first be met in order for an 
arrangement to be excluded.  Furthermore, section 80N(3) negates the exclusions if the 
main (or one of the main) benefits was to obtain or enhance a tax benefit.  If the 
arrangement is directly or indirectly dependent upon any other arrangement, the stand-
alone requirement is not met and the arrangement is potentially reportable.  If the 
arrangement complies with section 80N(2), question six must then be addressed. 
 
Question 6:  Is the arrangement entered into with the main purpose of obtaining or 
enhancing a tax benefit? 
 
Section 80N(3) determines that the excluded list of section 80N(1) does not apply to any 
arrangement that is entered into with the main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax 
benefit.  If the taxpayer can prove that the arrangement was not entered into with the main 
purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit, then that arrangement is non-reportable.  
Failing this, the arrangement is considered to be a reportable arrangement if question seven 
is answered in the positive. 
 
Question 7:  Is the arrangement listed in section 80M(2) or do any of the five 
scenarios of section 80M(1) apply?   
 
Question 7 determines, for example, that an arrangement is reportable in terms of section 
80M(1)(d) if the participant has no reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit resulting from 
that arrangement.  The list of objective factors referred to in paragraph 5.3 might be of 
value to assist taxpayers in objectively determining whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit. 
 
If the participant does have a reasonable expectation, the arrangement is non-reportable.  
If, however, the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement is not met, the 
answer to question 7 is ―yes‖.  The arrangement is then reportable and the disclosure 













The disclosure requirements of a reportable arrangement are addressed in the next 
paragraph. 
 
5.5  The Effect of Section 80M(1)(d) 
 
The main effect or implication of an arrangement that is deemed to be reportable in terms 
of section 80M(1)(d), is the disclosure of certain information. Any participant to a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement who fails to comply with the disclosure obligation shall 
be liable to a penalty of R1 million in terms of section 80S.  It is therefore of the utmost 
importance that taxpayers and tax planners fully understand the precise meaning of the 
requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
5.5.1  Disclosure Obligation 
 
 The disclosure requirements are contained in section 80O and are as follows: 
 
          ― 1)   The promoter must disclose such information in respect of a reportable arrangement as is 
contemplated in section 80P. 
 
 2)     If there is no promoter in relation to an arrangement or if the promoter is not a resident, all 
other participants must disclose the information contemplated in section 80P in respect of the 
reportable arrangement.‖ 
  
3)      A participant need not disclose the information in respect of a reportable arrangement if that 
participant obtains a written statement from— 
a)      the promoter that the promoter has disclosed that reportable arrangement as required by 
this Part; or 
b)      any other participant, if subsection (2) applies, that the other participant has disclosed 
that reportable arrangement as required by this Part. 
  
4)      The reportable arrangement must be disclosed within 60 days after any amount is first received 
by or accrued to any participant or is first paid or actually incurred by any participant in terms 
of the arrangement. 
  
5)      The Commissioner may grant extension for disclosure for a further 60 days, if reasonable 













Thus, the rather onerous burden of reporting and disclosing the necessary arrangement falls 
on the promoter.  In the absence of there being a promoter, all the other participants have 
the obligation to disclose the arrangement to SARS.  SARS (2010:27) concedes that this 
may seem onerous, but simultaneously states that an escape clause is included in section 
80O(3), which provides that a participant is relieved of the disclosure obligation, if such 
participant obtains a written statement (from either the promoter or any other participant) 
that the promoter or other participant has disclosed the arrangement to SARS as required. 
 
The information that must be disclosed is stipulated in section 80P.  The promoter or 
participant, as the case may be, must submit, in relation to the reportable arrangement, in 
the form and manner (including electronically) and at such place as may be prescribed by 
the Commissioner — 
 
 a detailed description of all its steps and key features; 
 a detailed description of the assumed tax benefits for all participants, including, but  not 
limited to, tax deductions and deferred income; 
 the names, registration numbers and registered addresses of all participants; 
 a list of all its agreements; and 
 any financial model that embodies its projected tax treatment. 
 
SARS (2010:27) notes that the initial disclosure requirement applies only to a list of the 
agreements to be submitted, therefore alleviating the administrative burden on participants 
compared to the repealed section 76A, which required all agreements to be submitted at an 
early stage. 
 
The duties of the Commissioner are set out in section 80Q: 
   
           ―1)      The Commissioner must, after receipt of the information contemplated in section 80P, issue a 
reportable arrangement reference number to each participant. 
 2)      The issuing of a reportable arrangement reference number is for administrative purposes 
only.‖ 
 
The disclosure obligation is further widened by the requirements of section 80R in terms of 













        ―1)      The Commissioner may, in relation to any arrangement, require a participant or any other 
person to furnish such information (whether orally or in writing), documents or things as the 
Commissioner may require. 
 2)      The information, documents or things must be submitted to the Commissioner in such form and 
manner (including electronically) and at such place as may be prescribed by the 
Commissioner.‖ 
 
In the Response Document released by SARS (2006b:17), BASA commented on the 
disclosure obligation as follows: 
 
―A reportable arrangement must be reported within 60 days of inception. However, at that time, the 
parties will not necessarily know if one or more of them will be disclosing the arrangement as a 
liability for accounting purposes. It may only be on finalisation of the audit that the accounting 
disclosure is finally determined.‖ 
 
This study agrees with the comment made by BASA.  SARS, however rejected the 
comment, noting that ordinary ongoing transactions are generally well catered for by 
GAAP. With respect to more exotic arrangements, it is SARS‘ experience that both the 
accounting treatment and tax benefits of these arrangements are considered when they are 
conceived. 
 
Moreover, for the purposes of these provisions, SARS (2010:27) does not require that the 
financial model be specially prepared for purposes of meeting the disclosure requirements. 
However, SARS may request such information at any time, particularly for more complex 
arrangements and in circumstances where it is apparent that a model was in fact prepared. 
A participant not having a readily available financial model should indicate the reason for 




Failure to comply with the disclosure requirements can lead to a substantial penalty 
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5.5.2  Penalty 
 
The penalty clause is found in section 80S and is determined as follows: 
 
―1)      Any participant who fails to disclose the information in respect of a reportable arrangement as 
required by section 80O or section 80R shall be liable to a penalty of R1 million. 
  2)      The Commissioner may reduce the penalty contemplated in subsection (1), if— 
a)        there are extenuating circumstances and the participant remedies the non-disclosure 
within a reasonable time; or 
b)        if the penalty is disproportionate to the assumed tax benefit.‖ 
 
The penalty is a fixed amount imposed upon any person who fails to disclose.  It is 
submitted that this penalty is not determined by an objective standard.  SAICA (2007b) 
suggests that the penalty be based on a percentage, for example 10%, of the potential tax 
benefits and limited to a maximum of R1 million.  The Commissioner should then be given 
the discretion to reduce the penalty due to extenuating circumstances.  SARS (2010:29) 
notes that as a safeguard for taxpayers, SARS‘ discretion to reduce the penalty is subject to 
objection and appeal. The penalty does, however, carry interest. 
 
Furthermore, if there are several promoters to an arrangement, all of them may be subject 
to the penalty, as section 80S(1) imposes the penalty on ―any participant‖.  However, 
SARS (2010:28) is of the opinion that this is counterbalanced by the fact that any promoter 
incurring a penalty may raise extenuating circumstances to request its reduction. 
 
The wording of section 80S(2)(a) is unclear as to what exactly is meant by a ―reasonable 
time‖.  Is the time period calculated from the date the transaction was entered into or from 
the time SARS indicates that the transaction is a reportable arrangement?  If the first option 
is applicable, and SARS only challenges the transaction a few years later, it could be 
argued that the taxpayer did not remedy the non-disclosure within a reasonable time and 
SARS could not then exercise its discretion of reducing the penalty (however extenuating 
the circumstances might be).  Obviously, the best option (from the taxpayer‘s point of 
view) is whereby the period is calculated from the time the agreement is deemed to be 














SARS (2010:29) states that it will notify a taxpayer in writing that the penalty has been 
raised. Scenarios that will trigger the penalty are instances where –  
 
 the arrangement has been disclosed to SARS but the disclosure is deficient in a 
material respect;  
 the arrangement has not been disclosed to SARS in circumstances where SARS has 
valid reasons to believe that the arrangement should have been disclosed in terms of the 
reportable arrangement provisions; and  
 additional information is requested but not supplied.  
 
This penalty may increase significantly should the TAB be promulgated.  The TAB 
contains a revised penalty clause in section 212, which reads as follows: 
 
“(1)  A‗participant‘ who fails to disclose the information in respect of a reportable arrangement as 
required by section 37 is liable to a ‗penalty‘, for each month that the failure continues (up to 
12 months), in the amount of— 
(a) R50 000, in the case of a ‗participant‘ other than the ‗promoter‘; or 
(b) R100 000, in the case of the ‗promoter‘. 
 (2)  The amount of ‗penalty‘ determined under subsection (1) is doubled if the amount of anticipated 
‗tax benefit‘ for the ‗participant‘ by reason of the arrangement (within the meaning of section 
35) exceeds R5 000 000, and is tripled if the benefit exceeds R10 000 000.‖ 
 
The TAB penalty is thus also a fixed amount.  Note that the penalty is levied on a monthly 
basis (up to a 12 month period).  The total proposed penalty could therefore be as high as 
R600 000 per year in the case of a participant not reporting the transaction or a penalty of 
up to R1.2 million if the promoter does not report the transaction.  Moreover, these 
penalties may double if the tax benefit exceeds R5 million or triple if the tax benefit 
exceeds R10 million. 
 
In the Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Tax Administration Bill, SARS 
(2009:16) states that these penalties essentially target non-compliance with an obligation 
under a tax act that does not include elements of tax evasion (since tax evasion is addressed 
under the additional tax provisions).  According to this Explanatory Memorandum, the 













―ensure that the amount of the penalty is imposed on a more proportionate basis‖.  Also, 
remittance remedies available to other administrative penalties are now available to this 
penalty.
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Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to expound on these remittance remedies, it 
should be pointed out that they do not contain the requirements included in section 80S(2), 
viz. if the participant remedies the non-disclosure within a reasonable time or if the penalty 
is disproportionate to the assumed tax benefit.  Instead, SARS may remit the penalty if it is 
the first incidence of non-compliance or if the non-compliance is nominal.  Also, SARS 
may remit the penalty if non-compliance was due to exceptional circumstances (for 
example, due to serious illness). 
 
Therefore, although the remittance remedies of the TAB provide more clarity than those of 
section 80S(2), it is submitted that the imposition of the proposed penalty is still not 
determined by an objective standard and is thus not an improvement on the penalty clause 
of section 80S(1).  Actually, the proposed penalty is potentially stricter than section 80S 
(especially is the tax benefit exceeds R10 million).  One could perhaps argue that if the 
penalties were more reasonable (such as the percentage based method suggested earlier), 
SARS would be able to act on it more, thus enhancing the effectiveness of the reportable 
arrangements provisions. 
 
The effect of an arrangement that is reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d) is therefore 
twofold:  firstly, the arrangement must be disclosed to SARS within 60 days after the 
arrangement has been entered into.  Secondly, if the participant fails to meet the disclosure 
obligation, it could result in a R1 million penalty. 
 
The application of section 80M(1)(d) to an arrangement could have numerous practical 
implications.  Some of these practical considerations are addressed in the next paragraph. 
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 The procedure to request remittance of the penalty is set out in section 215 of the TAB.  The remedies 
available to the taxpayer are contained in sections 216 to 220 of the TAB and include, amongst others, the 













5.6  Practical Considerations 
 
The problematic wording and rather complicated application of section 80M(1)(d) give rise 
to a number of practical implications.  These implications include the determination of a 
pre-tax profit by applying the reasonable expectation of profit test and the inclusion of 
routine transactions. 
 
(a)  Pre-tax profit 
 
If a company sells items as a loss leader, it has an overall profit motive, but for a particular 
transaction there might not be a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit.  Assume that a 
company purchases a million units of product X at R100 per unit and sells it at R70 per 
unit.   
 
The R70 selling price is included in gross income, being a non-capital cash amount that 
was received by the company.  The R100 cost price of product X is deductible in terms of 
section 11(a).  Thus, the loss of R30 per unit effectively decreases the taxable income.  
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the tax owed to SARS.  A tax benefit (as defined in 
section 80T) includes the reduction of a liability for tax.  This transaction has therefore 
resulted in a tax benefit of R8.4m, viz. one million units multiplied by the R30 loss per unit 
multiplied by the company‘s tax rate of 28%. 
 
The tax benefit exceeds the R1 million threshold provided for in the Gazetted exclusions 
and if the company fails to prove that the tax benefit was not the main benefit of the 
transaction, neither of the section 80N(4) exclusions are available.  Furthermore, due to the 
fact that the company has no reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit from this particular 
transaction, the purchase and sale are both reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d).   
 
Another questions to arise, is how much profit is considered to be enough?  What if the 
company had sold product X for R110 or R150 per unit?  As was the case with the 















(b) Routine transactions 
 
Due to the wide definition of a tax benefit, many routine transactions could become 
reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d) if none of the exclusions in terms of section 80N 
are available.  An example is an asset which is sold at a loss. 
  
When an asset is sold below market value (i.e. its tax value exceeds the proceeds from the 
transaction), the asset is sold at a loss.  This means that the seller has no reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit.  Furthermore, if the seller is entitled to a scrapping 
allowance in terms of section 11(o), the taxable income decreases.  This, in turn, leads to a 
decrease in the tax owed to SARS, or, to state it differently: a tax benefit has arisen.  
Moreover, due to the fact that the company has no reasonable expectation of a pre-tax 
profit from this particular transaction, the sale is reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d).   
 
Although SARS has stated that it is not the intention to include routine transactions in the 
reportable arrangements provisions (refer to Chapter 3), a strict interpretation of section 
80M(1)(d) has this cumbersome effect.  It is therefore recommended that these examples of 
routine, day-to-day transactions must also be specifically excluded as part of section 80N. 
 
5.7  Conclusion 
 
In an attempt to provide greater clarity on the majority of the issues that are likely to arise 
in practice due to the ―new‖ reportable arrangements provisions, SARS released a Draft 
Guide to replace the previous, outdated guide.  However, due to numerous anomalies in the 
Draft Guide, it was submitted that SARS‘ model is flawed and inappropriate for use by 
taxpayers.  This chapter therefore proposed an alternative, workable model to serve as a 
quick-reference, usable guide. 
 
The workable model consists of seven questions that must be answered in a specific order.  
It was submitted that the revised order, whereby the taxpayer first seeks to apply the 
exclusions and lastly to satisfy the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ criteria, 













would not be addressed where it was clear from the outset that the arrangement was non-
reportable.   
 
The main effect of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement is the disclosure of certain 
information within 60 days after its inception.  The disclosure obligation of section 80O 
was examined.  Failure to comply with the disclosure requirement can lead to a R1 million 
penalty in terms of section 80S.  It was submitted that the determination of the penalty was 
not objective and it was proposed that the penalty be based on a percentage of the tax 
benefit.  Also, the meaning of the phrase ―reasonable period‖ was found to be unclear.  The 
penalty provisions contained in the TAB were also examined and were found to be 
potentially stricter that the section 80S penalty.  Some practical implications of section 
80M(1)(d) were considered and it was submitted that these ordinary, routine transactions 
should also be specifically excluded as part of the section 80N exclusions. 
 
Having developed the workable model, it was necessary to test its accuracy, completeness 
and ease-of-use.  This was done by means of a survey in which tax partners at a sample of 
leading audit and legal firms completed a questionnaire which incorporated the proposed 
model and compared it with SARS‘ Draft Guide model.  Chapter 6 will discuss the 
sampling methodology, the questions contained in the questionnaire as well as the results 




































“The self-administered questionnaire is ubiquitous in modern living.” 
 














The Empirical Study 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
It was noted in Chapter 5 that the decision process in determining whether or not an 
arrangement is reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d) is somewhat tricky, due to the fact 
that the terminology of section 80M(1)(d) (as was discussed in Chapter 3) is subjective and 
could create considerable uncertainty in practice. 
 
In an attempt to address the subjective nature of the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax 
profit‖ requirement of section 80M(1)(d), a workable model was developed in Chapter 5.  
It is therefore the purpose of Chapter 6 to determine whether the workable model is a 
usable guide for South African taxpayers in the identification and application of a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
The completeness, accuracy and relevance of the model as well as the objective factors 
identified in the literature study to address the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ 
requirement, will be tested by a self-administered questionnaire to be completed by tax 
partners at selected audit and legal firms.  This chapter will examine and interpret the 
results of the survey. 
 
6.2  Background 
 
The model developed in this study poses seven questions in order to determine whether or 
not an arrangement is reportable in terms of section 80M(1)(d).  Although this model is 
based on the Draft Guide model proposed by SARS (2010), the questions are presented in 
a revised order with the primary focus on the section 80N exclusions.  Also, the Draft 
Guide model makes no reference to (nor provides any guidance on) the objective factors 
necessary to satisfy the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement. 
 
It was submitted in the previous chapter that the revised order, whereby the taxpayer first 













profit‖ criteria, would be less time-consuming and thus more cost-effective because 
unnecessary questions would not be addressed where it was clear from the outset that the 
arrangement was non-reportable. 
 
Chapter 3 examined the language of section 80M(1)(d) in order to determine the meaning 
of the words contained therein.  Due to the subjective nature and somewhat vague 
language of the provision, a number of research submissions were made (see Annexure C).  
Many of these research findings will also be tested as part of the survey, as the proposed 
model contains all of the problematic terminology discussed in Chapter 3.  As such, the 
questionnaire will include many of these research submissions in order to ensure that the 
model is indeed accurate, complete and usable.  The next paragraph will describe the 
research orientation followed in the survey. 
 
6.3  Research Orientation 
 
This study is qualitative by nature and specifically adopts an interpretive approach, which 
seeks to develop understanding through detailed description and to develop theory or build 
models which can be tested empirically in later research (Cooper & Schindler 2011:162). 
 
Although the research is mainly qualitative in its approach, it also has a positivist 
underpinning, as it is based on the broad premise that an ideal norm or standard exists 
against which to identify and apply the requirements of a section 80M(1)(d) reportable 
arrangement (Stiglingh 2008:19).  The study does not merely seek to understand, but to 




6.4  The Unit of Analysis and the Population 
 
The unit of analysis and the population consist of highly qualified professionals who are 
experts in the field of tax. 
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Venter and Stiglingh (2006) conducted a survey to obtain empirical evidence to clarify 
uncertainties surrounding the timing of the recognition of a liability for STC and the timing 
of the recognition of an asset for unused STC credits. Questionnaires were distributed to 
accounting lecturers teaching students at the post-graduate level at South African 
universities, the partners specialising in technical accounting matters and the leading tax 
partners at the eight largest audit firms in South Africa.  The purpose of the questionnaire 
was to test the conclusions reached in the literature study against the opinions of 
accounting and tax specialists in South Africa (Venter & Stiglingh 2006:113). 
 
A similar methodology is adopted in this study, but with the following differences in the 
approach: 
 
(a) Accounting Lecturers and Partners Specialising in Technical Accounting Matters 
 
In Venter and Stiglingh‘s survey (2006:113), the accounting lecturers and the partners 
specialising in technical accounting matters were chosen as they were actively involved 
with accounting standards on a day-to-day basis and were expected to have in-depth 
knowledge of the accounting requirements of IAS 12 Income Taxes (which interacts with 
the STC requirements of the Act).  However, in this study, the focus is on a purely taxation 
topic, viz. section 80M(1)(d).  Although the accounting definitions of ―liability‖ and 
―profit‖ were examined in Chapter 3 and are included in the questionnaire, an in-depth 
accounting knowledge is not necessary to understand these basic accounting definitions.   
 
The accounting and tax syllabi followed by  South African universities who offer courses 
to students wanting to qualify as chartered accountants (CAs) are based on the ―List of 
Examinable Pronouncements‖ updated and issued by SAICA each year.  In Venter and 
Stiglingh‘s study in 2006, IAS 12 and STC were prescribed accounting and tax topics 
respectively and accounting lecturers could therefore be expected to have an in-depth 
knowledge of these topics. 
 
The reportable arrangements provisions, however, are excluded from the list of examinable 
taxation pronouncements for SAICA‘s Qualifying Examination Part I in January 2011 













have to be presented at universities and taxation lecturers are thus not required to have an 
in-depth knowledge of the workings of section 80M(1)(d).  Furthermore, one would not 
expect partners specialising in technical accounting matters to have an in-depth knowledge 
of specialised taxation provisions. 
 
 It is therefore considered unnecessary to include university lecturers and accounting 
partners in the sample for this study, as it probably will not result in an increase in the 
quality of answers received in the questionnaire. 
 
(b) Tax Partners at Leading Audit and Legal Firms 
 
As was the case in Venter and Stiglingh‘s study, tax partners are also included in this 
study, as they are indeed expected to be actively involved with taxation legislation and 
should have in-depth knowledge of compliance with the reportable arrangements 
provisions.  Tax partners at audit, as well as legal, firms were included in the survey. 
 
Another reason why this study targets tax partners at audit firms especially, is because all 
qualified accountants entering public practice (i.e. those who become registered auditors), 
are required to register with the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors (IRBA) and 
are governed by its regulations (IRBA 2011:iv).  These audit firms are therefore subject to 




IRBA‘s Code of Professional Conduct requires a registered auditor to comply with a 
number of fundamental principles.  Section 100.5(c) contains the fundamental principle of 
Professional Competence and Due Care (IRBA 2011:4-19), which is described as follows: 
 
―to maintain professional knowledge and skill at the level required to ensure that a client receives 
competent professional services based on current developments in practice, legislation and 
techniques and act diligently and in accordance with applicable technical and professional 
standards.‖ [Own emphasis]. 
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  The Board is the statutory body controlling that part of the accountancy profession involved with public 
practice in South Africa.  The Board functions in terms of the Auditing Profession Act No. 26 of 2005 













Auditors are therefore required to maintain their professional knowledge and skills, based 
on current developments in taxation legislation and practices.
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  Venter and Stiglingh‘s 
sample included seven tax partners, but the sample in this study includes 40 tax partners.  
The basis for the selection of the sample is explained in the next paragraph. 
 
6.5  The Sample 
 
6.5.1  Non-probability Sampling 
 
This study will make use of non-probability sampling, and more specifically, judgement 
sampling.  Judgement sampling is one of the two types of purposive sampling (the other 
type being quota sampling).  According to Cooper and Schindler (2011:385), judgement 
sampling occurs when a researcher selects sample members to conform to some criterion.   
 
It was submitted that the wording in section 80M(1)(d) is ambiguous and difficult to 
interpret.  It was also noted that one of the ways to qualify for the non-disclosure of an 
arrangement is whereby the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million (section 80N(4)).  One 
would expect larger companies to fall within the ambit of the reportable arrangements 
provisions more often, as they are more likely to frequently conclude transactions whereby 
the tax benefit exceeds R1 million.   
 
One could therefore argue that the persons best able to address the statements in the 
questionnaire, are those tax professionals who are actively involved in complex, technical 
tax matters and who are involved in providing tax advice for larger companies.  Moreover, 
tax partners or directors are frequently individuals who have obtained advanced tertiary 
qualifications and who have many years of practical experience in complicated tax issues. 
They are therefore best suited to provide commentary on the subjective interpretation of 
tax provisions.   
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  The Council of the Law Society of South Africa (LSSA) has approved mandatory Continuing Professional 
Development (CPD) for attorneys at its meeting on 29 November 2010 (LSSA 2011).  The proposal and 
implementation plan indicate that this mandatory CPD will apply to all practising attorneys, subject to 
certain exemptions that may be granted in exceptional cases.  Although the proposals are not yet effective, 
it stands to reason that legal firms, especially the leading firms which are included in this survey, also 













Based on the above arguments, the criteria for the selection of the sample are 
 Tax partners or tax directors at 
 Leading audit and legal firms. 
 
Due to the fact that probability sampling is based on the concept of random selection, 
proponents of probability sampling could argue that non-probability sampling is arbitrary 
and subjective, as, with the latter, one chooses the sample with a certain pattern in mind.  
Although a random sample will give a true cross section of the population, this is not the 
objective of the present research.  The objective is to test the accuracy, completeness and 
usability of the proposed model, as well as some of the research submissions made in this 
study.   
 
As will be seen from the next paragraph, the sample selected includes all of the audit firms 
who audit companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as well as the ten 
largest audit firms globally.  The sample also includes the ten largest South African legal 
firms.  Non-probability sampling, specifically judgement sampling, is therefore considered 
to be both appropriate and adequate for this present study.  This is also in line with the 
methodology followed by Venter and Stiglingh, wherein the eight largest audit firms were 
identified. 
 
6.5.2  Audit Firms Selected for the Sample 
 
This study comprises a sample of 30 audit firms.  These firms were selected on the 
following bases: 
 
 A listing of the top ten audit firms in the world, based on the most recent available fee 
income figures (for 2009 and in US Dollar), was obtained from World Accounting 
Intelligence (2011).  Following a number of extensive Internet searches, no listing of 
the top ten South African audit firms could be obtained.  However, all of the top ten 
global firms have offices in South Africa.  The so-called ―Big Four‖ audit firms are 
naturally included in this list.  Table 6.1 indicates the global top-ten listing of audit 
















 A list of JSE accredited auditors was obtained from the JSE website.  According to the 
JSE‘s Listing Requirements (JSE 2011a:3-12), an applicant issuer may only appoint as 
its auditor and reporting accountant an audit firm, individual auditor and reporting 
accountant who is accredited as such on the JSE list of Auditors and their advisors.  
The list contains 29 IRBA registered audit firms as well as five foreign registered 
firms.  This study only includes South African audit firms registered in terms of IRBA. 
Table 6.2 (on the following page) indicates the 29 accredited auditors, in alphabetical 
order, in the most recently issued list of the JSE (at the time when the survey was 
conducted during June and July 2011), which is effective from 28 February 2011 (JSE 
2011b).   
 
 There are a number of duplications in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2.  Also, where an audit 
firm has more than one branch in South Africa, only the firm itself will be included in 
the sample (i.e. the individual branches will not be included separately).  This is the 
case for ―Nolands Jhb Inc‖ and ―Nolands (Cape Town)‖, entries number 21 and 22 of 
Table 6.2, and Horwath Leveton Boner and Horwarth Zeller Karro, entry number nine 





Table 6.1:  Global top-ten ranking of audit firms 
Global 
 ranking 
Organisation name:  
Global 
Organisation name:  
South Africa 
1 PricewaterhouseCoopers PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2 Deloitte Deloitte and Touche Inc 
3 Ernst & Young Global Ernst & Young Inc 
4 KPMG International KPMG  
5 BDO International BDO South Africa 
6 RSM International RSM Betty & Dickson 
7 Grant Thornton International Grant Thornton South Africa 
8 Baker Tilly International Baker Tilly Morrison Murray 
9 Crowe Horwath International *Horwath Zeller Karro (Cape Town) 
*Horwath Leveton Boner (Johannesburg) 













Table 6.2:  The JSE list of accredited auditors (alphabetical order) 
Number Organisation name 
1 ACT Audit Solutions Inc 
2 AM Smith & Co 
3 BDO Spencer 
4 Certified Master Auditors (South Africa) Inc 
5 Charles Orbach 
6 Deloitte & Touche Inc 
7 Ernst & Young Inc 
8 Grant Thornton 
9 Greenwoods Chartered Accountants 
10 Horwath Leveton Boner 
11 IAPA 
12 KPMG 
13 LDP Inc 
14 Logista International Incorporated 
15 Mahdi Meyer 
16 Mazars 
17 Middel & Partners 
18 Moore Stephens 
19 Ngubane Zeelie Incorporated 
20 Nkonki Inc 
21 Nolands Jhb Inc 
22 Nolands (Cape Town) 
23 PKF South Africa 
24 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
25 RSM Betty & Dickson 
26 SAB&T Chartered Accountants 
27 SizweNtsaluba VSP 
28 TAG Incorporated 
29 Tuffias Sandberg KSI 
 
 
 The final sample of audit firms is therefore a combination of the global top-ten audit 
firms and the JSE list of accredited auditors, after the above-mentioned duplicate 
entries were removed.  Table 6.3 (on the following page) contains the list of the 30 



















Table 6.3:  The sample of audit firms (alphabetical order) 
Number Organisation name 
1 ACT Audit Solutions Inc 
2 AM Smith & Co 
3 Baker Tilly Morrison Murray 
4 BDO Spencer 
5 Certified Master Auditors (South Africa) Inc 
6 Charles Orbach 
7 Deloitte & Touche Inc 
8 Ernst & Young Inc 
9 Grant Thornton 
10 Greenwoods Chartered Accountants 
11 Horwath Leveton Boner 
12 IAPA 
13 KPMG 
14 LDP Inc 
15 Logista International Inc 
16 Mahdi Meyer 
17 Mazars 
18 Middel & Partners 
19 Moore Stephens 
20 Nexia Southern Africa 
21 Ngubane Zeelie Incorporated 
22 Nkonki Inc 
23 Nolands  
24 PKF South Africa 
25 PricewaterhouseCoopers 
26 RSM Betty & Dickson 
27 SAB&T Chartered Accountants 
28 SizweNtsaluba VSP 
29 TAG Incorporated 
30 Tuffias Sandberg KSI 
 
6.5.3  Legal Firms Selected for the Sample 
 
This study also comprises a sample of ten legal firms.  These firms were selected on the 
following basis: 
 A listing of the ten largest legal firms in South Africa, based on the most recent 
available number of attorneys in their employ (at the time when the survey was 
conducted during June and July 2011), was obtained from Internet searches.
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 Table 
6.4 indicates the top-ten listing of legal firms of South Africa (in alphabetical order).   
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  Wikipedia (2011) combined the information of major South African legal firms by using data from their 













Table 6.4:  Top-ten ranking of legal firms in South Africa 
(alphabetical order) 
Number Organisation name 
1 Adams & Adams 
2 Bell Dewar 
3 Bowman Gilfillan 
4 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyer 
5 Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs 
6 Eversheds 
7 Norton Rose South Africa 
8 Shepstone & Wylie 
9 Webber Wentzel 
10 Werksmans 
 
6.6  Results of the Empirical Study 
 
The tax partners of the audit and legal firms in South Africa were identified either from 
information contained on the websites of the firms or by means of a telephone call to the 
firms to obtain the names and e-mail addresses of the relevant parties.  Where a firm did 
not have a specialist tax partner or department, the questionnaire was sent to the contact 
partner with a request to forward it to the most appropriate (senior) individual in the firm.   
 
The partners were initially contacted by a telephone call to determine their willingness to 
participate in the survey;  those that could not be reached telephonically, were contacted 
via e-mail.  The questionnaires were distributed to the parties by e-mail.  Respondents 
returned the completed questionnaires via e-mail or fax (directly to the researcher). 
 
6.6.1  Background to the Questionnaire 
 
Another document, e-mailed in conjunction with the questionnaire, was included to present 
a general background on the topic.  Due to the fact that the questionnaire included 
questions on SARS‘ Draft Guide model, an exact copy of the Draft Guide model was 
included in the background document, as well as the link to the original document on 
SARS‘ website. 
 
The first part of the questionnaire (Part A) consisted of general questions about the profile 













terminology in sections 80M to 80T.  The third part (Part C) consisted of 18 questions 
which analysed the Draft Guide model and compared it with the workable model proposed 
in this study.  The proposed model was referred to as the ―Alternative Model‖ in the 
questionnaire. 
 
6.6.2  Profile of Respondents 
 
The profile of the respondents was as follows: 
 
Table 6.5  Profile of respondents 






 % % % 
Tax director 25 80 41 
Tax partner 17 20 18 
Tax manager 25 0 18 
Other 33 0 23 
Total 100 100 100 
 
 
 59% of the respondents are partners or directors at their firms, while 18% are tax 
managers.  Where the tax partner was unable (for example due to time constraints) to 
complete the questionnaire, it was requested that the questionnaire be forwarded to an 
appropriate senior staff member.  Senior staff members who did not hold office as tax 
partner, director or manager, but who had practical experience with the reportable 
arrangements provisions, were grouped together in the category ―Other‖;  examples 
include the position of audit partner (where firms did not have a designated tax 
department), tax administrator and consulting counsel; 
 29% of the respondents have less than ten years experience in South African tax 
legislation, 24% have between ten and 15 years experience and 47% have more than 15 
years experience;  and 
 53% of the respondents considered their knowledge of the reportable arrangements 
provisions as ―good‖, 29% considered it to be ―fair‖, while 18% considered their 















6.6.3  Response Rate 
 
In total, 40 questionnaires were distributed – 30 to audit firms and ten to legal firms.  The 
response rate in both categories is set out in Table 6.6 below. 
 
Table 6.6  Response rate 
 Actual number 
of responses 
Response rate  
% 
Audit firms 12 40 
Legal firms 5 50 
Total responses 17 43 
 
Questionnaires that were not completed by the deadline were followed up with additional 
e-mails and/or telephone calls.  Although one would usually prefer a higher response rate 
in empirical studies of this nature, it is not the intention of this study to acquire results that 
give a true cross section of the population (refer to the earlier discussion of judgement 
sampling in 6.5.1).   
 
Instead, this study relies on the quality of feedback received from the respondents;  the 
majority (71%) of respondents have at least ten years of experience in South African tax 
legislation, while 82% considered their knowledge of the reportable arrangements 
provisions as good to fair (see 6.6.2 above).  In light of the expertise of the respondents, it 
can therefore be assumed that their responses are of great value and add credibility to the 
results.  The response rate of 43% is accordingly considered to be adequate.  
 
6.6.4  Statistical Summary of Results 
 



















Question 1: According to International Accounting Standards (IAS), an ―anticipated‖ 
liability (as interpreted by the tax courts) is not a liability to be recognised in 
the financial statements, but, at most, a contingent liability to be disclosed. 
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.7  Results of Question 1 






 % % % 
Totally agree 50 20 41 
Agree 42 40 41 
Neutral 0 20 6 
Disagree 8 20 12 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The results of the questionnaire confirmed the conclusion drawn from the literature study 
(see 3.5.1), namely that, in terms of IAS, an ―anticipated‖ liability – as interpreted by the 
tax courts – is not a liability to be recognised in the financial statements.  A high 
percentage (82%) of the respondents agreed or totally agreed that an ―anticipated‖ liability 
is, at most, a contingent liability to be disclosed in the financial statements. 
 
Question 2: Based on the recognition criteria of IAS 37, the distinguishing factor between 
an ―existing‖ liability and an ―anticipated‖ liability, is the requirement of an 
entity having a ―p esent obligation‖.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.8  Results of Question 2 






 % % % 
Totally agree 42 20 35 
Agree 42 40 41 
Neutral 0 20 6 
Disagree 16 20 18 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The majority of the respondents (76%) agreed with the statement made earlier in the 
literature study (see 3.5.1), i.e. that the distinguishing factor between an ―existing‖ liability 













Question 3: Which one of the following two criteria do you consider to be the most 
appropriate for determining whether a ―liability for tax‖ was avoided, 
postponed or reduced? 
 
Table 6.9  Results of Question 3 






 % % % 
The accounting criteria of the IASB 
Framework and IAS 37 
8 0 6 
The interpretation followed by the tax 
courts and SARS 
67 100 76 
Both (they are equally appropriate) 25 0 18 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The results obtained for Question 1 and 2 seem to indicate support for the submission 
made in Chapter 3, namely that the accounting and ordinary, grammatical meaning of a 
―liability for tax‖ differs from the meaning attached to it by the courts, i.e. that an 
―anticipated‖ liability is, by accounting principles, not a liability, but a contingent liability. 
 
However, the majority of respondents (76%) selected the criteria of the tax courts and 
SARS‘ interpretation to be the most appropriate for determining whether a ―liability for 
tax‖ was avoided, postponed or reduced.  Surprisingly, 18% of the respondents indicated 
that both the accounting criteria of the IASB Framework and IAS 37 as well as the 
interpretation followed by the tax courts and SARS, are appropriate.  It is interesting to 
note that of the 18% respondents who selected both criteria, l00% were audit firms.   
 
This could suggest that, given the audit environment and perhaps more frequent exposure 
to accounting-related matters (compared to legal firms), the seemingly opposing 
accounting and tax criteria could cause a conflict in judgment.  This, in turn, could result in 
an arrangement not correctly identified as a reportable arrangement. 
 
 
Question 4: Even though the Minister has excluded arrangements where the tax benefit 
does not exceed R1 million, some taxpayers could easily exceed this cut-off 

















Table 6.10  Results of Question 4 






 % % % 
Totally agree 34 40  35 
Agree 50 40 47 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 8 20 12 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A high percentage (82%) of the respondents agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 3.5.4) that even though the Minister has excluded 
arrangements where the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million, some taxpayers could 
easily exceed this cut-off amount with just a few transactions. 
 
Question 5: If none of the section 80N exclusions are applicable, the term ―any‖ in the 
definition of a ―tax benefit‖ is too wide and results in the cumbersome effect 
of ordinary, routine transactions becoming reportable.  Do you agree with 
this statement? 
 
Table 6.11  Results of Question 5 






 % % % 
Totally agree 17 0 12 
Agree 58 80 64 
Neutral 17 0 12 
Disagree 8 20 12 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The results of the questionnaire confirmed the conclusion drawn from the literature study 
(see 3.5.4), namely that the term ―any‖ in the definition of a ―tax benefit‖ is too wide.  The 
majority of respondents (76%) agreed or totally agreed that if none of the section 80N 
exclusions are applicable, the definition of a ―tax benefit‖ results in the cumbersome effect 















Question 6: The list of ―plain-vanilla‖ transactions in section 80N(1) should be extended 
to include other routine, operating transactions which do not give rise to an 
undue tax benefit, such as the acquisition of any asset, trading stock, 
consumables and services on credit.  Do you agree with this statement? 
  
Table 6.12  Results of Question 6 






 % % % 
Totally agree 17 0 12 
Agree 75 100 82 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
An overwhelming majority (94%) of respondents agreed or totally agreed that the list of 
―plain-vanilla‖ transactions in section 80N(1) should be extended to include other routine, 
operating transactions which do not give rise to an undue tax benefit.  The results obtained 
from the empirical study confirm the research proposals made in the literature study (see 
3.5.4), namely that the section 80N(1) list of exclusions should be extended to also include, 
for example, the acquisition of any asset, trading stock, consumables and services on 
credit. 
 
Question 7: The meaning of the requirement ―undue tax benefit‖ in section 80N(4) is 
unclear, as neither the Act nor SARS provides clarity on how the ―undue‖ 
amount should be determined and by whom. Do you agree with this 
statement? 
 
Table 6.13  Results of Question 7 






 % % % 
Totally agree 42 60 47 
Agree 42 40 41 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 8 0 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 














The results of the questionnaire confirmed the conclusion drawn from the literature study 
(see 3.9.3), namely that the meaning of the requirement ―undue tax benefit‖ in section 
80N(4) is unclear.  The vast majority of respondents (88%) agreed or totally agreed that as 
neither the Act nor SARS provides clarity on how the ―undue‖ amount should be 
determined and by whom, the meaning of the requirement is unclear. 
 
Question 8: The introductory requirement of section 80M(1) states, inter alia, that an 
arrangement is reportable if any tax benefit is ―assumed to be derived by any 
participant‖. Who do you consider must assume that a tax benefit is or will be 
derived? 
 
Table 6.14  Results of Question 8 






 % % % 
The Commissioner of SARS 17 40 24 
Any participant to the arrangement 75 60 70 
Question not answered by respondent 8 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The majority of respondents (70%) believe that the onus to assume that a tax benefit is or 
will be derived rests on any participant to the arrangement.  Only 24% of respondents 
agreed with the results obtained from the literature study (see 3.6), namely that the onus to 
assume that a tax benefit is or will be derived, lies upon the Commissioner of SARS.  The 
inconsistent results might indicate an uncertainty as to who must bear the onus of making 
an assumption that a tax benefit is or will be derived.  The results therefore appear to 
contradict the statement made by SARS (2010:9), i.e. that there ―is little room for debate as 
to what is meant by ‗assumed‘‖. 
 
Question 9:  Not all parties to a transaction are always given insight to the financial 
model contained in the arrangement and it is therefore possible that a 
participant may not be aware of the assumed tax treatment of the 






















Table 6.15  Results of Question 9 






 % % % 
Totally agree 25 60 35 
Agree 75 40 65 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The results of the questionnaire confirmed the conclusion drawn from the literature study 
(see 3.6), namely that it is possible that a participant may not be aware of the assumed tax 
treatment of the arrangement.  All of the respondents (100%) agreed or totally agreed with 
the research findings, due to the fact that not all parties to a transaction are always given 
insight to the financial model contained in the arrangement.   
 
In light of the results of the questionnaire, the submission made in the literature study 
appears to be particularly relevant, namely that SARS should specifically address 
circumstances where not all the parties are given insight to the financial models contained 
in the arrangements.  This will assist in ensuring that participants will not be expected to 
make assumptions relating to arrangements to which they are not fully privy. 
 
 
Question 10:  To cover situations where it is uncertain whether any tax benefit will flow, a 
more appropriate wording of section 80M(1) would be where the words 
―assumed to be derived‖ are replaced by ―may be derived‖.   
                     Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.16  Results of Question 10 






 % % % 
Totally agree 8 20 12 
Agree 34 60 41 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 42 20 35 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 8 0 6 














A slight majority of respondents (53%) agreed or totally agreed that a more appropriate 
wording of section 80M(1) would be where the words ―assumed to be derived‖ are 
replaced by ―may be derived‖.  35% of respondents did not consider this proposal to be 
appropriate in removing any uncertainty. 
 
Question 11:  If a person, for example an outside party appointed by a bank to act as a 
facility agent, played no part in setting up the transaction and is merely 
there to ensure that the interests of the parties are adequately catered for, 
there is no reason to include them in the definition of promoter, and as such, 
the word ―managing‖ should be deleted from the section 80T definition of 
―promoter‖.    Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.17  Results of Question 11 






 % % % 
Totally agree 0 20 6 
Agree 25 40 29 
Neutral 34 20 30 
Disagree 33 20 29 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 8 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The results from the empirical study are inconclusive for this question:  35% of 
respondents agreed or totally agreed with the statement, 30% remained neutral in this 
regard and 29% disagreed with the statement.  As the results of the questionnaire neither 
corroborate nor contradict the submission made in the literature study (see 3.8.1), it would 
appear that SARS‘ (2010:26) recommendation of obtaining a letter from the disclosing 
promoter if any doubt exists as to whether a particular participant is the promoter, is 
perhaps the safest route to follow. 
 
Question 12:  Neither the Act nor SARS addresses the scenario where the promoter is also 
a lawyer, and as such, SARS should specifically take the client/attorney 
privilege into consideration for the disclosure obligation of section 80O. Do 



















Table 6.18  Results of Question 12 






 % % % 
Totally agree 8 60 24 
Agree 33 20 29 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 42 20 35 
Totally disagree 8 0 6 
Question not answered by respondent 9 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A slight majority of respondents (53%) agreed or totally agreed that SARS should 
specifically take the client/attorney privilege into consideration for the disclosure 
obligation of section 80O.  However, 80% of legal firms agreed or totally agreed with the 
statement.  This seems to suggest a greater appreciation of the implications of a possible 
infringement upon the client/attorney privilege among lawyers (compared with auditors).   
 
As such, the results of the questionnaire confirmed the conclusion drawn from the 
literature study (see 3.8.1), namely that as neither the Act nor SARS addresses the scenario 
where the promoter is also a lawyer, SARS should specifically take the client/attorney 
privilege into consideration for the disclosure obligation of section 80O. 
 
Question 13:   
 
Text box 2 of the Draft Guide model makes a statement and does not pose a question.  Yet, 
the arrow flowing from text box 2 indicates ―yes‖, despite the fact that no question was 
posed. 
 
A better phrasing of text box 1 would be: ―Has an arrangement been entered into?‖ and 
the second text box must then be deleted.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.19  Results of Question 13 






 % % % 
Totally agree 33 40 35 
Agree 50 60 53 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 17 0 12 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 














A significant majority of respondents (88%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2.1), namely that a better phrasing of text box 1 of 
the Draft Guide model would be: ―Has an arrangement been entered into?‖ and that the 
second text box had to be deleted. 
 
Question 14:   
 
Text box 3 of the Draft Guide model indicates that if the arrangement is listed in section 
80M(2), the arrangement should be disclosed.  The section 80N(4) exclusions (by way of 
the  Government Gazette) excludes any arrangement where the tax benefit is not the main 
or one of the main benefits or where the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million.   
 
Irrespective of which category an arrangement falls into, namely sections 80M(1) or (2), 
the section 80N(4) exclusions prevail and the depiction in text box 3 (the ‗yes‘ arrow) is 
therefore incorrect. 
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.20  Results of Question 14 






 % % % 
Totally agree 58 60 59 
Agree 17 40 23 
Neutral 25 0 18 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A high percentage of respondents (82%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2.2), namely that the ―yes‖ arrow of text box 3 of the 
Draft Guide model is incorrect, as the section 80N(4) exclusions prevail irrespective of 
which category an arrangement falls into. 
 
Question 15:   
 
Text boxes 5 and 6 are related to text box 4 and refer to the section 80N(4) exclusions 
already mentioned.  If no tax benefit was derived, then the arrangement is not reportable – 
in this case the model at text box 4 is correct.  However, if a tax benefit was derived, the 
arrows flowing from text box 4 to text boxes 5 and 6 both state ―yes‖.   
 
Despite the fact that text boxes 5 and 6 must both be addressed, it is unclear which 
question should be addressed first and the order of the questions is thus potentially 













Table 6.21  Results of Question 15 






 % % % 
Totally agree 25 60 35 
Agree 58 20 47 
Neutral 17 0 12 
Disagree 0 20 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A significant majority of respondents (82%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2.4), namely that the order of the questions in text 
boxes 5 and 6 of the Draft Guide model are potentially misleading, as it is unclear which 
question should be addressed first. 
 
Question 16:   
 
The Draft Guide model correctly indicates (at text box 5) that the arrangement is not 
reportable if the tax benefit is not the main or one of the main benefits.  However, if the 
answer is ―yes‖, the arrow flows directly from text box 5 to 7 and does not allow for the R1 
million exclusion in text box 6 to apply.   
 
This treatment is incorrect as the notice in the Government Gazette allows for two 
exceptions:  either the tax benefit is not the main benefit or the tax benefit does not exceed 
R1 million.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.22  Results of Question 16 






 % % % 
Totally agree 50 60 53 
Agree 50 40 47 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
All of the respondents (100%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions drawn from 
the literature study (see 5.2.4), namely that the R1 million exclusion in text box 6 of the 
Draft Guide model is incorrectly omitted if the answer to the question in text box 5 is ―yes‖ 













The results of the questionnaire therefore appear to corroborate the proposal made in 
Chapter 5, i.e. that text boxes 5 and 6 should be combined in one question that is addressed 
after text box 4.  Thus, if either of the Gazetted exclusions is applicable, the arrangement is 
not reportable.  This proposal is utilised in Question 3 of the workable model. 
 
Question 17:   
 
Text box 5 of the Draft Guide model refers to the ―tax benefits‖.  Although probably just a 
typing error, the plural use of the word ―benefits‖ is incorrect, due to the fact that the 
Government Gazette uses the singular word ―benefit‖ and also because ―benefits‖ 
(plural) cannot be ―the main benefit‖ (singular) of the arrangement.  Do you agree with 
this statement? 
 
Table 6.23  Results of Question 17 






 % % % 
Totally agree 42 60 47 
Agree 42 20 35 
Neutral 16 20 18 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A high percentage of respondents (82%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2.4), namely that the plural use of the word 
―benefits‖ is incorrect, due to the fact that the Government Gazette uses the singular word 
―benefit‖ and also because ―benefits‖ (plural) cannot be ―the main benefit‖ (singular) of 
the arrangement. 
 
Question 18:   
 
Text box 8 of the Draft Guide model correctly indicates that if an arrangement is excluded, 
it is not reportable.  However, the question in text box 8 refers to section 80N as a whole, 
but text box 9 again refers to the Gazetted exclusions of section 80N(4).   
 
The Draft Guide model duplicates the question in text box 8 by once again referring to 
section 80N in text box 9;  the wording of text box 8 should therefore be more specific and 

















Table 6.24  Results of Question 18 






 % % % 
Totally agree 33 60 41 
Agree 59 20 47 
Neutral 0 20 6 
Disagree 8 0 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A significant majority of respondents (88%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2.6), namely that the wording of text box 8 in the 
Draft Guide model should be more specific and should refer to sections 80N(1), (2) and (3) 
individually and not to section 80N as a whole.  The results of the questionnaire therefore 
appears to corroborate the use of the three separate text boxes in the workable model in 
Chapter 6, each one addressing a requirement of section 80N. 
 
Question 19:   
 
The ―yes‖ and ―no‖ answers to the last question (in text box 9) of the Draft Guide model 
have been transposed, as the model incorrectly indicates that if the arrangement was 
excluded by the Minister, it must be disclosed as a reportable arrangement.   
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.25  Results of Question 19 






 % % % 
Totally agree 67 40 59 
Agree 25 60 35 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 8 0 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
An overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) agreed or totally agreed with the research 
findings of the literature study (see 5.2.7), namely that the ―yes‖ and ―no‖ answers to text 
box 9 of the Draft Guide model have been transposed, as the model incorrectly indicates 














Question 20:   
 
The Draft Guide model contains numerous anomalies and as such is flawed and 
inappropriate for use by taxpayers.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.26  Results of Question 20 






 % % % 
Totally agree 42 60 47 
Agree 42 40 41 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 8 0 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The vast majority of respondents (88%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions 
drawn from the literature study (see 5.2), namely that, due to numerous anomalies, the 
Draft Guide model is flawed and inappropriate for use by taxpayers. 
 
Question 21:   
 
The Alternative Model proposed in this questionnaire presents the questions in a revised 
order (as compared with the Draft Guide model) whereby the first questions to address 
relate to the section 80N exclusions. 
 
The revised order of the Alternative Model (whereby the taxpayer first seeks to apply the 
exclusions) will result in less time wasted on addressing unnecessary questions later in the 
model where it is clear from the outset that the arrangement is non-reportable. 
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.27  Results of Question 21 






 % % % 
Totally agree 50 60 53 
Agree 42 40 41 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 8 0 6 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 















An overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) agreed or totally agreed with the 
submission made in the literature study (see 5.4), namely that the revised order of the 
workable model will result in less time wasted on addressing unnecessary questions later in 
the model where it is clear from the outset that the arrangement is non-reportable. 
 
Question 22:   
 
Questions 4, 5 and 6 of the Alternative Model expound on the Draft Guide model‘s text 
box 8 where reference was only made to section 80N.   
 
Due to the relative complexity of the section 80N exclusions, the Alternative Model 
provides better guidance as it states each exclusion requirement as a separate question. 
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.28  Results of Question 22 






 % % % 
Totally agree 33 60 41 
Agree 67 40 59 
Neutral 0 0 0 
Disagree 0 0 0 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
All of the respondents (100%) agreed or totally agreed with the submission made in the 
literature study (see 5.4), namely that, due to the relative complexity of the section 80N 
exclusions, by stating each exclusion requirement as a separate question, the workable 
model provides better guidance. 
 
Question 23:   
 
Do you consider the Alternative Model to be more accurate than the Draft Guide model? 
 
Table 6.29  Results of Question 23 






 % % % 
Yes 92 100 94 
No 0 0 0 
Don‘t know 8 0 6 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 













An overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) considered the workable model to be 
more accurate than the Draft Guide model, whereas 6% of the respondents did not know 
the answer to this question.  The results of the questionnaire therefore confirmed the 
submission made in the literature study (see 5.4), i.e. that the workable model is more 
accurate than the Draft Guide model. 
 
Question 24:   
 
Do you consider the Alternative Model to be more helpful than the Draft Guide model? 
 
Table 6.30  Results of Question 24 






 % % % 
Yes 92 80 88 
No 0 0 0 
Don‘t know 8 20 12 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
A significant majority of respondents (88%) considered the workable model to be more 
helpful than the Draft Guide model, whereas 12% of the respondents did not know the 
answer to this question.  The results of the questionnaire therefore confirmed the 
submission made in the literature study (see 5.4), i.e. that the workable model is more 
helpful than the Draft Guide model. 
 
Question 25:   
 
Do you consider the Alternative Model to be more user-friendly than the Draft Guide 
model? 
 
Table 6.31  Results of Question 25 






 % % % 
Yes 92 100 94 
No 0 0 0 
Don‘t know 8 0 6 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 















An overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) considered the workable model to be 
more user-friendly than the Draft Guide model, whereas 6% of the respondents did not 
know the answer to this question.  The results of the questionnaire therefore confirmed the 
submission made in the literature study (see 5.4), i.e. that the workable model is more user-
friendly than the Draft Guide model. 
 
Question 26:  Due to the fact that the term ―reasonable expectation‖ in section 80M(1)(d) 
is not defined in the Act and that SARS has not issued any guidance on the 
application of this requirement, the interpretation of what constitutes a 
―reasonable expectation‖ is subjective.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Table 6.32  Results of Question 26 






 % % % 
Totally agree 25 60 35 
Agree 42 0 29 
Neutral 8 0 6 
Disagree 17 40 24 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 8 0 6 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The majority of respondents (64%) agreed or totally agreed with the conclusions drawn 
from the literature study, namely that, due to the fact that the term ―reasonable 
expectation‖ is not defined in the Act and because SARS has not issued any guidance on 
the application of this requirement, the interpretation of what constitutes a ―reasonable 
expectation‖ is subjective. 
 
 
Question 27: By applying the common law principles of a ―reasonable person‖, one could 
infer that a reasonable person‘s expectation of a pre-tax profit is similar to 
a person having a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖. 






















Table 6.33  Results of Question 27 






 % % % 
Totally agree 8 0 6 
Agree 25 60 35 
Neutral 34 0 23 
Disagree 25 20 24 
Totally disagree 8 20 12 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
Only 41% of the respondents agreed or totally agreed with the submission made in the 
literature study (see 3.10), namely that by applying the common law principles of a 
―reasonable person‖, one could infer that a reasonable person‘s expectation of a pre-tax 
profit is similar to a person having a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖.  
However, 60% of the legal firms agreed with this statement.   
 
These results seem to contradict the approach recommended by some Canadian courts (see 
Chapter 4), i.e. that the REOP test should not be viewed in isolation, but that one should 
also consider the behaviour of a reasonable person who applied commercial common 
sense.  The inconsistent results appear to corroborate the submission made in the study that 
the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ test is subjective;  the survey results 
seemingly underscore the need for a more objective approach.   
 
 
Question 28:   
 
Question 7 of the Alternative Model refers to any of the five scenarios of section 80M(1).  
One such scenario is the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement as 
contained in section 80M(1)(d).   
 
By leaving this question for last, the taxpayer might be able to determine earlier on in the 
model that the arrangement is not reportable and could therefore be prevented from 
spending valuable time and money on obtaining costly tax advice to determine whether 



















Table 6.34  Results of Question 28 






 % % % 
Totally agree 17 0 12 
Agree 42 60 47 
Neutral 33 20 29 
Disagree 8 20 12 
Totally disagree 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The majority of the respondents (59%) agreed or totally agreed with the submission made 
in the literature study (see 5.4), namely that by leaving the ―reasonable expectation of a 
pre-tax profit‖ requirement for last in the workable model, the taxpayer might be able to 
determine earlier on in the model that the arrangement is not reportable.   
 
This, in turn, corroborates the submission that the workable model could prevent a 
taxpayer from spending valuable time and money on obtaining costly tax advice to 
determine whether there is ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖. 
 
Question 29:   
 
How helpful did you find the ―rental loss‖ criteria identified by the South African courts to 
be in determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of 
section 80M(1)(d) is met? 
 
Table 6.35  Results of Question 29 






 % % % 
Very helpful 0 0 0 
Somewhat helpful 83 60 76 
Not really helpful 17 40 24 
Not helpful at all 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The majority of the respondents (76%) found the ―rental loss‖ criteria identified by South 
African courts to be helpful in determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-















Question 30:   
 
How helpful did you find the extended criteria identified by the Canadian courts to be in 
determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of 
section 80M(1)(d) is met? 
 
Table 6.36  Results of Question 30 






 % % % 
Very helpful 42 40 41 
Somewhat helpful 50 60 53 
Not really helpful 8 0 6 
Not helpful at all 0 0 0 
Question not answered by respondent 0 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
 
The overwhelming majority of the respondents (94%) found the extended criteria 
identified by the Canadian courts to be helpful in determining whether the ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement is met.  The results of the questionnaire 
therefore confirm the relevance and usefulness of including the Canadian criteria in the 
workable model. 
 
6.7  Conclusion 
 
Chapter 6 discussed the research design and the process followed in analysing the 
responses for the qualitative research performed.  An interpretive approach was adopted, 
and a non-probability sampling method was considered appropriate.  The tax partners of 30 
audit firms and ten legal firms were included in the sample.   
 
This chapter described the data collection method and process, the design of the data 
collection instrument (the self-administered questionnaire) and provided a statistical 
summary of the responses.  In nearly all of the questions, the majority of respondents 
agreed with the conclusions drawn from the literature study.  Notably, compared with 
SARS‘ Draft Guide model, an overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) considered 
the proposed model to be more accurate and user-friendly and a significant majority (88%) 













Also, the vast majority of respondents (94%) found the extended criteria identified by 
Canadian courts to be helpful in determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-
tax profit‖ requirement is met. 
 
Based on the empirical results, it is therefore submitted that the proposed model is indeed 
accurate, complete and relevant.  As such, this is a workable model which can serve as a 
usable guide for South African taxpayers in the identification and application of a section 























































“We stand ready to take agreed action against those jurisdictions which do not 
meet international standards in relation to tax transparency.” 
 
















7.1  Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 provided the background to the problem statement of this study.  It was noted 
that across the globe, revenue authorities regard the concept of tax evasion and tax 
avoidance as a serious threat to government revenue.  In light of the OECD‘s call for 
greater transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes, SARS required a more 
aggressive reporting system.  Consequently, the new reportable arrangements provisions 
were introduced in sections 80M to 80T of the Act with effect 1 April 2008. 
 
This study focused on a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement and noted that if the 
following requirements were met, the arrangement was reportable: 
 
1. An ―arrangement‖ (as defined) is entered into, 
2. A ―tax benefit‖ (as defined) is or will be derived or is assumed to be derived, 
3. By any ―participant‖ (as defined) by virtue of that arrangement and 
4. The arrangement does not result in a reasonable expectation of a ―pre-tax profit‖ (as 
defined) for any participant. 
 
Regrettably, the concept of a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ has not been 
defined in the Act; it has not been considered by our courts (in the context of reportable 
arrangements) and SARS has not issued any guidance or an Interpretation Note as to the 
application of section 80M(1)(d).   
 
The objective of this study was therefore to conduct a critical analysis of the language of 
section 80M(1)(d) in order to determine its nature and scope.  The rules of interpretation 
and the development of section 80M(1)(d) were also addressed.  The Canadian REOP test 
was examined to identify objective guidelines for the application of the ―reasonable 
expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement.  These guidelines were incorporated in the 













proposed model were tested in a survey conducted among tax partners at a sample of 
leading audit and legal firms. 
 
Chapter 1 furthermore described the research design, method and scope of the study and 
set out the structure of the dissertation. 
 
7.2  Chapter 2:  History and Development of Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act 
 
Chapter 2 analysed the history and development of section 80M(1)(d) from its initial 
inception as section 76A on 1 March 2005 to its current format as part of the reportable 
arrangements provisions.  It was determined that the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax 
profit‖ requirement did not evolve from previous legislation. 
 
7.3  Chapter 3:  Examining the Language of Section 80M(1)(d) of the Act 
 
After exploring the development of section 80M(1)(d), Chapter 3 examined the meaning of 
the words contained therein.  The definitions and interpretations attached to the words in 
section 80M(1)(d) were analysed by first noting their ordinary, grammatical meaning and 
thereafter by examining the meaning the courts have ascribed to them. 
 
Despite the fact that many of the terms are defined in section 80T, some of these 
definitions are difficult to apply in practice and other terms have not been defined at all.  
The ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ concept as a whole is not defined, nor has 
SARS issued any guidelines as to the interpretation of this requirement.  This could lead to 
considerable uncertainty among tax practitioners. 
 
Consequently, this chapter made numerous submissions and recommendations in an 
attempt to clarify the meaning of the words in section 80M(1)(d).  It became evident that 
















Using Constitutional principles as a backdrop to interpreting legislation, it was ascertained 
that South African courts are allowed to consider foreign law.  Although foreign case law 
(and by implication the Canadian REOP test) is not binding on South African courts, they 
do have persuasive value.  Also, because the wording of the REOP test is similar to the 
wording of section 80M(1)(d), it was submitted that South African courts may consider 
applying the Canadian REOP test to a section 80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement. 
 
7.4  Chapter 4:  Examining the Reasonable Expectation of Profit test in Canada 
 
Chapter 4 accordingly examined the Canadian REOP test and consequently identified a 
comprehensive checklist of objective factors used by Canadian tax practitioners in 
applying the REOP test.  An exposition of the legislative history and development of the 
REOP test was provided, along with a discussion of the practical problems encountered by 
Canadian taxpayers in the application of the REOP test. 
 
The objective guidelines identified in this chapter were incorporated in the workable model 
proposed in this study and were also included in the survey conducted among a sample of 
tax partners. 
 
7.5  Chapter 5:  Developing a Workable Model for the Identification and Application 
of a Section 80M(1)(d) Reportable Arrangement 
 
Despite SARS issuing an updated Draft Guide on Reportable Arrangements, the model 
contained therein is flawed.  Chapter 5 examined SARS‘ model and identified a number of 
anomalies.  The workable model proposed in this study is based on SARS model, but the 
questions (of which there are seven) are presented in a different order.  It was submitted 
that the revised order, whereby the taxpayer first seeks to apply the exclusions of section 
80N and leaves the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement for last, would 
be less time-consuming and thus more cost-effective.  The effect of section 80M(1)(d), viz. 
















7.6  Chapter 6:  The Empirical Study 
 
Having developed the workable model in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 tested the 
accuracy, completeness and usability of the model by means of a survey.  The tax partners 
at a sample of leading audit and legal firms completed a self-administered questionnaire 
which also tested many of the research submissions made in Chapter 3.   
 
In almost all of the questions, the majority of respondents agreed with the research findings 
submitted in the literature study.  Notably, compared with SARS‘ Draft Guide model, an 
overwhelming majority of respondents (94%) considered the proposed model of this study 
to be more accurate and user-friendly and a significant majority (88%) considered the 
proposed model to be more helpful.  Also, the vast majority of respondents (94%) found 
the extended criteria identified by Canadian courts to be helpful in determining whether the 
―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement is met. 
 
7.7 Areas for Future Research 
 
Although this study critically analysed the wording of the reportable arrangements 
provisions, the focus was on section 80M(1)(d).  The other four scenarios contemplated in 
section 80M(1) and the specific arrangements enumerated in section 80M(2) were 
excluded from the scope of this study.  As such, future research could also include these 
reportable arrangements provisions.  Their interaction with the GAAR provisions could 
also be explored. 
 
It is recommended that the tax shelter or disclosure provisions of other countries, 
especially those of Canada, the UK, the USA and Australia, be analysed in order to 
develop a best-practice framework within which SARS could operate.  The reportable 
arrangements provisions are certainly a step in the right direction;  however, it remains to 
be seen whether the ―new‖ reportable arrangements provisions will indeed serve SARS‘ 















To this end, the main research findings and recommendations of this study will be shared 
with SARS‘ Legal and Policy division as a starting point for at least clarifying the existing 
reportable arrangements provisions.  It is hoped that this will eventually lead to the 
publication of a properly updated and accurate guide by SARS as well as the issue of 
objective guidelines for the application of the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ 
requirement in section 80M(1)(d). 
 
7.8  Concluding Remarks 
 
A thorough examination of the reportable arrangements provisions of the Act, particularly 
section 80M(1)(d), shows that the interpretation of these provisions is subjective and 
difficult to apply in practice.  This is evidenced by the number of submissions that SAICA 
has made to SARS (see Chapter 3), the conflicting results to some of the survey questions 
(see Chapter 6) and the lack of accurate, helpful guidance from SARS. 
 
The study had as its objective the critical analysis of the language of section 80M(1)(d).  
The meaning of the words contained in section 80M(1)(d) were examined and interpreted 
in order to determine the nature and scope of section 80M(1)(d).  The Canadian REOP test 
was analysed to identify objective criteria to be used in the application of section 
80M(1)(d).  This detailed literature review served as a theoretical underpinning for the 
model developed in Chapter 5 and tested in Chapter 6.   
 
Based on the empirical results in Chapter 6, it is submitted that the proposed model is 
accurate, complete and usable.  As such, this is a workable model which can serve as a 
usable guide for South African taxpayers in the identification and application of a section 
80M(1)(d) reportable arrangement.  It is hoped that this model will serve as an aid to 
prevent taxpayers from spending valuable time and money on obtaining costly tax advice 
to determine whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of 
section 80M(1)(d) is met.  Indeed, if the survey results are any indication, the workable 
model is expected to prevent taxpayers from incurring unnecessary costs in order to 
comply with the disclosure obligation when in fact they were under no obligation to report 














The G20 countries, who support the OECD‘s work on transparency and exchange of 
information, issued this rather dire warning (OECD 2009): 
  
―We stand ready to take agreed action against those jurisdictions which do not meet international 
standards in relation to tax transparency.‖ 
 
SARS will in all likelihood come under increasing pressure from South Africa‘s trade and 
investment partners to cultivate a cooperative tax environment.  The reportable 
arrangements provisions and other non-compliance measures will probably fall under 
SARS‘ spotlight to a greater extent in the future.  Despite SARS‘ (2010:5) intention, it is 
questionable whether their Draft Guide and model have in fact provided greater certainty 
to participants and promoters in determining whether arrangements should be disclosed to 
the Commissioner. 
 
Until such time as SARS adequately addresses the anomalies in the wording of the 
reportable arrangements provisions and issues a properly revised guide, it is incumbent 
upon taxpayers to carefully consider whether their arrangements fall within the ambit of 
sections 80M to 80T.  It is hoped that the results of this study will assist in affording 
taxpayers greater clarity on the identification and application of the reportable 
arrangements provisions.  The workable model proposed in this study could be of value to 
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Sections 80M to 80T of the Act 
 
Section 80M.  Reportable Arrangements 
  
1)       An arrangement is a reportable arrangement if it is listed in subsection (2) or if any tax benefit is or 
will be derived or is assumed to be derived by any participant by virtue of that arrangement and the 
arrangement— 
a)       contains provisions in terms of which the calculation of ‗interest‘ as defined in section 24J, 
finance costs, fees or any other charges is wholly or partly dependent on the assumptions 
relating to the tax treatment of that arrangement (otherwise than by reason of any change in 
the provisions of this Act or any other law administered by the Commissioner); 
b)       has any of the characteristics or characteristics which are substa tially similar to those 
contemplated in section 80C(2)(b); 
c)       is or will be disclosed by any participant as giving rise to a financial liability for purposes of 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practice but not for purposes of this Act; 
d)      does not result in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any participant; or 
e)        results in a reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit for any participant that is less than the 
value of that tax benefit to that participant if both are discounted to a present value at the end 
of the first year of assessment when that tax benefit is or will be derived or is assumed to be 
derived on a consistent basis and using a reasonable discount rate for that participant. 
  
2)        The following arrangements are reportable arrangements: 
a)        Any arrangement which would have qualified as a ‗hybrid equity instrument‘ as defined in 
section 8E, if the prescribed period had been 10 years; 
b)        any arrangement which would have qualified as a ‗hybrid debt instrument‘ as defined in 
section 8F, if the prescribed period in that section had been 10 years, but does not include 
any instrument listed on an exchange regulated in terms of the Securities Services Act, 2004 
(Act No. 36 of 2004); or 
c)        any arrangement identified by the Minister by notice in the Gazette as an arrangement which 
is likely to result in any undue tax benefit. 
  



















Section 80N.  Excluded arrangements 
   
1)        An arrangement is an excluded arrangement if it is— 
a)        a loan, advance or debt in terms of which— 
i)          the borrower receives or will receive an amount of cash and agrees to repay at least 
the same amount of cash to the lender at a determinable future date; or 
ii)         the borrower receives or will receive a fungible asset and agrees to return an asset of 
the same kind and of the same or equivalent quantity and quality to the lender at a 
determinable future date; 
b)        a lease; 
c)        a transaction undertaken through an exchange regulated in terms of the Securities Services 
Act, 2004 (Act No. 36 of 2004); or 
d)        a transaction in participatory interests in a scheme regulated in terms of the Collective 
Investment Schemes Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 45 of 2002). 
  
2)        Subsection (1) applies only to an arrangement that— 
a)        is undertaken on a stand-alone basis and is not directly or indirectly connected to, or directly 
or indirectly dependent upon, any other arrangement (whether entered into between the same 
or different parties); or 
b)        would have qualified as having been undertaken on a stand-alone basis as required by 
paragraph (a), were it not for a connected arrangement that is entered into for the sole 
purpose of providing security and where no tax benefit is obtained or enhanced by virtue of 
that security arrangement. 
  
3)        Subsection (1) does not apply to any arrangement that is entered into— 
a)        with the main purpose of obtaining or enhancing a tax benefit; or 
b)        in a specific manner or form that enhances or will enhance a tax benefit. 
  
4)        The Minister may determine an arrangement to be an excluded arrangement by notice in the 
Gazette, if he or she is satisfied that the arrangement is not likely to lead to an undue tax benefit. 
 
 
Section 80O. Disclosure obligation 
  
1)        The promoter must disclose such information in respect of a reportable arrangement as is 
contemplated in section 80P. 
  
2)        If there is no promoter in relation to an arrangement or if the promoter is not a resident, all other 














3)        A participant need not disclose the information in respect of a reportable arrangement if that 
participant obtains a written statement from— 
a)        the promoter that the promoter has disclosed that reportable arrangement as required by this 
Part; or 
b)        any other participant, if subsection (2) applies, that the other participant has disclosed that 
reportable arrangement as required by this Part. 
  
4)        The reportable arrangement must be disclosed within 60 days after any amount is first received by 
or accrued to any participant or is first paid or actually incurred by any participant in terms of the 
arrangement. 
  
5)        The Commissioner may grant extension for disclosure for a further 60 days, if reasonable grounds 
exist for that extension. 
 
Section 80P. Information to be submitted 
 
The promoter or participant, as the case may be, must submit, in relation to the reportable arrangement, in the 
form and manner (including electronically) and at such place as may be prescribed by the Commissioner — 
 
a)        a detailed description of all its steps and key features; 
b)        a detailed description of the assumed tax benefits for all participants, including, but not limited to, 
tax deductions and deferred income; 
c)        the names, registration numbers and registered addresses of all participants; 
d)        a list of all its agreements; and 
e)        any financial model that embodies its projected tax treatment. 
 
Section 80S. Penalties 
 
1)        Any participant who fails to disclose the information in respect of a reportable arrangement as 
required by section 80O or section 80R shall be liable to a penalty of R1 million. 
  
2)        The Commissioner may reduce the penalty contemplated in subsection (1), if— 
a)        there are extenuating circumstances and the participant remedies the non-disclosure within a 
reasonable time; or 


















Section 80T. Definitions 
 
 „arrangement‟ means any transaction, operation or scheme; 
 
„financial benefit‟ means any reduction in the cost of finance, including interest, finance charges, costs, fees, 
and discounts in the redemption amount; 
 
„participant‟ in relation to a reportable arrangement means— 
a)        any promoter; or 
b)        any company or trust which directly or indirectly derives or assumes that it derives a tax benefit or 
financial benefit by virtue of a reportable arrangement; 
 
„pre-tax profit‟ in relation to an arrangement, means the profit of a participant resulting from that 
arrangement before deducting any normal tax, which profit must be determined in accordance with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Practice after taking into account all costs and expenditure incurred by that participant 
in connection with the arrangement and after deducting any foreign taxes paid or payable by that participant; 
 
„promoter‟ in relation to a reportable arrangement means any person who is principally responsible for 
organising, designing, selling, financing or managing that reportable arrangement; 
 
„reportable arrangement‟ means any arrangement as contemplated in section 80M; 
 
„tax‟ includes any tax, levy, duty or other liability imposed by this Act or any other Act administered by the 
Commissioner; 
 





















Summary of the Tax Disclosure Rules 































Summary of the Tax Disclosure Rules of the UK, USA and Canada 
 
Chapter 3 alluded to the tax disclosure rules of the foreign countries mentioned in the 
original Reportable Arrangements Guide (SARS 2005).  Annexure B briefly summarises 
these rules.  It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to expound on these foreign tax 
disclosure rules or to examine the various definitions contained in these rules.   
 
1.  The United Kingdom (UK) 
 
The disclosure requirements for the UK came into effect on 1 August 2004.  Promoters, 
and in some instances, users of certain tax schemes and arrangements, are obliged to 
disclose details of those arrangements when they are first available for implementation.   
 
Her Majesty‘s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) office widened the scope from tax 
arrangements concerning employment or certain financial products to the whole of Income 
Tax, Corporation Tax and Capital Gains Tax with effect from 1 August 2006  (HMRC 
2010). 
 
Briefly, the tax arrangement must be disclosed when: 
 
 It will, or might be expected to, enable any person to obtain a tax advantage; 
 That tax advantage is, or might be expected to be, the main benefit or one of the main 
benefits of the arrangement; and 
 It is a tax arrangement that falls within any description (―hallmarks‖) prescribed in the 
relevant regulations. 
 
In most situations where a disclosure is required it must be made by the scheme 
―promoter‖ within five days of it being made available. However, the scheme user may 
















 the promoter is based outside the UK; or 
 the promoter is a lawyer and legal privilege applies; or 
 there is no promoter. 
 
The HMRC identified the following hallmarks for disclosure: 
 
 Wishing to keep the arrangements confidential from a competitor; 
 Wishing to keep the arrangements confidential from HMRC; 
 Arrangements for which a premium fee could reasonably be obtained; 
 Arrangements that include off market terms; 
 Arrangements that are standardised tax products; 
 Arrangements that are loss schemes; 
 Arrangements that are certain leasing arrangements; and 
 Arrangements for certain pension benefits. 
 
Upon disclosure, HMRC issues the promoter with n eight-digit scheme reference number 
for the disclosed scheme. By law the promoter must provide this number to each client 
that uses the scheme, who in turn must include the number on his or her tax return.  A 
person who designs and implements their own scheme must disclose it within 30 days of 
implementation. 
 
2.  The United States of America (USA) 
 
The USA has adopted formalised rules in their tax code which define tax shelters and 
require the registration of these tax shelters and the maintenance of investor lists by 
promoters and which also levy penalties for non-compliance (SARS 2005:2). 
 
As of 28 February 2000, USA taxpayers and tax shelter organisers have been required to 
disclose certain ―reportable transactions‖.  These regulations were finalised three years 
later and became effective for all transactions entered into on or after 28 February 2003 














―Reportable transactions‖ are defined in Regulations to the Internal Revenue Code. 
Consequently, in order to identify tax-advantaged products which have been sold to  
individual and corporate taxpayers, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued Regulations 
which require taxpayers to identify certain ―reportable transactions‖ which have the 
potential for tax avoidance.  These categories include listed transactions, confidential 
transactions, transactions with contingent fees, loss transactions, transactions with 
significant book or tax differences and transactions involving tax credits (Tooma 
2008:112).  If such a ―reportable transaction‖ exists, the taxpayer must report the 




3.  Canada 
 
Canada also has well developed reportable transaction legislation in the form of tax shelter 
rules (SARS 2005:2). The tax shelter provisions were enacted in 1989 to ensure the more 
effective audit of certain tax-advantaged investments. To that end, the ―promoter‖ of a 
property that is a ―tax shelter‖ is required to obtain an identification number from the 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) before the sale of an interest in the property. Failure to do 
so will result in the promoter being subject to a monetary penalty, and the investor will be 
denied any tax deductions claimed in respect of the property (Wertschek & Wilson 
2008:282). 
 
In very general terms, a tax shelter includes either a gifting arrangement or the acquisition 
of property, where it is represented to the purchaser or donor that the tax benefits and 
deductions arising from the arrangement or acquisition will equal or exceed the net costs of 
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 During December 2010, Germany‘s largest bank, Deutsche Bank, agreed to pay a fine of US $553 million 
and to admit to criminal wrongdoing, settling a long-running investigation of the IRS into tax shelter fraud 
that prosecutors said generated billions of dollars in ―bogus tax benefits‖ (Protess & Browning 2010).  The 
investigation into Deutsche stemmed from an earlier inquiry into the US branch of accounting firm 
KPMG, which marketed tax shelters.  The inquiry into KPMG resulted in KPMG agreeing to pay US $456 
million in a deferred prosecution agreement in 2005.  Three people associated with KPMG were convicted 
on criminal charges in 2008.  Clearly, the US government views the use of tax shelters in a very serious 
light, as is evidenced by a recently revised version of the ―Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act‖ which was 
introduced in the US Senate on 12 July 2011 (KPMG 2011).  This version of the bill (not yet enacted) 













entering into the arrangement or the property.  Also, a gifting arrangement where the donor 




The CRA (2010) considers and investment in property or the gifting arrangement as a tax 
shelter if: 
 
 it is promoted as offering income tax savings; and 
 it is reasonable to consider, based on statements or representations made or proposed to 
be made, that within the first four years of buying an investment in the property or 
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Submissions and Recommendations 






























Submissions and Recommendations Made in respect of  
the Wording of Section 80M(1)(d) 
 
Chapter 3 analysed the wording of section 80M(1)(d).  The following submissions and 
recommendations were made in Chapter 3, many of which were included in the survey 
conducted among tax partners at a sample of leading audit and legal firms: 
 
 Amend the section 80T definition of ―arrangement‖ to align it with the section 80L 
GAAR definition of ―arrangement‖ so as to widen the scope of the reportable 
arrangements provisions. 
 Based on the recognition criteria of IAS 37, the distinguishing factor between an 
―existing‖ liability and an ―anticipated‖ liability, is the requirement of an entity having 
a ―present obligation‖. 
 The accounting definition and ordinary, grammatical meaning of ―liability‖ imply an 
existing liability, and not an anticipated (or contingent) liability. 
 As regards an ―anticipated liability‖, the accounting meaning differs from the 
interpretation followed by the tax courts, as an ―anticipated liability‖ is not a liability to 
be recognised in the financial statements, but rather a contingent liability to be 
disclosed. 
 The insertion of the word ―any‖ in the section 80T definition of ―tax benefit‖, has the 
cumbersome effect of potentially including an indefinitely large number of ordinary, 
routine transactions. 
 Although arrangements where the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million are excluded 
from the reportable arrangements provisions, some taxpayers could easily exceed this 
cut-off amount with just a few routine transactions. 
 The section 80N(1) list of ―plain-vanilla‖, excluded transactions should be extended to 
also include other routine, operating transactions such as the acquisition of any asset, 
trading stock, consumables and services on credit. 
 The onus of proof rests on the Commissioner of SARS to assume that a tax benefit has 














 To cover scenarios where it is uncertain whether any tax benefit will flow, the words 
―assumed to be derived‖ should be replaced by ―may be derived‖. 
 SARS should specifically address circumstances where not all the parties are given 
insight to the financial models contained in the arrangements. 
 The phrase ―by virtue of‖ in the introductory requirement of section 80M(1) implies 
that a causal link has to be established between the arrangement entered into and the 
tax (or financial) benefit that was obtained;  the ―but-for‖ criterion of factual causation 
could be helpful in indicating a causal link. 
 The section 80T definition of ―promoter‖ should be amended by deleting the word 
―managing‖;  in doing so, a person who played no part in setting up the transaction and 
who merely acted as a facilitator, would not be regarded as a ―promoter‖. 
 As regards the term ―promoter‖, SARS should specifically address circumstances 
where the promoter is not based in South Africa or where there is no promoter. 
 SARS should specifically take the client/attorney legal privilege into consideration to 
adequately address the scenario where the promoter is also a lawyer. 
 Legal professional privilege should also be extended to accountants who act as tax 
advisors. 
 The two methods prescribed by SARS to determine the existence of a tax benefit (viz. 
the comparative method and the control transaction method) could also be used to 
determine whether or not a tax benefit was enhanced. 
 The meaning of the requirement ―undue tax benefit‖ in section 80N(4) is unclear, as 
neither the Act nor SARS provides clarity on how the ―undue‖ amount should be 
determined and by whom.  As such, the term ―undue tax benefit‖ should be replaced 
with the term ―reporting requirement‖. 
 By applying the common law principles of a ―reasonable person‖, one could infer that 
a reasonable person‘s expectation of a pre-tax profit is similar to a person having a 
―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖. 
 Based on the Canadian REOP test, a reasonable expectation is not to be determined by 
the presence of subjective hopes or aspirations, nor of an expectation that the taxpayer 






















Summary of the Case Law Principles 































Summary of the Case Law Principles of the REOP test post-Moldowan 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, the status of the REOP test has shifted continuously over 
the past few decades.  For a period of time after the Moldowan case, Canadian tax 
assessors were zealously disallowing losses, that with the benefit of hindsight, they thought 
resulted from an activity with no REOP (Williamson & Chapman 2010:181).   
 
Due to a large volume of litigation, the REOP principles have evolved over the period 
subsequent to the Moldowan case.  Many of these principles, and the court cases from 
which they have evolved, are found in Bowman J‘s judgment in Shaughnessy v. R (2002) 
and are summarised in the table on the following page.  It is beyond the scope of this study 
to expound on the facts of the cases listed in the table.  Although the court cases are 
alluded to, it is the principles established in those court cases which are considered to be of 
significance. 
 
In the Stewart case, Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ offered several reasons why a REOP 
should not be viewed as a general test for the existence of a business or property as a 
source of income [at paragraphs 36 to 39]: 
 
 The REOP test should be understood as a sufficient condition for a source of income, 
not a necessary requirement for a business or property source; 
 Equating the term ―business‖ with the phrase ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ does 
not accord with the traditional common law definition of business, which is that 
―anything which occupies the time and attention and labour of a man for the purpose of 
profit is a business‖; and 
 The limited use of the phrase ―reasonable expectation of profit‖ in the definition of 
―personal and living expenses‖ in section 248(1) of the ITA does not support its use as 

















Table D.1  Case law principles of the REOP test post-Moldowan 
 REOP principle Court cases 
1 Where there is no personal element the REOP 
test should be applied sparingly. 
Belec v. The Queen (1995) 
Tonn et al. v. The Queen (1996) 
Walls v. The Queen (1996) 
Keeping v. The Queen (2001) 
2 The absence of a personal element does not 
establish conclusively that the REOP test cannot 
be invoked, but such an absence is a factor that 
carries a great deal of weight. 
A.G. of Canada v. Mastri et al. 
(1997) 
3 The court should not, with the benefit of 
hindsight, second-guess the business acumen of 
a taxpayer who embarks upon a business 
venture in good faith. 
Nichol v. The Queen (1993) 
Belec v. The Queen (1995) 
Smith v. The Queen (1996) 
Tonn et al. v. The Queen (1996) 
Kuhlmann et al. v. The Queen 
(1998) 
Keeping v. The Queen (2001) 
4 The fact that a business or property is 100% 
financed is not in itself a reason for applying the 
REOP test. 
Mohammad v. The Queen (1997) 
Saunders v. R. (1998) 
Milewski v. The Queen (1999) 
5 A taxpayer should be allowed a reasonable 
period of time to get the business established.  
Keeping v. The Queen (2001) 
 
6 The period to establish a business will vary with 
the circumstances and may well be lengthy. 
Milewski v. The Queen (1999) 
 
7 The REOP test should not be invoked as a 
substitute for analysis.  Before invoking REOP 
the assessor should examine the expenses to 
determine whether they are reasonable or for 
any other reason not deductible. 
Belec v. The Queen (1995) 
Tonn et al. v. The Queen (1996) 
Walls et al v. The Queen (1996) 
Keeping v. The Queen (2001) 
 
8 For an expectation of profit to be reasonable it 
has to be not ―irrational, absurd and ridiculous‖. 
Kuhlmann et al. v. The Queen 
(1998) 
 
9 The fact that an investment or a business is 
motivated in part by tax considerations is not 
relevant in determining whether there is a 
business, nor is tax motivation in itself relevant 
in determining the deductibility of expenses if a 
business exists. 
Stubard Investments Limited v. 
The Queen (1984) 
10 The REOP is only one factor in the 
determination of whether a ―business‖, and 
therefore a source of income, exists. 
Kaye v. The Queen (1998) 
11 Reasonableness operates both in the context of 
the existence of a business, where the deduction 
of expenses to the extent that they are 
unreasonable, is disallowed, and also at the 
liminal stage of determining whether there is a 
business. 
Kaye v. The Queen (1998) 
12 If what is ostensibly a rental property was 
acquired and held in the course of an adventure 













in the nature of trade and it was reasonable to 
expect a profit on the resale, the rental losses 
should not be disallowed on the basis of REOP. 
13 If the taxpayer has several rental properties, 
some yielding a profit and some a loss, it is 
improper to apply REOP to the losing properties 
and ignore the profitable ones.  The entire 
investment picture should be considered. 
Smith v. The Queen (1996) 
14 When to start a business and when to abandon it 
are business decisions in which neither the 
taxing authorities nor the court should intervene. 
Nichol v. The Queen (1993) 
15 Despite the principle listed in point 14 above, if 
losses go on being incurred year after year for 
an inordinate length of time, sooner or later one 
has to apply what Bowman J calls the ―enough 
is enough‖ principle and decide that what might 
have been a viable business has, with the 
effluxion of time, become hopeless.  
Nonetheless, a businessman‘s judgement to 
maintain a business must be treated with great 
respect. 























































The Questionnaire Used in the Empirical Study 
 
Department of Accounting      Research conducted by: 
Leslie Commerce Building        
Engineering Mall · Upper Campus      Lee-Ann Steenkamp 
OR Private Bag X3 · Rondebosch 7701      Student number: STNLEE004 
Telephone: (021) 650 2269       Tel:  (021) 808 3418 
Fax: (021) 689 7582       Fax:  086 542 8461 




Title of the study:  
 “The development of an accurate, user-friendly model for the 
identification of reportable arrangements” 
 
 Prior to answering the questionnaire, please read the attached ―Background‖ document.  
This should not take more than 30 minutes of your time. 
 This questionnaire consists of Part A, Part B and Part C and contains 30 questions.   
 Please answer all of the questions as accurately as possible.  This should not take more 
than 15 minutes of your time. 
 Your name will not appear on the questionnaire and the answers you give will be treated 
as strictly confidential. Neither the name of your firm nor your name will appear in the 
research findings of the survey.  You can not be identified in person based on the 
answers you give. 
 Your feedback on this tax topic is of immense value, as this research study seeks to 
provide more clarity and certainty in the interpretation of the reportable arrangements 
provisions, especially that of the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ criterion. 
 You will be provided with a summary of the findings on request.  The results of the 
study might also be considered for future research purposes. 
 By completing the questionnaire you are consenting to participate in the study. 
 Please e-mail Lee-Ann Steenkamp at dplessis@sun.ac.za if you have any questions or 














A:  Profile of the respondent  
B:  Terminology in sections 80M to 80T 1 – 12 










PART A:  PROFILE OF RESPONDENT 
 









specify)    
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.                               
 








Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.    
 
How would you rate your knowledge of 
the reportable arrangements provisions 
contained in sections 80M to 80T of the 
Income Tax Act? 
Good Fair Poor 






















PART B:  TERMINOLOGY IN SECTIONS 80M TO 80T 
 
NB:  Please refer to p5-6 of the ―Background‖ document.  Part B of the survey examines 
some of the terminology contained in the reportable arrangements provisions of sections 
80M to 80T.  This terminology is also contained in the model developed in this study.  The 
results of the survey will be used to assist in the interpretation of the terminology to further 
enhance the workability of the model in order to ensure that it is indeed accurate and user-
friendly. 
 
Questions 1 to 3 refer to the term “liability for tax” as contained in the section 80T 
definition of a “tax benefit”.  See p5 of the “Background” document. 
 
Question 1: According to International Accounting Standards (IAS), an ―anticipated‖ 
liability (as interpreted by the tax courts) is not a liability to be recognised in 
the financial statements, but, at most, a contingent liability to be disclosed. 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 2: Based on the recognition criteria of IAS 37, the distinguishing factor between 
an ―existing‖ liability and an ―anticip ted‖ liability, is the requirement of an 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 3: Which one of the following two criteria do you consider to be the most 
appropriate for determining whether a ―liability for tax‖ was avoided, 
postponed or reduced? 
 
Question 3  
The accounting criteria 
of the IASB Framework 
and IAS 37 
The interpretation 
followed by the tax 
courts and SARS 
 
Both (they  
are equally 
appropriate) 






Questions 4 to 7 refer to the exclusions of section 80N.  See p6 of the “Background” 
document. 
 
Question 4: Even though the Minister has excluded arrangements where the tax benefit 
does not exceed R1 million, some taxpayers could easily exceed this cut-off 














Question 4  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 5: If none of the section 80N exclusions are applicable, the term ―any‖ in the 
definition of a ―tax benefit‖ is too wide and results in the cumbersome effect 
of ordinary, routine transactions becoming reportable.  Do you agree with 
this statement? 
 
Question 5  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 6: The list of ―plain-vanilla‖ transactions in section 80N(1) should be extended 
to include other routine, operating transactions which do not give rise to an 
undue tax benefit, such as the acquisition of any asset, trading stock, 
consumables and services on credit.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 6  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 7: The meaning of the requirement ―undue tax benefit‖ in section 80N(4) is 
unclear, as neither the Act nor SARS provides clarity on how the ―undue‖ 
amount should be determined and by whom. Do you agree with this 
statement? 
 
Question 7  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
*** 
Questions 8 to 12 refer to terminology contained in section 80M(1).  See p6 of the 
“Background” document. 
 
Question 8: The introductory requirement of section 80M(1) states, inter alia, that an 
arrangement is reportable if any tax benefit is ―assumed to be derived by any 
participant‖. Who do you consider must assume that a tax benefit is or will be 
derived? 
 
Question 8  The Commissioner of SARS 
Any participant to the 
arrangement 

















Question 9:  Not all parties to a transaction are always given insight to the financial 
model contained in the arrangement and it is therefore possible that a 
participant may not be aware of the assumed tax treatment of the 
arrangement.   Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 9  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
 
Question 10:  To cover situations where it is uncertain whether any tax benefit will flow, a 
more appropriate wording of section 80M(1) would be where the words 
―assumed to be derived‖ are replaced by ―may be derived‖.  Do you agree 
with this statement? 
 
Question 10  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
 
Question 11:  If a person, for example an outside party appointed by a bank to act as a 
facility agent, played no part in setting up the transaction and is merely 
there to ensure that the interests of the parties are adequately catered for, 
there is no reason to include them in the definition of promoter, and as such, 
the word ―managing‖ should be deleted from the section 80T definition of 
―promoter‖.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 11  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
 
Question 12:  Neither the Act nor SARS addresses the scenario where the promoter is also 
a lawyer, and as such, SARS should specifically take the client/attorney 
privilege into consideration for the disclosure obligation of section 80O.  
Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 12  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 




















PART C:  COMPARATIVE MODELS 
 
NB:  Please refer to p7-11 of the ―Background‖ document.  Part C of the survey compares 
the model provided in SARS‘ Draft Guide to Reportable Arrangements with the 
Alternative Model (flowchart) developed in this study.   
 
Questions 13 to 20 refer to the Draft Guide model of SARS.  See p8 of the 
“Background” document.   
 
Question 13:   
 
Text box 2 of the Draft Guide model makes a statement and does not pose a question.  Yet, 
the arrow flowing from text box 2 indicates ―yes‖, despite the fact that no question was 
posed. 
 
A better phrasing of text box 1 would be: ―Has an arrangement been entered into?‖ and 
the second text box must then be deleted.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 13  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 14:   
 
Text box 3 of the Draft Guide model indicates that if the arrangement is listed in section 
80M(2), the arrangement should be disclosed.  The section 80N(4) exclusions (by way of 
the  Government Gazette) excludes any arrangement where the tax benefit is not the main 
or one of the main benefits or where the tax benefit does not exceed R1 million.   
 
Irrespective of which category an arrangement falls into, namely sections 80M(1) or (2), 
the section 80N(4) exclusions prevail and the depiction in text box 3 (the ‗yes‘ arrow) is 
therefore incorrect. 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 15:   
 
Text boxes 5 and 6 are related to text box 4 and refer to the section 80N(4) exclusions 
already mentioned.  If no tax benefit was derived, then the arrangement is not reportable – 
in this case the model at text box 4 is correct.  However, if a tax benefit was derived, the 
arrows flowing from text box 4 to text boxes 5 and 6 both state ―yes‖.   
 
Despite the fact that text boxes 5 and 6 must both be addressed, it is unclear which 
question should be addressed first and the order of the questions is thus potentially 














Question 15  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 16:   
 
The Draft Guide model correctly indicates (at text box 5) that the arrangement is not 
reportable if the tax benefit is not the main or one of the main benefits.  However, if the 
answer is ―yes‖, the arrow flows directly from text box 5 to 7 and does not allow for the R1 
million exclusion in text box 6 to apply.   
 
This treatment is incorrect as the notice in the Government Gazette allows for two 
exceptions:  either the tax benefit is not the main benefit or the tax benefit does not exceed 
R1 million.  Do you agree with this statement? 
 
Question 16  
Totally 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 17:   
 
Text box 5 of the Draft Guide model refers to the ―tax benefits‖.  Although probably just a 
typing error, the plural use of the word ―benefits‖ is incorrect, due to the fact that the 
Government Gazette uses the singular word ―benefit‖and also because ―benefits‖ (plural) 






Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 18:   
 
Text box 8 of the Draft Guide model correctly indicates that if an arrangement is excluded, 
it is not reportable.  However, the question in text box 8 refers to section 80N as a whole, 
but text box 9 again refers to the Gazetted exclusions of section 80N(4).   
 
The Draft Guide model duplicates the question in text box 8 by once again referring to 
section 80N in text box 9;  the wording of text box 8 should therefore be more specific and 






Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
















Question 19:   
 
The ―yes‖ and ―no‖ answers to the last question (in text box 9) of the Draft Guide model 
have been transposed, as the model incorrectly indicates that if the arrangement was 
excluded by the Minister, it must be disclosed as a reportable arrangement.   





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
Question 20:   
 
The Draft Guide model contains numerous anomalies and as such is flawed and 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 




Questions 21 to 25 refer to the Alternative Model developed in this study.  See p9 of 
the “Background” document.   
 
Question 21:   
 
The Alternative Model proposed in this questionnaire presents the questions in a revised 
order (as compared with the Draft Guide model) whereby the first questions to address 
relate to the section 80N exclusions. 
 
The revised order of the Alt rnative Model (whereby the taxpayer first seeks to apply the 
exclusions) will result in less time wasted on addressing unnecessary questions later in the 
model where it is clear from the outset that the arrangement is non-reportable. 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 22:   
 
Questions 4, 5 and 6 of the Alternative Model expound on the Draft Guide model‘s text 
box 8 where reference was only made to section 80N.   
 
Due to the relative complexity of the section 80N exclusions, the Alternative Model 
provides better guidance as it states each exclusion requirement as a separate question. 

















Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 23:   
 
Do you consider the Alternative Model to be more accurate than the Draft Guide model? 
 
Question 23 Yes No Don‘t know 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.    
 
 
Question 24:   
 
Do you consider the Alternative Model to be more helpful than the Draft Guide model? 
 
Question 24 Yes No Don‘t know 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.    
 
Question 25:   
 






Questions 26 to 30 refer to the “reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit” 
requirement of section 80M(1)(d).  See p10-11 of the “Background” document.   
 
Question 26:  Due to the fact that the term ―reasonable expectation‖ in section 80M(1)(d) 
is not defined in the Act and that SARS has not issued any guidance on the 
application of this requirement, the interpretation of what constitutes a 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 27: By applying the common law principles of a ―reasonable person‖, one could 
infer that a reasonable person‘s expectation of a pre-tax profit is similar to 
a person having a ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖. 




Question 25 Yes No Don‘t know 
















Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 28:   
 
Question 7 of the Alternative Model refers to any of the five scenarios of section 80M(1).  
One such scenario is the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement as 
contained in section 80M(1)(d).   
 
By leaving this question for last, the taxpayer might be able to determine earlier on in the 
model that the arrangement is not reportable and could therefore be prevented from 
spending valuable time and money on obtaining costly tax advice to determine whether 





Agree Neutral Disagree 
Totally 
disagree 
Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.      
 
Question 29:   
 
How helpful did you find the ―rental loss‖ criteria identified by the South African courts to 
be in determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of 













Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.     
 
Question 30:   
 
How helpful did you find the extended criteria identified by the Canadian courts to be in 
determining whether the ―reasonable expectation of a pre-tax profit‖ requirement of 













Mark ―X‖ in the appropriate box.     
 
 
***END OF QUESTIONNAIRE*** 
 
Thank you for your time and assistance! 
 
 
 
